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THE MAKING OF A PENNY-A-DOZEN EXPERT 
The problem of career diplomats in the American 
Foreign Service, Eugene H. Dooman had discovered, was that 
no one listened to their expert advice. He had spent 
thirty-three years in the service, from 1912 to 1945 1 almost 
entirely in Japan and had learned this truism from his 
experience, but he found it hard to understand and accept. 
The point was driven home again on a spring day in 1945, 
shortly before he retired. After giving a high level report 
on American Occupation policy for Japan, Dooman overheard 
Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy 1 solicit Under-
secretary of State Dean Acheson's opinion. "I have dis-
covered," Acheson replied, "that these Far Eastern experts 
are a penny a dozen. And you can find some experts which 
[sic] will support any point of view that you care to have. 
I prefer to be guided by those who think along my own lines." 1 
1Eugene H. Dooman, unpublished oral memoirs, pp. 139-
140; United States' Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings, 
Part 3, The Institution of Pacific Relations (Washington, D.C.: 
Governn1ent Printing Office, 1950), p. 723 (hereafter referred 
to as IPR). The anecdote here is a compilation based on accounts 
given in both sources. The oral memoirs (hereafter referred to 
as EHD) are part of a larger collection which Dooman's widow 
recently donated to the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
2 
The disdain expressed by a man of Acheson's caliber under-
scored the breadth and depth of the indifference and 
opposition that Dooman had faced for a good part of three 
decades and which seriously affected his life and career. 
Dooman's career was an enigma·tical series of events, 
and a study of his thirty-three years of government service 
raises several questions. What was an expert? How did 
American Foreign Service Officers gain their expertise? 
Finally, what effect did they have upon American foreign 
policy toward Japan in the period between the passage of 
the Irunigration Act of 1924 to the end of World War II in 
the Pacific. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate 
the nature of these problems by studying Dooman's career. 
This essay is not intended to be a complete biography but 
rather a portrait, a biographical overview, that provides 
some answers to the forementioned questions. 
The idea of experts existed before Dooman entered 
the government, but his early career and training reflected 
a growing illnerican tendency towards recognizing the need for 
them. Spawned in the 1890's, the idea of experts matured 
during the progressive era, from 1900 to 1916, and was 
applied to well educated individuals who also had training 
in a specific skill. Additionally, they had some thought 
of applying their specialization in the pursuit of some 
3 
higher social goal. The progressive era experts had taken 
their image from an 1892 experimental program conducted at 
the University of Wisconsin. The purpose of this "Wisconsin 
idea" was to provide practicaltraining for the reform minded 
person who could, eventually, apply his skills as "an efficient 
practical servant of the state." 2 
In Dooman's case the problem of acquiring diplomatic 
expertise was compounded by the difficulties of becoming an 
area expert since he was expected to know the language, 
history, and culture of the country in which he specialized. 
He was caught in a paradox, as he later described it to 
as socia te;.s: 
The trouble is that they sent people out to 
those countries to become specialists and after 
they had been there long enough to become 
sufficiently knowledgeable of the country they 
said you were too sympathetic to that country. 
During the course of his career Dooman found that this was 
the most widely used argument employed by those who opposed 
him and his advice. The opposition over the years had 
included politicians holding high appointed offices, 
ranking military officers, foreign service officers and 
2Richard Hofstader, Anti-Intellectualism in American 
Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), see Chapter VIII, 0 The 
Rise of the Expert," and pp. 199-201; Robert D. Schulzinger, 
The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, outlook, and 
Style of the United States' Foreign Service Officers, 1908-
~ (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1975), p 24. 
4 
Department of State personnel who represented different 
geographical areas, American journalists, and men whom Dooman 
labeled "opportunists," which to Dooman meant those indi-
viduals who acted in their own best interests, often to the 
detriment of the United States. Many of them had a role in 
the development of American foreign policy during the period 
under study, and, because of personal beliefs and ideals, 
they negated the efforts of Dooman and others who constantly 
sought an amicable solution to the problems of Japanese-
American relations. 3 
Dooman reached professional maturity in the decades 
before 1941. His own evolution as a country expert coincided 
with the growth of the Department of State and the professional-
ization of the foreign service. There was a distinct idea 
of what a diplomat should be and the nature of his role in 
international relations, and in the years between 1900 and 
1924, the Department underwent a metamorphosis. The changes 
were a result of both the direct and indirect efforts of 
private businessmen, government employees, and American 
scholars. 
3rnterview with Mrs. Eugene H. Dooman, February 25, 
1973. The problems of becoming a Japan hand or China hand were 
unique in the Diplomatic Corps. While a good college education 
sufficed for other consular appointments, those destined to 
become Asian experts faced added burdens, most notably over-
coming the language barrier. Lack of proper living quarters, 
and for some years, the lack of a systematic training program 
contributed to the problem. The continuing nature of this is 
explored in I.M. Destler's "Country Expertise and the United 
States Foreign Policymaking: The Case of Japan," Pacific 
Community, Vol. 5,4, July 1974, pp. 546-564. 
5 
The arrival of the twentieth century marked the 
emergence of the United States as an imperialist nation 
playing a larger role in international power politics. 
As American interests overseas expanded with foreign trade 
and territorial acquisitions, there was a need for reorgan-
izing the Department of State and improving the diplomatic 
and consular corps. Pressure for change came initially 
from the business community which argued that America's 
consular service should accommodate America's prime mover -
business. Commercial firms sought to influence appointments 
that would insure the success of their foreign sales and 
inves·tments. To accomplish this, representatives from the 
business world suggested that the "entire diplomatic system" 
should be administered on a "business basis. 114 
A second agent of change in the years following the 
Spanish-American War was the academic community. The pro-
fessors stressed the need for training specialists in the 
art of diplomacy. Academic reformers were concerned about 
the intensification of international rivalries and American 
leadership in the world. Their ideas of reform found support 
among elected and appointed government officials, including 
President Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, 
who believed there was a link between diplomacy and imperialism. 5 
4warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in 
the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 57, 70. 
5schulzinger, pp. 22-35, passim; Ilchman, p. 57. 
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Pressures like those produced results. Slowly the 
Department and the diplomatic and consular corps underwent 
changes, however limited. By 1905, the number of first and 
second secretaries had doubled over the 1895 figure. In 
1894, recognition of the importance of communicating with 
foreigners in their native language had already led to the 
hiring of interpreters in Persia, Korea, and Siam. There 
followed in 1902 the formation of a student interpreter 
corps for service in China, then for Japan. The overseas 
expansion of the United States also led to the creation of 
the first specialized geographical and political office in 
the Department. In March 1907, the Department established 
the Division of Far Eastern Affairs at the urging of Third 
Assistant Secretary of State, F. M. Huntington Wilson who 
served as its director, assisted by William Phillips and 
Percival Heinzleman, who had served in the diplomatic and 
consular services in China. The division functioned on an 
experimental and temporary basis until 1909 when it became 
permanent with the appointment of Ransford Miller of the 
Japan service as its chief. The division was charged with: 
Diplomatic and consular correspondence on matters 
other than those of an administrative character 
in relation to China, Japan, Korea, Siam, Straits 
Settlements, Borneo, East Indies, India, and in 
general the Far East.6 
6Ilchman, pp. 72-73;Conversation with Marlene Mayo, 
August 6, 1976; Register of the Department of State, 1909 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 18. 
7 
The trend towards growth and professionalization 
received additional impetus in 1905 when Roosevelt signed 
an executive order that placed admission to the consular 
service, theoretically, on a merit basis. The order was 
in effect for a short period and had little direct effect, 
but it set a precedent for further efforts. Subsequent 
congressional action did, in fact, produce mild changes 
regarding hiring and provided for the inspection of consulates. 
A second executive order, issued in 1906, further strengthened 
professionalization attempts by establishing a board of 
examiners, and stipulating that entrance into the lowest 
positions of the consular service would be by examination. 
It also provided that promotions in the consular corps would 
be made on a merit basis and it abolished "partisan" appoint-
ments and promotions. This order like its predecessor had 
limited effectiveness because it would terminate with the 
end of Roosevelt's tenure, and, additionally, only candidates 
whose names appeared on an approved list were eligible to 
take the examinations. President William Howard Taft con-
tributed to attempts at professionalization with an executive 
order in 1909 which re-emphasized that appointments should 
be made without consideration of political affiliation and 
which established a thorough examination testing "the 
flexibility of mind that characterized the 'generalist.'" 
It applied, as had the other measures, only to the lower 
echelons in the consular service. It did enhance the career 
• 
8 
attractiveness of the service as salaries were raised and 
the possibilities for promotions were improved. 7 
In 1906, the first appointments to the student 
interpreter corps in Japan were made. Among the first 
appointees were John Caldwell in 1906, Edwin Neville in 
1907, and Joseph W. Ballantine in 1909. All three spent 
the first two years concentrating on language studies after 
which they received appointments as vice consuls and thereby 
established a pattern for future Japan experts. For these 
men and those who followed, the student interpreter corps 
played an important role because it afforded them a means 
of entering into a career otherwise denied because of social 
or economic disadvantages. The corps had been in existence 
in Japan only six years,and it had attracted few candidates 
when in 1912 Dooman journeyed to Washington, D. C. where he 
and an estimated one hundred other applicants competed for 
appointments in examinations based on the 1906 and 1909 
'd 1' 8 gul e lnes. 
Dooman passed the required physical examination and 
then took the general written test which required knowledge 
of eight major areas: modern languages; natural, industrial, 
7Tracy Hollingsworth Lay, The Foreign Service of the 
United States (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1925), pp. 21-22; 
Schulzinger, p. 42; Ilchman, pp. 94-95, 99. 
1906 
EHD, 
8Department of State, Department of State Register, 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Pr1nting Office, 1906); 








and commercial resources, and comnerce of the United States; 
political economy; international, maritime, and commercial 
law; American history, government, and institutions; political 
and commercial geography; arithmetic; and modern history (since 
1850) of Europe, South America, and the Far East. Faced 
with this seemingly herculean task, Dooman harbored some 
misgivings about his chances of success, but he overcame 
his anxieties, took the examination and won an appointment. 
Notification came on March 18, 1912, one week before his 
twenty-first birthday, and shortly thereafter he traveled 
once again to Washington, then on to Japan, his home for 
most of the next three decades. 9 
9Department of State, Register of the Department of 
State, 1908 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 
1908), pp. 141-144, "Sample Examination of the Student Inter-
preter Corps." With the exception of the section on language, 
which required the examinee to translate a paragraph from and 
into either French, Spanish, or German, the remaining sections 
e-ach had several questions, examples of which follow. 11 11Discuss 
the commercial relations of the United States with the Far 
East, mentioning the principal articles of commerce with each 
country"; "Distinguish between a direct and indirect tax, 
giving an example of each"; "Name the essential elements of 
a contract"; "What effects did the discovery of America have 
on Europe in regards to geographical knowledge, commercial 
enterprise, and colonization"; "Name two countries which pro-
duce the largest supply of raw silk. What three countries 
produce the most pig iron?" "Briefly describe the causes and 
results of (a) the war between China and Japan (1894-95), and 
(b) the Russo-Japanese war." The examinee also had to com-
pletely itemize and balance a ledger. EHD, pp. 1-4; l23D72/a, 
Wilbur Carr, Acting Secretary of State to Dooman, 3/18/1912 
(month/day/year), and 123D72/b, Carr to Dooman, 4/17/1912. 
The 123D72 file is a personal record of Dooman which is part 
of Record Group 59, Diplomatic Papers of the United States, 
which are deposited in the National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
Papers in the record group are indicated throughout this paper 
by their file number, author, recipient and title (if available), 
and the date. 
10 
For Dooman it w,as, more accurately, a return to 
Japan. He was born in Osaka on March 24, 1890, the son of 
missionary parents. Both of his parents' families were 
Nestorian Christians living in Urimiah, Iran. His father, 
Isaac M. Dooman, was born in Tiflis, Russia but he and his 
wife, Grace Allchin, grew up in Urimiah, the families' 
ancestoral home. The father had been influenced by a 
Presbyterian Minister in his youth, and after the family 
migrated, first to France then to the United States, the 
elder Dooman entered the General Theological Seminary. After 
the death of his first three children he became an Episcopal 
missionary and was sent to Japan in 1887 where he worked 
seeking converts and training native lay ministers. His 
experience among the Japanese taught him that despite the 
"devil's success ...• " in "sugar coating the sin of sexual 
immorality," which victimized the "entire male population," 
they were "open and trustful ..• with artist.],c tastes."10 
The elder Dooman admired the Japanese and exhibited 
a quality of understanding not frequently associated with 
"culturally bound" missionaries. He acknowledged his belief 
that the Japanese needed salvation, but at the same moment 
he respected their unique national character. An unnamed 
10rsaac M. Dooman, A Missionary's Life in the Land 
of the Gods (Boston: Gorham Press, 1914), pp. 237-238, 243. 
Confusion exists regarding Reverend Dooman's ethnic origins. 
He spoke Turkish and Persian indicating that he was from the 
Middle East. Questions remain as to whether he was Persian, 
Armenian or a Persian-Armenian. Associates of his son, 
including John K. Emmerson have identified him as an Armenian. 
Dooman does not give any indication of his families' ethnic 
origins other than the information cited above which is taken 
from "Isaac and Grace Allchin Dooman: 1857-1931," a paper 
prepared by Eugene Dooman, December 5, 1958. 
11 
American diplomat who had served in·Japan for sometime, yet 
who claimed that he could not "understand the Japanese," 
explained his dilemma to the missionary. Dooman listened, 
then counseled the diplomat to view the Japanese from "a 
point of vantage," and attempt to "observe their better side 
with more prominence." This objectivity had led the missionary 
to a profound affection for the Japanese and Reverend Dooman 
passed these qualities on to his children. The elder Dooman's 
observation that professional diplomats who, by the nature 
of their work, ignored Japan's "ephemeral charms," provided 
an important lesson that his son, Eugene adopted in later 
years. 11 
The Dooman family moved several times while residing 
in Japan, but by age five, Dooman had entered a French teaching 
brothers,' institution, L'ecole de l'etoil du Matin, in Tokyo. 
In 1903, at age thirteen, Dooman left Japan traveling to the 
United States by himself and entered a military academy in 
Ohio. The following year his family also returned, settling 
in New York where Dooman completed high ~chool in 1907. That 
fall he entered Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut where 
11rbid., pp. 19-20. Isaac Dooman's awareness of Asian 
opposition to Western imperialism is also evident in his book. 
When asked if there was anything to fear "from the aggressive-
ness of the Yellow races," he replied that while the Asians 
would never invade Europe, they would want to repulse "the 
advancement of European nations in Asia. • " 
12 
he studied for two years. Then, after a year of "seeking 
certain avenues of intellectual development," including 
one semester at the University of Pennsylvania and one at 
Columbia University, he returned to Trinity. A schedule 
weighted in philosophy and the classics led to an interest 
in the past and Dooman decided on a career in archaeology. 
News of an impending war in the Middle East dashed his 
archaeological aspirations, and a newspaper advertisement 
for the student interpreter examination provided an interesting 
alternative. His background and education had influenced 
young Dooman, and with a reformer's spirit, he went out in 
1912 as a student interpreter having made up his mind that 
his "career in the service should aim toward contributing 
something toward averting war between the United States 
and Japan." 12 
During his initial years in the service, Dooman's 
primary task was to learn the Japanese language. He and the 
other student interpreters studied with their private 
language tutors (Japanese nationals), while performing a 
minimum amount of official work. The labors of his superiors, 
Dooman recalled, focused on organizational problems related to 
a "consortium ... of various financial groups .••. 11 and 
"keeping Washington informed of the enactment of laws, and 
in general the trends in political affairs which were of no 
12EHD, pp. 1-4; Dooman to Herbert Feis,7/8/l949~ 
Dooman papers. A discrepancy in dates exists. The father states 
that he served in Japan for twenty-five years (1887-1912). The 
son wrote in his 1958 paper that his father retired in 1922. In 
his 1962 interview, however, he states that the family settled 
in New York in 1907 (p. 1). 
13 
great moment." This lack of "urgent pressing problems ... 
meant work of a "leisurely character." Given an inordinate 
amount of free time, Dooman took the opportunity to renew 
acquaintances with Japanese friends whom he remembered from 
the French school that he attended fourteen years earlier. 
They played tennis, frequented teahouses, and generally 
enjoyed themselves. "We weren't," as Dooman described it, 
"thinking of very serious ·things at that time ." 13 
In spite of his own observation, Dooman was an 
industrious and dedicated worker who took full advantage of 
his time and that of his private tutor. During his first 
two years, he was tested at quarterly intervals, and at the 
end of that period he took a comprehensive examination. He 
also had to demonstrate a cognizance of "the history, geo-
graphy, commerce, and institutions .•. and an elementary 
knowledge ••• of the laws .•.• " of Japan. Having passed 
this milestone in 1914, Dooman received a promotion and a 
l3EHD, pp. 4-7, 56-57. Dooman 1 s description of the 
leisurely nature of his early assignment is corroborated by 
Joseph W. Ballantine, who had gone out to Japan two years 
before Dooman. Ballantine described a typical day as a 
student: from six to eight, study with a tutor; breakfast 
at eight; study until one; lunch at one, then tennis or 
" 
riding in the afternoon. "The Reminiscences of Joseph W. 
Ballantine," contained in the Oral History Research Office, 
Columbia University, New York, 1961, p. 114. No evidence 
exists which reveals Dooman's reaction to the Japanese "Twenty-
One Demands 11 issued to China in 1915, suggesting that he did 
not pay attention to "urgent and pressing problems of the 
moment." For procedures regarding the testing of student 
interpreters see the Department of State Register for 1912, 
pp. 138-144. 
14 
salary increase from one thousand to fifteen hundred dollars 
a year. Two years later he took his final examination, a 
test similar to the first but more detailed and the language 
section required him to read the Chinese classics in Japanese. 
That feat, Dooman reminisced, necessitated an understanding 
of over six thousand characters. But at this point, the 
time spent with his Japanese friends on the tennis courts, 
in tea houses, and in study began paying dividends. Dooman's 
performance on his exam warranted a telegram from his superior, 
Ambassador George W. Guthrie, to the Secretary of State, 
emphasizing Dooman's score of 92, which Guthrie felt deserved 
"particular commendation." 14 
In the years between 1912 and his appointment as 
assistant Japanese secretary at the Tokyo embassy in 1921, 
Dooman had the usual consular posts in Yokohama, Kobe, and 
Taihoku (Taiwan). From 1914 to 1917, he moved between Kobe 
and Yokohama, first as a student interpreter and then as a 
consul. During those years, he found himself concerned 
primarily with shipping and commercial work which he con-
sidered "very dull." Typically, as a consul he also pro-
cessed visas and passport applications. After a promotion 
to vice consul in charge at Kobe, he was&ill confronted 
with characteristic consular chores that included investigating 
14EHD, p. 3; l23D72/9, Charles J. Ansell to George 
w. Guthrie, 12/20/1916; 123072/7, Guthrie to Secretary of 
State, 12/28/1916. 
15 
and reporting cholera cases and handling the affairs of 
German citizens, both alive and deceased. The latter chore 
was a result of the first world war and because Germany and 
Japan were at war, German citizens in Japan were forced to 
carry on their communications via the United States which 
remained neutral until April 1917. 15 
In the early years of his career Dooman had faced 
problems of a personal nature as well. In June, 1918, 
Irving Herskovits, president of the Russo-Asiatic Fur 
Company, wrote a letter to the Secretary of State in which 
he linked Dooman to an unscrupulous fur trader, S. J. Kanter, 
who had swindled the fur company out of nearly thirty 
thousand dollars. Although he threatened to sue Dooman 
in.Japanese court, Herskovits failed to make any specific 
charges. Eight weeks later, a telegram from the consul 
general at.Kobe to the Secretary of State reported that "no 
indication or slightest suspicion of any connection between 
consul Zooman [sic] and Kanter or firms .••• " existed. 16 
Besides personal attacks on his character, the con-
sular service officer in Asia during this period faced other 
15EHD, pp. 8-9; 125.5215/4, Dooman to Secretary of 
State, 7/24/1916; 158.941/46, Dooman to Secretary of State, 
8/20/1916; 394.623/4, Dooman to Secretary of State, 9/8/1916; 
394.63/26, Dooman to Secretary of State, 5/31/1916. 
16
123D72/16, Letter, Irving Herskovits, to Secretary 




and more common problems. An associate of Dooman's who.was 
serving in Kobe complained to higher officials that the 
salary of a junior officer fell short of providing a com-
fortable life style and contributed to a sense offueling 
inferior. Erle R. Dickover, who was appointed as a student 
interpreter in 1914, complained that his "messmates," while 
eight to ten years younger than himself, and employed at 
the lowest level of employment in their private business firms, 
made substantially more than his one one thousand dollars 
a year. A similar complaint which Dooman filed, citing the 
high cost of living and lack of proper quarters, reinforced 
Dickover's statements. Coupled with the poor living con-
ditions was a loss of dignity that came from performing duties 
that Dooman considered clerk-like and unimportant. This 
situation prompted him to request a transfer in 1919 based 
on his feeling that he '.'could be of greater service in a 
capacity in which knowledge of this [Japanese] language would 
b f 
. . u'l~7 e o ass~stance. 
In September, 1920, Dooman again sought a change, 
this time a major one. Dooman asked that he be transferred 
to France "or some other country in Western Europe," citing a 
popular argument that officers who were detailed in Japan 
17123D562/29, Dickover to Secretary of State, 10/12/ 
1918; 123D72/20, Dooman to Secretary of State, 2/13/1919 .. 
/ 
17 
for long periods should be transferred to Europe to broaden 
their experiences. Dooman pointed out that he had "been 
stationed in Japan for more than eight years, for more than 
five years in Kobe, 11 and consequently was 11 keenly desirous 
of a change."· He was so interested that he offered to defray 
the cost of his traveling expenses. His boss, Consul General 
George H. Skidmore, did not approve the request because of 
the understaffed conditions of the various consulates in 
Japan. 18 
As fate would have it, Dooman did receive a transfer, 
the cause of which was not his request necessarily, but 
rather an apparently common occupational hazard, malaria. 
The eonsul at Taihoku (present day Taipei) , Taiwan, Henry 
B. Hitchcock had asked for an extended leave because of 
his wife's frail health. Hitchcock pleaded that her con-
dition made her more susceptible to malaria, the disease 
"for which Formosa is notorious." Dooman soon received his 
order detailing him to the post. Ironically, Dooman had 
submitted a report about an outbreak of bubonic plague in 
Yokkaichi that went forward on October 16, three days after 
his arrival in Taihoku. 19 
18123072/35, Dooman to Secretary of State, 9/10/1920. 
19123H631/39, Hitchcock to Secretary of State, 10/11/ 
1920; 158.941/46, Dooman to Secretary of State, 10/16/1920. 
18 
Taihoku must have been the scourage of foreign service 
officers stationed in East Asia. Malaria aside, few diversions 
existed on the island in 1920. A report that Dooman filed 
in compliance with a departmental request on "Aeronautics 
in Formosa," revealed that the island had no rules or regula-
tions governing aircraft operation, nor for that matter were 
there officers who could enforce them if such rules had 
existed. There were no routes in, or out, and no airfields 
leading Dooman to estimate thatthe island's state was such 
that "it is doubtful whether civilian and conunercial ~riation 
will·be developed in Formosa for many years to come. 11 These 
unpleasantries were compounded by typical consular duties 
such as: reporting "export bounties" paid by the Taiwanese 
government; requests for funds necessary to pay salary raises 
for consulate staff members; reports on the peanut industry 
of the island; rules governing the manufacture and sale of 
tea; similar regulations regarding camphor production; and the 
"Annual January Census" report. The only break in his monotonous 
routine took the form o£ another scandal which occurred shortly 
f h . . 1 20 a ter ~s arr~va • 
20123D72/36b, Dooman to Secretary of State, 10/13/1920, 
800796/73, Dooman to foreign trade adviser, 11/8/1920; 611.008/ 
262, Dooman to foreign trade adviser, 10/26/1920; 125.9253/37, 
Dooman to Secretary of State, 11/3/1920; 125.9253/106, Dooman 
to Secretary of State, 3/4/1921; 165.213, Dooman to Secretary 
of State, 11/10/1920; 894.61332/1, Dooman to Secretary of State, 
11/17/1921; 611.9499/7, and 611.9499/8, Dooman to Secretary of 
State, 2/7/1921 and 2/18/1921; 894.5011/8, Dooman to Secretary 
of State, 1/28/1921. 
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Prior to his departure, Hitchcock had received word 
that a Japanese national had approached several of the con-
sulate's Japanese employees explaining that he wished to 
speak with the Consul about possible sale of several important 
military maps that the visitor possessed. After listening 
at some length to the stranger's comments, and in turn being 
subjected to intense questioning, the consul dismissed the 
man on the assumption that Japanese military officials may 
have been attempting to test Hitchcock's integrity. His 
suspicions aroused, Hitchcock warned Dooman of the incident. 
In less than a month after Dooman's arrival, the Japanese 
returned to the consulate where Dooman cordially invited him 
in. After examining what apparently were strategic military 
maps of forts at Keelung and the Pescadores, Dooman excused 
himself, asking his guest to finish the Japanese tea which 
the ·Consul had prepared. Dooman then contacted the police 
who stationed themselves outside the.entrance to the con-
sulate grounds and waited until Dooman ushered the thief 
out. For his part, Dooman gained personal commendations 
from the governor general and several other Japanese officers 
of rank, but the first newspaper accounts in the Taiwan Shinbun 
implicated Dooman as an accessory. Subsequent reports, 
however, cleared him, noting that Dooman spoke "in fluent 
Japanese" when he discussed the case, and a final editorial 
commented that "We Japanese must be grateful for the kindness 
20 
of the consul . who was able to use this opportunity 
to show in deed the good will the United States have towards 
Japan. " 21 
In April 1921, Doornan returned to Kobe for three 
months. In July, he was transferred to the embassy in 
Tokyo as the assistant Japanese secretary. During the next 
decade, Doornan found himself increasingly involved in work 
of a more interesting and serious nature. At the same time 
22 
his personal life would undergo a change. 
By 1921, a major effort was taking shape among a 
group determined to change the diplomatic and consular 
services. The first world war and its aftermath had pro-
vided some impetus for change as it placed a strain on 
diplomats and consuls who found themselves overloaded with 
the task of protecting American citizens in belligerent 
countries and with the upsurge of visa applications filed 
by refugees fleeing war torn Europe. The war also left the 
United States in a position of economic predominance which 
produced another clamor from the business community for 
reorganization of the foreign service. But it was a group 
of diplomats and consular officers who worked hard between 
21811.20294/28, Dooman to Secretary of State (copy 
to the embassy in Tokyo), 11/17/1920. Dooman had enclosed 
a translation of the last newspaper article which had 
appeared in the November 15 issue of the Taiwan Shinbun. 
22 123D72/45 Edward Bell to Secretary of State, 
6/30/1921. 
21 
1919 and 1923 at convincing their Washington superiors and 
Congress that diplomacy needed highly trained men. 2 3 
Among the most active leaders of the group were 
Wilbur J. Carr, Joseph C. Grew, and William Phillips. Carr 
represented the interests of the consular service,and he 
favored a fusion of the two branches. He argued that a 
diplomat should begin his career as a consul and could 
thereby benefit from the "business side of diplomacy" so 
necessary for defending America's interests which were 
largely economic. In 1919 he prepared a paper entitled, 
"Reasons Why the State Department Should be Reorganized," 
and it was he who urged Department officials to testify at 
the Congressional hearings on reorganization.24 
Grew represented the diplomatic point of view regard-
ing reorganization, although he was more interested in pro-
fessionalizing the diplomatic corps. Grew was a career 
diplomat whose first appointment was in 1904. He recognized 
over the years a need for experienced individuals with skills 
in the art of negotiation. The impermanent nature of 
presidential nominees filling the highest diplomatic positions 
precluded the development of a qualified foreign service 
23schulzinger, pp. 47, 67-68. 
24 rbid., pp. 58-59. Others in the group included 
Lewis Einstein, Leland Harrison, High Gibson, Hugh Wilson, 
and Charles Evans Hughes. 
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which he considered absolutely necessary for handling American 
foreign relations. But he and the other diplomats did not 
agree that amalgamation of the two branches was the best 
means for achieving his goal of an established foreign 
. 25 
serv~ce. 
The problem of cooperation fell on the shoulders of 
William Phillips, who as the Undersecretary of State and 
the senior career diplomat in the Department, worked with 
Carr and Tracy Hollingsworth Lay of the consular corps in 
preparing a reorganization plan to submit to the Congress. 
Together they worked on a previous bill and Representative 
John Jacob Rogers reintroduced it into Congress in 1924. 
Its passage made the Rogers Act of 1924 the most significant 
step taken in the direction of professionalization. The 
union of the two branches took place, with lateral transfers 
making it possible, theoretically, for consuls to achieve 
ministerial positions. It was now properly called the 
Foreign Service, and student interpreters were subsequently 
called foreign language officers. Salary scales were also 
adjusted, and in general, career opportunities enhanced. 
The act satisfied all concerned that the Department had 
25rbid., p. 75; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American 
Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United 
States' Diplomatic Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1966), pp. 95-96. 
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moved to eliminate a majority of the problems which pre-
viously confronted the two branches and had at the same 
time broadened the base of recruitment. 26 
Those concerned knew the qualities that they were 
interested in. In a 1921 address to an American audience, 
France's renown ambassador to the United States, J. J. 
Jusserand had contributed something to the idea of the 
necessary characteristics of a modern diplomat. A nation's 
representative in a foreign state had to know, Jusserand 
stated, first his own country, then he "must study the 
country where he is . . . see people of all ranks . • • I 
[and] understand the trends of opinion and discover the 
various forces at play there." "No invention, no telephone, 
no aeroplane, no wireless will," he stressed, "ever replace 
the knowledge of a country and the understanding of a 
people's disposition." Seven years later, Charles Evans 
Hughes elaborated on this idea of the changing role of 
envoys: 
The new diplomacy requires not the divining of 
the intent of monarchs, the mere discovery and 
thwarting of intrigues, but the understanding 
of peoples. There must be intimate acquaintance 
with their interests, their opinion. There must 
be ability to sift; to seize upon what is significant 
in the mass of news, of rumours, of assertion, of 
26 rbid., 74-75; Ilchman, pp. 143-146. The Moses-Linthicum 
Act of 1931 settled the remaining problems and guaranteed a 
true fusion of the two branches. Schulzinger, p. 122. 
debate; to know the character and particular aims 
of men who control the action of governments. For 
this, alertness and general adaptability will not 
suffice. One must have the equipment of the 
student of history and politics, and the democratic 
sympathies and cultural training which enable him 
to enter into the thoughts of peoples. While he 
seeks to do this, he cannot escape giving an 
impression of the life of his own country. In 
no slight measure, by his own character and 
development2 he determines the reputation of his government. 7 
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Dooman represented the new breed of diplomatic pro-
fessionals. His background, education, and his particular 
skill qualified him as an expert. He was well educated 
and his practical training was in the form of a tool which 
few Americans possessed: the ability to understand and com-
municate in the Japanese language. In the decade following 
his assignment to the embassy in Tokyo, Dooman would have an 
opportunity to apply himself in earnest in his pursuit of 
bettering Japanese-American relations. 
27Jusserand, The School for Ambassadors and Other 
Essays (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1925), pp. 37, 59. 
Jusserand first gave his address at a meeting of the American 
Historical Society, in 1921 and later revised it for publica-
tion as 11 The School for Ambassadors," (footnote, page 4). 
Lay, The Foreign Service, from the "Foreward'by Charles Evans 
Hughes, p. ix. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DECISIVE DECADE 
In July, 1921 Dooman began a decade of service in 
the Tokyo embassy, a vantage point from which he observed 
rising tensions between the United States and Japan. At 
the same time his own life underwent several changes as 
he benefited from the passage of the Rogers Act in 1924. 
His marriage the following year to Dorothy Calvert Wilcox, 
whom he had met during her travels in Asia, suggests that 
he sensed a feeling of job security and a good future. He 
received rapid promotions to Class VI in July of 1924 and 
to Class v in August. Within two years he was again pro-
rooted, this time to Second Secretary, attaining the rank of 
Class IV in 1928 and Class III in 1930. Then, after ten years 
of waiting:, he received orders for Europe. He was assigned 
to London in 1931, as First Secretary of the embassy. He 
had ~nessed the decline in Japanese~American relations 
during the 1920's and had been in London only a short time 
when news came of a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops 
in Mukden. He was subsequently ordered to Paris to act as 
special adviser to Ambassador Charles G. Dawes, the American 
representative to the special meetings called by the Council 
of the League of Nations to investigate the beginnings of the 
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Manchurian Incident. To Dooman those meetings symbolized 
the end of an important period in his life and career. It 
had been an ominous ten years. 
Looking back at the period some forty years later, 
while engaged in interviews for an oral history project for 
Columbia University, Dooman recalled a pattern of events 
that he felt had seriously affected Japanese-American rela-
tions in the decades before Pearl Harbor. Years of previous 
confrontations, always ending in losses to western powers, 
nurtured, Dooman believed, Japanese antipathy towards western 
powers including the United States. He traced Japan's dis-
enchantment with western diplomacy back to the 1896 Triple 
Intervention. Japan's victory in the first Sino-Japanese war 
had quickly drawn the attention of the imperialist nations 
with an interest in China. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which 
ended the war, had not been signed, when Russia and Germany, 
knowing of Japan's plans to acquire the Liaotung peninsula, 
made overtures to Great Britain and France seeking a united 
front of opposition. Great Britain declined, happy that 
Russia had another concern, thus relieving some of the 
pressures already in existence between those two European 
powers. France and Germany, hoping to maintain their security 
in the Far East, sided with Russia, and representatives from 
the three nations met with Japanese leaders and "advised" 
them to relinquish their claim. This confrontation resulted 
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in a Japanese compromise that failed to satisfy the European 
powers who now forced Japan's hand. Asserting to the public 
that Japan had attained its original goals, the government 
returned the Liaotung territory as the powers demanded. A 
second treaty, appropriately revised, followed, avoiding 
national humiliation. 1 
That show of power, Dooman believed, had a lasting 
impact on the Japanese. He described the incident as "an 
episode which the Japanese have never forgotten . . " and, 
he continued, "I have heard a great nnnber of them say that 
never again would Japan give up, surrender under pressure, 
any of the rights that it had acquired in China." Although 
the United States had not played a role in that clash, Dooman 
maintained that it had a lasting effect on Japanese-American 
relations. 2 
1Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York: The 
Ronald Press Company, 1955), pp. 209-210; William L. Langer, 
The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890-1902 (2nd ed. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), pp. 177-189 passim; It is interesting 
to note that this chapter in the second edition of Langer's 
work is unchanged following· page for page the original published 
in 1936. Frank W. Ilke', "The Triple Intervention: Japan's 
Lesson in the Diplomacy of Imperialism," Monumenta Nipponica, 
XXII, nos. 1 & 2, 1967. Ikle challenges Langer's contention 
that the Russians led in the intervention. He contends that 
the responsibility rested with the Germans who sent an early 
warning to Japan (although it was not delivered to the Prime 
Minister) on March 6, 1895. This German willingness to co-
operate, Ikl~ explains, was the key to the intervention. 
2EHD, p. 14; Ikl~ supports Dooman on this point. "The 
basic lesson had been that might makes right, and that national 
survival and salvation could only be obtained through military 
strength and aggressive nationalism. 
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In the subsequent decades the United States and 
Japan gradually emerged as Pacific powers, and a change 
in diplomacy slowly took effect. It came in part from 
the agreements reached at the Washington Conference of 
1921-1922. The American government called the conference 
primarily as a result of growing concern over Japan's 
"process of aggrandizement;" a process that included Japan's 
acquisition of the Liaotung peninsula from Russia in 1905, 
annexation of Korea in 1910, and an ever increasing number 
of demands on the Chinese. Spurred on by Wilsonian idealism, 
and the horrors of World War I, American government officials 
hoped to accomplish more than a restoration of the inter-
national order which they felt Japan threatened; they planned 
the demise of worldwide imperialist diplomacy. With these 
goals in mind the Department of State began efforts to stymie 
the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; an alliance which 
they believed served Japan's imperialist ventures and 
ensured British recognition of Japan's spheres of influence. 3 
The United States' emergence as a leader in Asian 
diplrnnatic maneuverings bore bitter fruit. Although Japan 
accepted the new spirit of the Washington Conference and 
peaceful economic expansion, Dooman raised the possibility 
that American insistence on the abrogation of the Anglo-British 
3Akita Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a 
New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 14-15. 
j 
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alliance and its demands at the Washington Conference 
adversely affected the good relations which had existed, 
and subsequently led to the Pacific war. 4 Despite their 
disillusionment, Japanese representatives entered into 
agreements concerning Pacific fortifications, naval arms 
limitations, and new guidelines governing actions of foreign 
powers in China. 
The new guidelines of conduct were outlined in the 
Nine Power Treaty. It proscribed unilateral actions by the 
foreigners in dealing with the Chinese, required signatories 
to respect China's territorial integrity, forbade foreign 
intrusion in Chinese internal affairs, and called for equal 
economic opportunity for all concerned. Implementation of 
these policies necessitated cooperation of all the powers 
party to the treaty including China. With some misgivings 
about the intent of the changing of the rules by the western 
powers, the Japanese moved to end their expansionist policies 
and abide by the new concept of international agreements. 5 
France failed to ratify the treaty until mid-1925 and in 
the interlude, the United States' Congress approved legisla-
tion that precluded Japanese immigration into the country. 
4 EHD, pp. 14-15. 
5rriye, pp. 18-19; Borton, pp. 303-304; Iriye, "The 
Failure of Economic Expansionism: 1918-1931," in Bernard S. 
Silberman and H. D. Harootunian, eds. Japan in Crisis: Essays 
on Taisho Democracy (Princeton: Princeton Universlty Press, 








That move was part of a larger outbreak of xenophobia 
which occurred after World War I. The anti-foreign campaign 
touched all sectors of the United States, focusing on the 
particular group most evident in the area. In Illinois the 
Italians received the brunt of the attacks. In Georgia it 
was an anti-Catholic movement, and in the mid-west the Jews 
fell prey to propaganda financed by Henry Ford. Anti-Japanese 
hysteria struck on the west coast, then spread east and 
finally into Washington, D. C. by 1923. 6 
It was in this atmosphere that two congressmen intra-
duced into the House of Representatives a bill aimed at 
preventing further Japanese immigration. Although unsuccessful 
in their initial attempt in December of 1923, the two men 
reentered their proposed act early the following year and 
with the support of Southern and Mid-Western sympathizers 
pushed the bill through in April. Similar action typified 
Senate reaction after some early opposition. Opponents of 
the legislation had the support of Secretary of State Hughes, 
who opposed it on legal and moral grounds. He argued that it 
would cause strong Japanese resentment thereby undermining the 
progress made at the Washington Conference. 
6Rodman W. Paul, The Abrogation of the Gentlemen's 
Agreement (Cambridge, Mass.: The Society, 1936), pp. 14-18, 
34-37; John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American 
Nativism, 1860-1925 {New York: Atheneum, 1964), pp. 264-265; 
Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1948), pp. 170-172. 
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In an eleventh-hour attempt at preventing passage 
Hughes met with the Japanese Ambassador Hanihara Masanao. 
Hughes suggested and Hanihara prepared a letter protesting the 
discrimanatory nature of the proposed legislation, which 
the Secretary then forwarded to the proper Congressional 
committees. Hughes• tactic backfired as proponents of the 
bill, led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, seized on Hanihara•s 
allegation that enactment would produce "grave consequences.•• 7 
The embassy closely followed, as did the Japanese 
press, Congressional action on the bill. The embassy observed 
in April that "a resentful tone'' had surfaced in various 
articles. When it appeared that both houses would accept 
the legislation, it became the major news item in Japan, 
taking precedence over a bitter political campaign which 
was being waged at the same time. Eventually, the eniliassy 
produced, on a daily basis, telegrams detailing the deep 
seated bitterness that the Japanese felt. Shortly after 
congress passed the bill, on April 24, Ambassador Cyrus E. 
Woods cabled the Secretary of State: 
It is now perfectly clear to me that unless some 
decisive action is taken which will correct the 
impression created in Japan by the recent passage 
. . . the good work accomplished by the Washington 
Conference, insofar as Japan is concerned, can be 
regarded as lost, together with the wonderful 
opportunities for businesses which have grown up 
recently in Japan. Unless a remedy is found there 
7rbid. I pp. 57, 78. 
will remain a deep seated resentment against our 
government and against our people which cannot be 
overcome in many years.B 
32 
In Tokyo, Dooman then Assistant Japanese Secretary, 
had watched the American lawmakers build their wall, then he 
experienced Japanese reactions voiced in newspaper editorials 
and at demonstrations near the embassy and the chancery. 
"There was no violence," he emphasized, "but there was no 
doubt that the Japanese were hurt right down to the bone." 
It was not until eight years later, in 1932, that he dis-
covered evidence that raised some question about Hughes' 
sincerity or, at least cast some shadow of doubt on the 
Secretary•s wisdom. In 1932, Dooman had returned to the 
Department on temporary assignment on the Japan desk. While 
removing materials from a desk that had been occupied by 
Ransford Miller, Dooman discovered a series of documents that the 
Division had accumulated relating to the debate over the 
Exclusion Act. Among these documents appeared a draft letter 
that Hanihara had prepared and submitted for prior approval 
to Hughes and John V. A. MacMurray, head of the Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs. Piecing together the chronology of 
events, Dooman found that Hughes had taken the initiative 
8711.945.1045, Woods to Secretary of State, 4/15/1924; 
7ll..495/1050, Woods to Secretary of State, 4/17/1924; 711945/ 
1052, Woods to Secretary of State, 4/19/1924; 711495/1123, 
Woods to Secretary of State, 5/31/1924. 
33 
in suggesting that Hanihara prepare a note setting forth 
the Japanese point of view. A speech previously given by 
Baron Sakatani Yoshiro in Japan's House of Peers denouncing 
the proposed legislation had obviously impressed the Ambassador, 
Sakatani had used the term "grave consequences" in reference 
to Japan's possible cessation of cooperation in China, taking 
care to make equally explicit that he harbored no thoughts 
of war when he used the phrase. Apparently, with that thought 
in mind, Hanihara incorporated the fateful words in his draft 
to Hughes and MacMurray. Hughes read it, and pausing momentarily 
when he reached the term, commented that it was an "unfortunate 
phrase," but neither he nor MacMurray raised any further 
objections. Ambassador Hanihara then sent the definitive 
letter to Hughes, who forwarded it to "the interested com-
mittees of the House and Senate." Undoubtedly, MacMurray, 
who read the diplomatic reports from Tokyo, and reported to 
Hughes, knew of Sakatani's speech and its true meaning. Lodge 
seized Hanihara's choice of words and exploited congressional 
ignorance of its intended meaning. Using inflammatory articles 
for support, Lodge assured his colleagues that Japan had 
threatened the United States and in reaction, they passed 
the bill. 9 
9Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, Vol. II (New 
York: Coluniliia University Press, 1963), pp. 513-514; Paul, 
p. 78. Dooman implies that Miller was at the desk in 1924. 
This is an error as Miller was in Chosen (Korea) . He was at 
the desk in 1932, and as Dooman points out, Dooman was his 
replacement at that time. EHD, p. 18; see the Department of 
State Register for 1924, p. 27, and for 1932, p. 7. 
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Several congressmen and others interested in the bill 
suggested that the tone and phraseology of the letter sounded 
fru~iliar, so familiar in fact, that many believed that Hughes 
had contributed heavily to the final version of the note. 
Hughes and MacMurray vigorously denied any complicity. The 
draft that Dooman discovered, however, had changes and correc-
tions in the handwriting of both men. Aware of the "touchy 
nature" of his discovery, Dooman removed the documents in 
1932 and burned them. 10 
Ambassador Hanihara found himself in an awkward 
position in 1924. Any attempts at explanation that would 
uncover the American role in preparation of the letter would 
have been embarrassing. Thus, he never spoke out in his own 
defense nor attempted to explain the misunderstanding. Neither 
did he, or Hughes, make public the fact that the Secretary 
had approved Hanihara's letter and that it did not have the 
connotations which others attached to it. Dooman believed 
that passage of the bill did irreparable damage to Japanese-
American relations. Despite "the stupidity" of the act, he 
recognized it as a formal act of his government and refused 
to discuss it outside of official channels. 11 
Although he reserved comment, Dooman realized the 
serious implications of the act. In later years he called 
10 Paul, p. 68, Pusey, pp. 514-515; EHD, 17-22. 
11EHD, p. 22. Dooman explained that "This was a 
formal act of the United States and it was not a matter that 
you could discuss. " 
---------------------------
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the congressional action "unfair and iniquitous," and he knew 
that the anti-American feelings generated by the bill made it 
a pivotal point in Japanese-American relations. He paraphrased 
a statement by Edmund Burke, to sum up his feelings as to 
whether or not the "exclusion act" had, in part, led to 
Japan's decision for war in 1941: 
It is impossible in these political inquiries to 
find any proportion between the apparent forces 
of any moral cause we may assign and their known 
operation. We are therefore obliged to deliver 
up that operation to mere chance or more piously or 
more rationally - to the occasional interposition 
and irresistible hand of the Grand Deposer.l2 
He was certain that serious inroads had been made into 
relations between the two nations by events growing out of 
agreements contained in the Nine-Power Treaty and the failure 
of the United States to honor its commitments. 
Dooman believed France's ratification of the treaty 
in 1925 coincided with an intensification of the Chinese 
nationalist movement; this, Dooman maintained, killed the 
Washington system in childbirth. During the decade of the 
twenties, the Kuomintang (KMT) nationalist forces struggled 
for power against warlord armies in the north and west of 
China and with the ever growing force of Chinese communists. 
As the warlords became less of a factor, communist and KMT 
leaders struggled to win a mantle of legitimacy; the right 
12rbid., 17, 19. 
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to head the Chinese nationalist movement. In their efforts 
to accomplish this, both groups began focusing their attentions 
on a common enemy, western imperialist nations. 13 
1925 also marked a momentous shift in American 
attitudes regarding international agreements affecting China. 
Chinese officials who had exploited the events surrounding 
the May 30 incident, demanded concessions from foreign powers, 
particularly in the area of judicial and tariff autonomy. A 
special tariff conference for this purpose had been scheduled 
for later in the year. In the United States, a new Secretary 
of State, Frank B. Kellogg, received the requests from the 
Chinese and wasted little time in establishing an official 
attitude of American sympathy for China. Unlike his pre-
decessor, he lacked an interest in maintaining multilateral 
relations in East Asia. Dooman described the pro-China 
sympathies Kellogg demonstrated at this point as "misplaced 
American benevolence" which simply encouraged the Chinese 
towards radical action that evolved into "a veritable orgy 
of violating foreign rights and interests .. nl4 
In the spring of 1926, the Chinese government in 
Peking challenged a western power in a move that Dooman 
described as a "piece of diplomatic banditry," but which 
the United States supported. As a signal that it intended 
13rbid., 23-24, 27. 
14 rriye, 63-65; EHD, 25-27. 
-------------~~---
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to eliminate unequal treaties, the warlord supported adminis-
tration informed the Belgian government of their intent to 
abrogate an 1865 treaty between the two nations. Belgian 
authorities denied that the Chinese could demand, according 
to the treaty, such a change. Belgium took its case to the 
Court of International Justice and then turned to the other 
signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty for assistance. Kellogg 
announced in September that he saw no reason to support them. 
Belgian resistance collapsed and the Chinese followed through, 
announcing the abrogation in November. 15 
At home congressional action substantiated the United 
States intentions to respect, unilaterally, Chinese nationalist 
aspirations regardless of existing treaty obligations. In 
January 1927, Representative Stephen Porter, Chairman of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, introduced into the House 
a resolution intended to guarantee United States' support 
for a China free of unequal treaties. Porter worked with 
H. L. Warnshuis, Secretary of the International Missionary 
Council and whom Dooman described as a representative of an 
11 active sinophile" element in the United States. The two men, 
15rriye, 96-97; EHD, 30, 33-34, 36. Dooman erroneously 
states that the move against the Belgians occurred in the 
summer of 1926; Dorothy Borg, American Policy and the Chinese 
Revolution, 1925-1928 (New York: MacMillan Company, 1947), 
pp. 122, 135, 150. Borg argues that Kellogg failed to support 
Belgium in order to allow the United States to remain 11 Free 
to enter into negotiations for a new agreement to replace the 
Sino-American treaty of 1903 if it so desired." 
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Doornan believed, worked for "the dissociation of the United 
States from the ... Nine-Power Treaty ... " arguing that 
special privileges granted in the unequal treaties hampered 
religious and social work. Congress adopted the resolution. 
Kellogg now sensed support for his position and issued a 
policy statement that expressed America's willingness to 
recognize and help a stable, legitimate Chinese government 
without collaboration of the other powers. Although he 
announced a new policy, the secretary had not made any new 
or practical commitments to China outside of those made 
earlier at the Washington Conference. Kellogg re-emphasized: 
(1) The obligation of Chinese authorities to protect American 
nationals, (2) a continuation of the spirit of the Open Door 
policy and its provision of equality for all, and (3) the 
willingness of the American government to enter into 
negotiations with representatives of a stable Chinese 
government. Dooman saw in this event "a spirit and temper. 
among State Department officials which indicated to him an 
increasingly strong disposition towards dealing with China 
independently on the issue of treaties.
16 
A major problem confronting State Department officials 
concerned with East Asian affairs was the lack of a stable 
Chinese government. Between 1926 and 1928, forces of the KMT 
rectified the problem as its "northern expedition" succeeded 
16rriye, 107-109, Borg, 242; EHD, 34- 35. 
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~n partially unifying China and eliminating most KMT rivals. 
The KMT's drive to reduce its opposition paid dividends when 
on July 25, 1928, the Nationalists concluded the long sought 
after treaty with the United States. In it the American 
government recognized China's tariff autonomy, the start of 
a deliberate effort at establishing bilateral agreements 
calculated to force the other nations into similar concessions. 
This treaty, Dooman speculated, which was negotiated and 
settled while the other powers were meeting in Peking to 
discuss the same topic, sounded the death knell for all hopes 
of international cooperation. 17 
The "consequences" of these events, particularly the 
American response to the situation in China, "were to prove 
tragic for both Japan and China and . 
involve the United States in a war . II 
were to eventually 
In his oral memoirs 
Dooma n later supported his idea of these pre-1931 origins of 
the Pacific war by pointing to the gradual change in Japanese 
foreign policy from 1927 to 1931. One manifestation of this 
change came in 1927 with the ouster of Japan's Foreign 
Minister Shidehara Kijuro. Shidehara, Japan's representa-
tive at the Washington Conference, embraced the western 
powers' concept of international cooperation. Until the 
Northern Expedition, he had depended on that cooperation for 
settling damages that Japanese nationals incurred as a result 
l7Iriye, 229; EHD, 38-39. 
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of hostilities between warring Chinese factions. After 
1926 repeated instances of destruction, with little hope 
of compensation added heat to political fires in Tokyo. 
Internal economic and political problems plagued Japan, and 
those attacks on Japanese nationals on the mainland had an 
intensifying effect. Shidehara had consistently refused to 
interfere in China's civil war, nor would he press, as army 
officials had hoped, for further Chinese concessions. This 
attitude ran counter to those of expansion-minded militarists. 18 
General Tanaka Giichi, President and leader of the 
opposition party, the Seiyukai, condemned Shidehara's "weak 11 
China policy. Tanaka demanded a more "positive" approach 
in resolving Japan's problems on the Asian mainland. The 
Nanking incident of March 29, 1927 indicated just how weak 
Shidehara's program was. After Chinese troops attacked and 
killed several foreigners, including Japanese nationals, the 
United States and Great Britain bombed the city to aid their 
countrymen who were fleeing. Japanese naval units remained 
silent. This conciliatory attitude which won the trust of 
the western powers for Shidehara worked against him at home 
where criticism of his "weak kneed policy towards China 11 
18Borton, pp. 310-312; Iriye, p. 311. 
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increased. Less than a month after the Nanking incident, 
Tanaka became Premier and announced his intentions of serving 
as his own Ebreign lYti.nister .19 
At the time of Tanaka's appointment, Dooman described 
the general as a "great student of international affairs. 
who had become Premier only as a result of "fortuitous 
circumstances." Dooman reported that the new Premier lacked 
the qualities of a good politician, but that the general could 
prove to be an able statesman. In that same embassy dispatch, 
Dooman's superior, First Secretary Norman Armour, concluded 
that despite Tanaka's claims, the Premier would not make any 
major changes in Japanese foreign policy. Some thirty-five 
years after the fact Dooman concluded that 1927 marked 
Japan's shift from an internationalistic approach to a more 
nationalistic means of settling the "China problem," and he 
cited Tanaka's appointment as an indication of "growing 
support for an expansionist policy in China. II Reasons 
for this change not only included the internal chaos in Japan, 
but also American violations, in spirit, of the Nine-Power 
Treaty. Dooman asserted that as far as the Japanese were 
II 
19Nobuya Bamba, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New 
Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924-1929 (Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 1972), pp. 267, 272, 279, 280; Iriye, 
"Failure of Economic Expansion," p. 263. Iriye points out that 
some Japanese officials managed to carry on the facade of 
cooperation after 1928, but this ended in 1931; Sidney DeVere 
Brown, "Shidehara Kijuro: The Diplomacy of the Yen," in Diplomats 
in Crisis: United States-Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1931-1941 
Richard Dean Burns and Edward M. Bennett, eds. (Santa Barbara: 
American Biographical Center, Clio Press, Inc., 1974), p. 212. 
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concerned, the United States "had disavowed any obligation 
to work in concert with Japan. II Members of the State 
Department sensed the shift as well. Early in 1928, Stanely 
K. Hornbeck, newly appointed Chief of the Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs, noted in a memorandum to Assistant Secretary 
of State Nelson T. Johnson that despite "Premier Tanaka's 
daily affirmation that Japan has no intentions of interfering 
in China's internal affairs, Japan is devoting twenty-four 
hours a day to interference in one form or anothe~" 20 
Japan's meddling reached its apex three years later 
as Japanese Kwantung Army troops stationed in Manchuria staged 
a military coup and captured the territory. This, Dooman 
attributed to several factors, including Japan's depressed 
economy, popular support for expansionists policies, increasing 
prestige and independence enjoyed by the military, and the 
breakdown of international diplomacy in Asia. These factors 
led to the invasion, and it in turn marked a turning point 
in Japanese-American relations - in 1932, Dooman contends, 
"the die was cast." 
Our contributions to the China disaster . . . [were 
made] with the most praiseworthy intentions, but 
with invincible ignorance, without imaginativeness 
and with tactical inflexibility, the magnificent 
plan designed by Mr. Hughes was eviscerated, and 
misplaced American benevolence towards Chinese 
20 / 
894.00253, Norman Armour, Charge, to Secretary of 
State, 4/27/1927. Dooman had prepared the biographical data 
on each of Tanaka's appointees including the Premier, EHD, 
41-42; Iriye, 142; 793.94/Manchuria/33, Hornbeck to Nelson 
T. Johnson, 4/6/1928. 
violations of foreign rights gave encouragement to 
the Chinese to continue on a course ending in a war 
which lasted for 15 years.21 
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Dooman's 1962 assessment of the situation in East 
Asia during the tumultuous decade between 1921 and 1931 is 
perhaps understandable given his background. He was not 
completely objective in his evaluation of the period, since 
he lacked sympathy for and understanding of the Chinese 
Nationalist movement. This, by the nature of his background, 
was to be expected. Dooman was a conservative, that is 
he distrusted anything that threatened the status-quo. He 
cmne from a middle class strongly religious family, and he 
had worked hard over the years to achieve his position. As 
an American expert on Japan, trained in the early half of the 
century, he had to be distressed by the action of the Chinese 
nationalists who appeared to be a small group of rabble 
rousers with xenophobic fears. In a 1926 publication, China's 
New Nationalism and other Essays, Professor Harley Farnsworth 
I:1acNair described the situation in China as seen by many of 
his contemporaries and shared by Department officials, 
including Dooman: 
To be sure, there was an anti-foreign sentiment 
aroused, but this was based rather upon the 
personal feelings of a few, and the feeling 
of racial superiority of the many, than upon 
the spirit of nationality itself. 
21EHD, 46, 53-55; James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for 
Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). Crowley 
contends that the breakdown in American-British-Japanese rela-
tions resulted from an abuse of the Washington Conference 
treaties. It was not a conflict over Manchuria but rather the 
events surrounding the London Naval Conference in 1930, p. 34. 
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Dooman's description of Nationalist activities as a "series 
of reckless and wanton violations of treaties and international 
law ... " coincides with MacNair's point that events during 
the period "show conclusively that China is not yet ready for 
responsible ... government." 22 
Dooman's apparent insensitivity to the nationalist 
movement is comprehensible in light of the fact that the 
theory of national self-determination which had gained in 
popularity after World War I, did not receive wide acceptance 
until after the Second World War. Borg confirms this in her 
work American Policy and the Chinese Revolution of 1925-1928. 
The Washington Conference and the treaties that it generated 
affirmed the fact that the powers were determined to continue 
the treaty system despite their promises of future revisions. 
Borg indicates that Americans generally supported or accepted 
the nationalist movement,but many of those whose testimony 
she cites as evidence had some prior commitment to China and 
two of the most reliable newspapers at the time reflected a 
concern over Chinese-Soviet ties. 23 
Dooman seems justified in his concern over the attitude 
of the Department of State, particularly that of Kellogg, which 
22MacNair, Harley Farnsworth, China's New Nationalism 
and other Essays (Shanghai: Commercial Press, Limited, 1926), 
pp. 5, 379; EHD, p. 32. 
23 Borg, American Policy, pp. 243-245, 263-264. 
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seemed to give approval to the efforts of the Chinese there-
by destroying the basis of the Nine-Power Treaty. This he 
concluded led to the destruction of amicable relations with 
Japan. Although Secretary Kellogg emerged as a leader of 
foreign support for the nationalists, there remains,as 
previously discussed, some doubt as to the nature of the 
"support" that he received from his associates and the American 
populace. The widely held assumption that the United States 
sympathized with the Chinese falters somewhat when one 
considers that on this issue there existed no clear cut 
difference between "conservative" and "liberal" opinion, and 
for good reason. It was an issue that both could support -
the "liberals" because of their ideals, and the "conservatives" 
because of their isolationist tendencies. Thus the United 
States government could and did support the nationalist 
impulse. 24 
Dooman's argument that it was this attitude on the 
part of the United States which led the Japanese out of a 
period ~n which they were willing to cooperate and into a 
period of self-aggrandizement has received additional 
historical support. That shift, Dooman contended, was a 
natural outgrowth of Japan's desire for increased national 
well being and security. Here Dooman appears to have 
24Note: Borg does not bring up the question of this 
isolationist attitude in her work. 
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anticipated the later works o£ Bamba, Iriye, and Crowley 
whose books generally explored Japan's attempts to solve its 
diplomatic problems during the period in question. Their 
work ·expanded on ideas similar to Doom:an'.'s 1 although 
Iriye disputes the notion that "that the die was cast" in 
1932, arguing persuasively the notion that other alternatives 
presented themselves to the Japanese in subsequent years. 
All agree that as a result of the nationalist movement in 
China and American reaction to it, international diplomacy 
in Asia broke down. 
During the period between 1927 and 1931 Dooman 
remained on assignment in Tokyo, watching those shifts in 
international relations and biding his time. Japan's invasion 
of r.1anchuria in 1931, half a world away touched Dooman in 
London where he had been assigned as First Secretary of the 
embassy. The Council of the League of Nations convened a 
special meeting in Paris to consider the situation. Although 
the United States had not joined the League, its members 
persuaded the American government to send an unofficial 
representative to the council sessions. Secretary of State, 
Henry L. Stinson designated Charles G. Dawes, then ambassador 
to Great Britain, and in a transatlantic telephone conversa-
tion recommended Dooman's services. Dooman soon found himself 
bound for Paris supposedly as Dawes• "specialist and guide on 
things Japanese." G. Howland Shaw, a Middle Eastern specialist 
was considered by Stimson to be "one of the best men in Europe." 
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Dawes' and Shaw's limited knowledge of Asian matters in 
general, and of the Manchurian incident in particular, made 
the presence of an East Asianist an obvious necessity. But, 
as Shaw saw it, Dooman's presence made little difference, 
since Dawes functioned without the benefit of advice from 
anyone. 25 
Dooman, however, had opinions and gave advice in a 
lengthy memorandum, in which he analyzed the shifting of 
Japanese foreign policy and the poor planning that the 
department had undertaken in its attempts to cope with the 
situation in Asia. Somehow this came to the attention of 
25Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1931, 
Vol. III, the Far East (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1946), 407-414; EHD, pp. 10-11; Sara 
Smith, The Manchurian Crisis, 1931-1933: A Tragedy in 
International Relations (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1948), p. 158; Robert Ferrell, American Diplomacy 
in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 
1929-1933 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), pp. 
147-149. The most thorough analysis of the Manchurian 
Incident is presented in Christopher Thorne, The Limits 
of Foreign Policy: The West, The League, and The Far 
Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933 (London: Hamish-Hamilton, 1972). 
Other texts dealing with the period, but not as extensive 
in coverage include Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: 
The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley: 
Stanford University Press, 1964), and Crowley, Japan's 
Quest for Autonomy. Dooman's work did warrant a letter 
of appreciation from Stimson, noting his "efficient 
services and manner during these delicate negotia-
tions. . " 123D72/120, Stimson to Dooman, 2/3/1932. 
---------------------
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General Frank HcCoy, close friend and confidant of Stimson, 
and a member of the Lytton Cornmittee.26 
"The Manchurian affair . . is just the sort of 
thing that we in Tokyo had considered likely to happen," 
Dooman wrote. He complained that the embassy had warned 
of impending Japanese encroachment but that "F. E. [Division 
of Far Eastern Affairs] thought we were being unnecessarily 
exercised by an interesting problem but one that was entirely 
academic. II This attitude sprang, Dooman alleged, (and 
he apologized for his "impertinence") from a preoccupation 
"with affairs of the moment." He stressed the fact that 
not enough time was given for planning ahead on "questions 
which are in a state of solution but likely to be precipitated 
at any time." This lack of planning, he continued, had 
26Memorandum, unsigned and undated, and marked as 
being from Dooman ("E.H.D., Emb. London, formerly Tokyo 11 ), 
in the FrankL. McCoy papers, Library of Congress. McCoy 
served on the Lytton Commission that went to Manchuria to 
investigate the causes of the incident. For further informa-
tion regarding HcCoy see Who Was Who in America, Vol. III 
(Chicago: A. N. Marquis, Co., 1960), p. 574. The McCay-
Stimson relationship is established in Henry L. Stimson and 
McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 40, 115, 350. Both 




been caught completely unprepared and consequently found 
itself groping for answers. 27 
Having made clear these observations, Dooman drew 
on his twenty years of service and experience, then he summoned 
his courage and let his inner feelings regarding American 
policy towards Japan be known. The West in general, and 
the United States in particular, had consistently, although 
erroneously, measured situations in Asia by "Occidental 
standards ... There also seemed to exist, Dooman observed, 
an unequal set of standards for international behavior. 
The United States had cited its right of self-defense in 
implementing various policies in South America. France had 
done likewise in the Mediterranean, as had Britain in numerous 
27nooman's allegation that the embassy had warned 
the department is not clearly supported by dispatches, May-Sept., 1931_ 
The embassy had stated in its August report on political 
developments in Japan that there were rumors in the Japanese 
press regarding "radical changes" in Japanese policies 
toward Manchuria. But there was no further information 
available regarding the changes. 894.00PR/44, 8/1/1931, 
Edwin Neville to Secretary of State. In the September report, 
the embassy made reference to "The already tense relations 
between Japan and China over Manchuria. . 11 in describing 
the murder of a Japanese army officer who was murdered while 
traveling on an improper passport and carrying a large sum 
of money. His destination was Mongolia and the embassy 
concluded that his mission was one of 11 spying and propaganda. 11 
894.00PR/45, 9/12/1931, Neville to Secretary of State. In an 
ex post facto comment, the embassy observed that the invasion 
of Manchuria "fanned into flame the feelings of irritation which 
had been smouldering in the minds of the Japanese over a long 
series of unsettled problems. . ." 894.00/46, 10/9/1931. 
Stimson acknowledges that "we had known in the Department of the 
strained relations in Manchuria . [and] there had been pre-
liminary warnings of possible trouble during the summer." Henry 
L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observa-
tions (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936), p. 31. 
~ -~-----------~~----------------
50 
parts of the world. Neither France, Britain, nor the United 
States, nor any other power for that matter, had submitted 
to arbitration by the League any question involving the 
national interests of these countries. Failure to do this 
was, Dooman pointed out, in violation of Article 2 of the 
Kellogg Pact which stipulated that "'all disputes or conflicts, 
of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be' should 
be settled by pacific means." He further argued that "the 
Chinese had refused to enter into direct negotiations. II 
and at the same moment, the powers had insisted that "con-
ditions in China are 'normal'" and thus negated "the Japanese 
contention that its forces [were] caught in the middle, unable 
to convince the Chinese or the Western powers of their claims 
that they were protecting their vital interests and acting 
. . h . h . ..28 as any other natlon mlg t ln t e same Clrcumstances. 
Doornan believed that the onus for settling the issues 
in question fell on the western powers according to the 
agreements entered into in the Nine-Power Treaty. Those 
powers, he insisted, had a legal obligation to ask Japan 
to seek a peaceful settlement. But those nations also had 
a moral obligation "to suggest to Japan a method of solution 
which they would adopt for themselves in analo.gous situations, 
at least to refrain from tacitly condoning Chinese intransigence." 
28nooman in the McCoy papers. 
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Dooman concluded with what turned out to be his cure for 
the ills plaguing Japanese-American relations: 
So long as the powers do not clearly indicate that 
they expect equity to be maintained, the Japanese 
will be suspicious of the good faith of their 
intervention. The atmosphere must first be changed; 
and when that is done, and the League's commission 
has finished its work, it should not be so difficult 
as it would be if things are left to drift for the 
two countries to be left to find a satisfactory 
settlement.29 
Instead there was a generally hostile atmosphere 
in the Department of State. One man in particular generated 
a feeling of enmity towards Japan: Stanley Hornbeck. He 
had been outraged by Japan's intrusion onto Chinese soil and 
he had solicited support for his idea 11 to condemn Japan and 
brand her an outlaw." But he lost to the wishes of cooler 
heads, including President Herbert Hoover and Stimson. The 
Secretary of State did, nonetheless, take Hornbeck into his 
confidence along with Undersecretary of State, Allen Klots, 
and Assistant Secretary James Grafton Rogers. Together they 
composed a letter enunciating America's response to Japanese 
plans for establishing an independent state in Manchuria. On 
January 7, 1932 Stimson sent his letter to the governments 
of both China and Japan. Stimson later revealed the gist of 
that note to the American public in an open letter to Senator 
William E. Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
29rbid. 
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and a staunch isolationist who opposed American intervention. 
These two letters were the only public protests forthcoming 
from the United States. 30 
The passive nature of his government's policy vexed 
Hornbeck and in a memorandum on January 12th, two days after 
the publication of the Stimson letter, Hornbeck registered 
his dissatisfaction. He agreed that China's inclination 
towards pacificism and its political disorganization 
"invited disciplining and despoiling," but he warned that 
the Japanese were "inclined towards imperialism," and were 
organized on the lines of "military feudalism." Thus, "her 
natural inclination is to use force rather than to rely on 
the possibilities of success by methods of persuasion." 31 
Hornbeck's warning seemed to be borne out when on 
January 28, Japanese troops stationed in Shanghai attached 
Chinese units of the local Nationalist leader, Wang Ching-wei. 
The attacks followed a series of events including several 
murders of both Chinese and Japanese citizens. The murders 
30Armin Rappaport, Henry L. Stimson and Japan: 1931-
1933 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 38; 
Stimson and Bundy, p. 248. Hornbeck had originally favored 
the use of economic sanctions. Convinced of Japan's financial 
weakness, he suggested their use in September but Stimson 
and two of his assistants, James Grafton Rogers and Allen T. 
Klots objected, as did President Herbert Hoover. By December 
his plan had won support from Stimson and his aides and they 
submitted a formal plan of action to Hoover but the President 
again refused, professing a desire to avoid any confrontation. 
See Elting Morrison, Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the 
Life and Times of Henry L. St1mson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1960), p. 317. 
31 793.94/3610, Hornbeck Memorandum, l/12/1932. 
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had been instigated by Japanese who had hoped to draw 
attention away from events in Manchuria. The fighting 
intensified, causing concern among the other powers in the 
Shanghai area, and the United States and Great Britain 
announced their intention of dispatching military reinforce-
32 
ments to the settlement. 
'rhe formal establishment of the puppet state of 
Manchukuo in March further enraged Hornbeck. In another 
memorandum entitled "China-Japan Affair: Problem of United 
States Far Eastern Policy," Hornbeck compared Japan to 
Prussia in 1914. In supporting his comparison, Hornbeck 
asserted that "as Prussian ideals and aspirations were in 
conflict with the rights and interests of Great Britain, so 
Japan's ideals and aspirations are today in conflict with 
those of the United States." Because of these conflicts, the 
United States, as one of the "advanced nations," had to take 
positive action to avoid war with the "backward and most 
reactionary of the great powers .... (Japan)." 33 
To Hornbeck and other State Department officials, 
Japan's transgressions were obvious, and they cited numerous 
32Thorne, pp. 205-206, 211. It should be noted that 
Wang Ching-wei was a member of a rival faction of the Kuo-
ming tang . that did not support Chiang Kai-shek nor was the 
faction noted as being particularly anti-Japanese as was 
Chiang. 
33 711.94/671, Hornbeck Memorandum, 3/8/1932. 
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violations of the Nine-Power Treaty as manifestations of that 
guilt. Dooman, in looking back at the period and remembering 
American violations of treaties, found it ironic that indi-
viduals, living in glass houses chose to throw rocks. Stimson 
had called attention to the treaty in his Borah letter, 
describing it as the "legal basis upon which rests the open 
door policy towards China." According to Stimson, Japan 
threatened the existence of that policy and the army had 
invaded Manchuria because it failed to respect Japan's treaty 
agreements. "We believe," he wrote, "that this situation 
would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully 
observed. . . II The secretary concluded his letter stating 
that "We concur with those statesmen representing all the 
nations in the Washington Conference who decided that China 
was entitled to make that our policy for the future." 34 
Herein lay, though ever so subtle, the irony and the 
fact. The United States had dedicated itself unilaterally 
to aiding China while continuing to insist on Japanese 
adherence to the ideals of international cooperation. It 
seemed that the Americans used cooperation much as they would 
use a taxi - taking it as far as it was convenient, then 
leaving it for the use of others. 
For Dooman, the contradictions inherent in this ironic 
relationship grew out of the United States' decision to 
34 793.94/2411a, Stimson to Dawes, 11/14/1931. 
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"follow an independent course. ." foregoing "such pro-
cedures as friendly persuasion and counseling of the Chinese 
by the powers acting in concert." To Dooman, the reasons 
for that choice remained 11 an insolvable mystery." "The Nine-
Power Treaty was," he contended, "inoperable without the full 
consultation and cooperation among its signatories. II 
and between 1931 and 1941 the United States made this point 
in "dozens of notes. II American dedication to the system 
lay in the shadow of other considerations, including the open 
door language of the Porter Resolution. How, Dooman asked, 
could a foreign government take seriously American pleas for 
multilateral efforts and agreements when its own lawmaking body 
had overwhelmingly passed a resolution that read in part: 
The United States should now free itself from 
entangling relations with other powers whose 
policies are not identical with those of the 
United States. 
The language of that resolution, coupled with American actions, 
indicated to the Japanese that "the United States had no 
legal responsibility or obligation to consult with the other 
signatories. .. " and thus, Dooman concluded that "they 
regarded the contract ... no longer binding." 
We had gone our own way. We had disavowed any 
obligation to work with the other interested powers 
to bring the Chinese into line, And from the point 
of view of the Japanese, there was consequently no 
validity to the legal pieces of paper known as the 
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Nine-Power Treaty. To that extent, the united 
States contributed toward the creation of the crisis 
which eventually led to the Pacific war.35 
The roots of the United States-Japanese conflict 
therefore extended, in Dooman's mind, to events that occurred 
before 1931. 
His work in the first two decades of service had won 
Dooman promotions, praise, and attention. In 1928, Stanley 
Hornbeck had asked that Dooman be assigned to the Division 
of Far Eastern Affairs in conjunction with a forthcoming 
36 
leave. Doornan did visit the division, but it was not 
until 1933 that he received permanent assignment, to the 
Japan desk, where he remained for a period of four years. 
He worked under the direct supervision of Hornbeck, a close 
associate of Stimson, and Hornbeck had undoubtedly read 
Dooman's "impertinent" letter to McCoy citing the numerous 
faults of the division. In addition, Hornbeck's penchant 
for China nearly matched Dooman's own propensity for Japan. 
A clash was inevitable. 
35 EHD, pp. 53, 55. 
36123D72/73, Hornbeck to Division of Foreign Service 
Administration, 8/8/1928. 
CHAPTER 3 
YEARS OF TRYING -- TRYING YEARS 
In 1933, Dooman returned home where he spent the 
next four years working at the Japan desk. His arrival 
coincided with Franklin D. Roosevelt's launching of a new 
deal, the President's attempt to cure America's economic 
ills. There emanated from Washington a new idealism, a 
conviction that problems plaguing the nation could be 
solved and things made better. Roosevelt, his cabinet, 
and a new elite, the "brain trust," epitomized this notion 
of revitalization. Beneath this frosting of things new, 
Dooman found continuity of the old existing in the form 
of anti-Japanese sentiment, both within and outside of 
government. Some American businessmen, bemoaning their 
financial state, claimed that Japanese competition, through 
unscrupulous practices, threatened their survival. Dooman 
also perceived this anti-feeling in his boss, Stanley Hornbeck. 
Although a personal conflict developed between the two men, 
it remained submerged in a routine of daily problems and 
particularly those necessitated by planning for and events 




America's depression had led to an increasingly inward 
focus of attitudes solidifying the isolationist impulse that 
had seized the nation following World War I. During the 
performance of his duties, Dooman found that this mentality 
manifested itself in numerous complaints from members of the 
business community. A large amount of his time went into 
investigations of various allegedly insidious tactics that 
Japanese companies used in their attempted encroachment 
upon the American market. One such case involved research 
into allegations that Japanese prophylactic toothbrush 
manufacturers had violated American patent rights when they 
used designs and brand names closely resembling their American 
made counterparts. Representatives of American firms argued 
that the Japanese imitations, introduced into the United 
States at a price substantially lower than the American 
product, threatened the existence of the American cornpaniesy 
and thus also threatened the nation's economic well being. 
A similar complaint regarding Japanese intentions of securing 
a monopoly in the production and sale of matches resulted 
from a Ripley's Believe it or Not report that the "crafty" 
Japanese had renamed a section of their country "Sweden," 
thereby enabling match manufacturers in that region to market 
matches embossed with the message "Made in Sweden." Use of 
this tactic had a two-fold purpose: First it permitted sale 
of an item which was cheaply produced in Japan but which 
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carried a symbol of excellence since Swedish matches had 
gained world-wide recognition. Additionally, the false 
labeling permitted the Japanese to import matches into the 
United States over and above the quota set for matches 
marked "Made in Japan. ,l 
Inquiries into these and similar allegations 
mirrored illuerica's economic concerns and the business 
world's influence on the Department of State. The com-
plaints and the investigations that they engendered also 
provide some indication of how Americans looked upon the 
Japanese. They seemed to have preferred images or stereo-
types. There were reasons for such attitudes. As Walter 
Lippman later observed, stereotypes provide a defense. 
They offer an "ordered, more or less consistent picture of 
the world. II Thus, stereotypes tend to promote security 
as they give a feeling of orderliness to a turbulent and 
disorderly range of daily experiences. In the turmoil of 
the Depression, Americans would have found it easy to 
believe the negative image of the Japanese popularized by 
contemporary magazines. Within the covers of some of the 
1see 611.006/matches series, 1934. See also 894.542/ 
prophylactic toothbrush file, 1933-1934. The 611 file contains 
reports on similar complaints which were filed regarding liquor, 
sunglasses, lead pencils, cotton, and other products. Some 
investigations took up to four years to complete. As the 
Division was a rather small unit (manned by seven officers 
until 1934) the bulk of this work was completed by Dooman, 
the single Japan hand until the assignment of William T. 
Turner in October 1934. Department of State Register, 1935, 
P· 8. 
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rnos·t widely circulated journals, Americans learned that 
the Japanese had achieved economic success "thru unfair 
practices, conniving slyness, low standards of living 
[and] poor working conditions." In the words of journalist 
Edgar Snow who was basically a China hand, the Japanese were 
a "smirking, haughty, undersized, energetic, toothy, baffling, 
disciplined. ." people who threatened the "white man's 
prestige." The invasion of Manchuria marked, recorded Upton 
Close in a Saturday Evening Post article, Japan's "industrial 
invasion of the world." Close echoed an article that warned 
of impending Japaneseeconornic warfare, that had appeared the 
previous year in the same magazine, noting that the Japanese 
government supported businesses and industry to the point 
where "The Nipponese bayonet and sample case invariably 
2 travel together." 
During his four-year assignment to the Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs, Dooman found himself burdened with a 
multitude of apparently menial chores that resulted from, 
and reflected, typical diplomatic encounters. An investiga-
tion, for example, into the legal and ethical aspects 
regarding the importation of Japanese carnelia trees intended 
for the wife of a United States senator, required Dooman's 
2walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free 
Press, 1965), p. 63; Issac F. Marcosson, "Made in Japan," 
Saturday Evening Post, July 7, 1933, p. 5; Edgar Snow, "The 
Decline of Western Prestige," Saturday Evening Post, August 
26, 1933, p. 12; Upton Close, "Trade Follows the Flag - Horne," 
Saturday Evening Post, October 11, 1933, p. 11; Marcosson, 
"The Japanese Smokescreen, 11 Saturday Evening Post, May 7, 
1932, p. 3. 
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attention. A complaint from the Japanese embassy in Washing-
ton concerning government publication of a 1919 document in 
reference to Japanese operations in Shantung during World 
War I necessitated some diplomatic maneuvering, and it 
became Dooman's responsibility to convince the embassy's 
representative that publication of the document would not, 
as the attache had suggested, have "undesirable repercussions 
in Japan .... " Dooman succeeded in his task, pointing out 
that the document in question merely set forth the Depart-
ment of State's position. That position "closely followed" 
President Woodrow Wilson's and the Japanese had not, Dooman 
commented, objected to publication of the President's 
statement which appeared in the same volume. Besides, he 
added pragmatically, "the type has already been set." 3 
From these and similar episodes, he discovered what 
others had apparently known for sometime - that "being in 
charge of the Japan des~" afforded less dignity and carried 
less prestige than the title implied. Early in 1934, 
Professor Payson J. Treat of the History Department, Stanford 
University and a specialist in Japanese-American diplomatic 
relations, had written to Robert NlcClintock, American vice-
consul at Kobe and a former student, that 11 lack of a well-
experienced Japan hand . . at the Division desk. . II 
3093.941/67, Dooman memorandum 4/21/1934; 026. foreign 




left something to be desired. In his reply, McClintock 
told Treat that "your wish ... has come true," as "they 
have transferred First Secretary Dooman . . , " who "is, 
with the exception of Counsellor Neville, probably our most 
experienced Japan man." Commenting on the nature and bias 
of the division, McClintock speculated that Dooman had been 
chosen as part of the President's request to strengthen the 
Japanese section, and that required a man with "the weight 
of rank or years to stand up to the old China hands led by 
Dr. Hornbeck." Treat presented a further commentary on the 
Chinese orientation of the division and the magnitude of 
Hornbeck's power in subsequent correspondence: 
I am very glad to hear that Dooman was about 
to be sent to the Department. I know him and 
have a very high regard for him . . • I hardly 
expect him to stand up to the Ph.D. Chief, but 
perhaps the Big Shot himself will turn to 
Dooman for advice on purely Japanese affairs. 
When I was working downstairs in 1928-29, the 
Japanese hands were huddled in a little office 
across the hall from the Chief.4 
Dooman, unaware of this exchange of views, learned 
for himself what it meant to be a Japan hand working for the 
"Ph.D. Chief." Following Dooman' s temporary assignment to 
4Payson J. Treat, had been researching material for 
his book Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and 
Japan: 1853-1895 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1932). 
Correspondence between Treat and McClintock is contained in 
the Payson J. Treat papers, Archives of the Hoover Institution 
at Stanford University. Treat to McClintock, 2/8/1934; 
McClintock to Treat, 3/14/1934; Treat to McClintock, 4/3/1934. 
These letters were provided by Dr. Marlene J. Mayo, University 
of Maryland, for use in this essay. 
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the Division in 1932, Hornbeck had prepared a written report 
on his future Japan expert. Hornbeck credited Dooman with 
"an unusually effective working knowledge of and general 
proficiency in the use of the Japanese language," and 
possession of a "satisfactory" personality. 
noted that Dooman was "tactful and willing. 
He further 
. " with 
"no objectionable habits. ." while being "agreeable in 
appearance and manner." The evaluation focused, however, on 
Dooman's shortcomings. "On the whole," Hornbeck averred, 
"his performance fell short of the high quality which . . 
had been expected." His "knowledge of Japan, the Japanese 
people and Japanese foreign relations. " failed, in 
Hornbeck's mind, to counterbalance the lack of "knowledge 
of the United States and of American foreign relations in 
general." Despite a "keeness in analysis and discussion 
of problems. 
imagination. 
. , " Hornbeck decried Dooman • s "lack of 
.;"and "constructive initiative." Con-
tinuing in this vein, Hornbeck alleged that Dooman's prime 
concern centered around "certain financial aspects of the 
relationship between himself and the service. II 
Dooman's failure to "work overtime . . unless absolutely 
required. " evidently led to the charge that Dooman 
failed to match up with other officers when "given the 
opportunity to 'show their stuff.'" Using what might best 
be described as a back handed compliment, Hornbeck hinted 
at Dooman's abilities, attributing his shortcomings to a 
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lack of experience in that Dooman did not "apprehend fully 
the difference between the work . . . and tempo . . . of a 
political division in the Department and the work of an 
embassy or consulate in Japan." In summing up, Hornbeck 
wrote that he construed Dooman's qualificatiomand capacities 
to be far greater than would appear from his report and he 
theorized that Dooman's apparent ineptitude sprang from 
three factors: "the temporary character of his detail to 
the Department . the fact that the whole of his 
experiences ... had been in Japan," and finally, with 
perhaps a subtle hint of an ethnic slur, "the inheritance 
and temperament of this officer." 5 
Dooman, in return, was to find his boss less than 
perfect and with a special temperament of his own. Dooman 
(in later years) characterized Hornbeck as an individual 
who lacked an "objective mind." "He had," Dooman believed, 
"two supreme passions. One was a feeling of affection and 
sympathy for China. And the second was a pathological 
hatred of Japan and the Japanese." Although he could only 
speculate about the cause of these feelings (perhaps an 
"unpleasant experience" while Hornbeck was a "young man 
teaching in Mukden .... "), Dooman concluded that these 
5Hornbeck's evaluation of Dooman, FSO, Class III, 
5/24/1933, Box 146, Hornbeck papers. Provided by Marlene 
J. Mayo, Associate Professor, History Department, University 
of Maryland. 
65 
two inclinations acted as the "motivating elements" ln 
Hornbeck's "conception of dealing with Japan." Given this 
mutual antipathy, Dooman described his four years at the 
Japan desk as "an unpleasant experience." 6 
The winter of 1933-34 had witnessed a deluge of 
rumors raising questions about the possibility of a change 
in America's Far Eastern policy commensurate with the change 
in administrations in Washington. Hornbeck quashed these 
rumors on December 11, 1934 in a speech that received much 
attention in Japan. In it, he assured the world that no 
change would be forthcoming and that the Roosevelt administra-
tion, as had Hoover's, would not recognize "governments made 
by swords." The following year, the United States' navy 
sent a flight of six flying boats to Honolulu and the army 
dispatched ten bombers to an air base in Alaska. Both 
incidents received great play in the Japanese press and 
exaggerated already existing fears among the Japanese. 
Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell's speech in 
October 1934 had a further amplifying effect when he urged 
construction of air units designed specifically for attacks 
on Japan. 7 On the heels of these displays, which the 
6 EHD I p. 108. 
?William Neuman, America Encounters Japan: From Perry 
to MacArthur (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1965), pp. 201-
208; u. S. Department of State, "Principles of American Foreign 
Policy in Relation to the Far East," address by Stanley K. 
Hornbeck before the Ninth Conference on the Causes and Cure 
of War, Washington, D. C., 11/18/1934. 
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Japanese press interpreted as belligerent acts, America's 
minister to the Netherlands suggested that he be sent on an 
official visit to the Dutch East Indies. 
Since 1933 the governments of Japan and Holland had 
been involved in a series of trade disputes growing out of 
the Dutch colonial government's issue of quotas and restric-
tions affecting imported Japanese goods. By 1935, the two 
nations were engaged in commercial warfare. In view of 
this situation, the Japanese had taken careful note of public 
discussions in the Netherlands as to whether the United States 
would support Dutch colonial possessions in the Pacific from 
possible Japanese economic or military expansion. 8 
Members of the Division found themselves enmeshed in 
this conflict as a result of a suggestion made by American 
Minister to the Netherlands Grenville T. Emmet that he visit 
Pacific islands belonging to the Netherlands. Various indi-
viduals in the Department of State supported his plan, and 
it drew the attention and patronage of President Roosevelt. 
Hornbeck, for one, considered it an "excellent plan .. II 
as "it would at least cause among the Japanese all sorts of 
conjectures, some suspicions and some real worry • " and 
Government Printing Office, 1934). The term "Far East" was 
widely used during the period under study, but has recently 
been discouraged because of its ethnocentric and imperialistic origins. 
Academicians now prefer the term East Asia which is more specific 
referring .. to· China, Japan, ·and Korea, while the Department uses the 
term to include Southeast Asia as well. 
8 o33.1156D/3, Roosevelt to Hull, 4/25/1935. 
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as such the trip would be a "helpful" move. Having voiced 
his personal feelings, Hornbeck then cautioned against the 
visit and at the same time alluded to a rift of opinion 
within his own "bailiwick, .. stating that 11 I have not the 
slightest doubt but that the Japanese (and probably a good 
number of other people -- including not a few of our 
nationals) would assume that there was something special and 
important 'doing.'" When called upon several weeks later, 
Hornbeck reiterated his complete accord "in principle" with 
the visit but added that the political assumptions it would 
engender did not warrant the risk of such a misunderstanding. 
"This proposal," he wrote in April 1935, "should not be 
approved." 9 
Dooman did not share his superior's feelings about 
the results that Emmet's sojourn might have vis-a-vis Japanese-
American relations, nor did he hesitate to explain the reasons 
for his opposition. After carefully detailing the existing 
Japanese-Netherlands' economic confrontation, he added his 
personal viewpoint in a memorandum that Hornbeck sent to 
Phillips and Hull. "There exists," Dooman concluded, "not 
only in this country, but in Far Eastern countries an 
impression that the United States has assumed an obligation 
to maintain the territorial integrity of China." Accordingly, 
the proposed visit to the East Indies would only enhance 
Japanese consternation over America's continuing involvement 
9o33.1156D/l and 2, two memoranda from Hornbeck to 
William Phillips, 12/14/1934 and 4/23/1935. 
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and, Dooman surmised, "no benefit which may accrue to the 
United States from a visit . would . . . offset the 
international difficulties (suspicions) created by the 
confusion of thought which would arise. .,10 
The timing of Emmet's request added significance to 
the controversy that ensued as it came during preliminary 
talks undertaken in connection with the forthcoming London 
Naval Conference. His request had in fact come just days 
before Japanese officials made known their plans to abrogate 
those naval treaties scheduled for renegotiation in 1935. 
While the subtle differences in Doomans and Hornbeck's 
political posture appeared in their respective memoranda 
issued in response to Emmet's proposal, the papers that 
each drew up regarding the naval conference clarified those 
differences. 
The conference was an outgrowth of earlier ones that 
had taken place in 1921-1922 and 1930. Agreements reached 
at Washington in 1922 had been generally satisfactory to all 
parties and had set a tone of international cooperation. 
The second came, however, during a period of internal upheaval 
in Japan. Cooperation that had been the keynote of Japanese-
Western relations after 1922, seemed threatened in 1927 when 
General Tanaka Giichi assumed Japan's Premiership. Under 
Tanaka, Japan's military undertook expeditions in China, an 
10 o33.1156D/2H/DF, Dooman memorandum, 4/23/1935. 
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action which won support from economically depressed 
Japanese who interpreted the move as a part of the new 
Premier's "positive" policy. But, like his predecessors, 
Tanaka could not satisfy the multi-interests of the many 
Japanese political factions including the military. In 
1928, a group of Japanese army officers, dissatisfied with 
Tanaka's efforts, forecast his decline when their troops 
precipitated the assassination of Chang Tso-lin, the ruling 
Warlord in Northern China. Tanaka's cabinet fell in 1929 
as a result of the incident. In November, Hamaguchi Osachi, 
who succeeded Tanaka, announced his intention to participate 
in the naval conference scheduled to begin two months later. 
Japan's participation came under the direction of Foreign 
Minister Shidehara Kijuro, who sought re-establishment of 
Japanese-Western cooperation in hopes of achieving peace, 
stability, and prosperity in East Asia. 11 
Shidehara attained his goal and yet failed. Under intense 
pressure from the United States in Britain, Japan's delegates 
to the conference forewent their objective of attaining a 
10:7 ratio in heavy cruisers, accepting instead a 10:6 ratio. 
Ratification by the Emperor depended on a favorable recommenda-
tion from the Privy Council where discussions raged pro and 
llFor a lengthy explanation of the Tanaka/Shidehara 
policy towards China and the problems raised by Chang Tso-lin, 
see Iriye After Imperialism, Chapter V, "Coprosperity in 
Manchuria," and pp. 205-214. 
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con, bringing Hamaguchi's ''soft" policy under fire. Despite 
their reluctance and fierce opposition from the navy's Chief 
of Staff and a hostile press over a period of two months, 
the council recommended approval. Here success turned to 
failure as the turmoil created led to Hamaguchi's assassina-
tion a few weeks later. The upheaval continued, increasing 
in the years preceding the 1935 conference. 
The second naval conference, scheduled to convene 
in London five years after the first, foreshadowed the eventual 
clash between Japan and the United States and its ally Great 
Britain. Each of these nations envisioned differently the 
conference's purposes. The Western allies entertained thoughts 
of talks geared to producing a phoenixlike ressurection of 
the Washington treaty system, then in ashes. Japanese 
officials, under growing influence of several political 
and military groups, determined to assert their nation's 
equality with that of the western nations. From the outset, 
a common idea seized officials in both of the nations that 
the conference would fail. Thus, the participants held fast 
to their own position~ and simultaneously tried fostering 
the idea that any failure was the result of the other's 
intransigence. 
By early 1934, American officials involved in the 
planning stages, including Dooman, realized that the distinct 
possibility existed of Japan's withdrawal from the Washington 
and London treaty agreements, should the latter be denied 
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parity with the western nations. Hornbeck preferred seeing 
Japan's withdrawal if parity was the only alternative and 
he agreed with a contemporary journalist who equated such 
action as 11 ratifying Japan's Monroe Doctrine." Hornbeck, 
like many of his associates, clung to the belief that 
national security depended on overwhelming naval strength 
and that abandoning a position of relative power for the 
sake of maintaining a treaty made little sense. Thus, in 
the early stages of conference planning, he advised that 
the fixed ratios were "correct" and should stand, adding 
that the United States and Britain should meet any demand 
for changes that Japan might make with a refusal to hold 
12 a conference. 
Military leaders in Japan, particularly naval 
officers, who had been humbled in 1930, objected. They 
were determined that Japan would achieve parity with the 
west. The Kwangtung army's success in its Manchurian 
adventure stimulated thoughts of empire and lent credence 
to the idea that Japan needed a firm policy in East Asia. 
Carrying out any "positive 11 policy, while at the same time 
l2soo.Al5A5/34, Dooman memorandum, "Japanese insistence 
upon participation in any preliminary conversations which may 
be held with regard to naval limitation;" 2/6/1934; 500.Al5A5/ 
277 l/2, Hornbeck to Hull, and Phillips, 11/16/1934; 500.Al5A5/ 
135, Hornbeck memorandum, "Naval Conference: Preliminary 
Conversations," 6/25/1934; 500.Al5A5/53 1/2, Hornbeck to 
Hull, 7/23/1934; ~O.Al5A5/45 l/2, Hornbeck to Hull, 3/31/1934; 
894.00/533, Dooman to Maxwell Hamilton, and Hornbeck, 8/9/1934. 
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providing an adequate self defense, required a stronger 
military, a position that naval officers felt had been 
undermined by the agreements of 1930. By 1933, moderate 
admirals (proponents of disarmament) no longer held 
influential positions, victims of political machinations 
carried out by members of the more radical "fleet faction." 13 
Outside of the military developments on the national 
and international scene abetted the navy's campaign. In 
their attempts to maintain domestic tranquility, proponents 
of disarmament found themselves out of political office. 
In 1932, the Minseito, Japan's pro-disarmament party lost 
its majority in the Diet to its rivals in the Seiyukai. The 
latter favored a firm policy and also the capture of 
Manchuria with its rich resources had lifted hopes for 
Japan's economic recovery. These changes enhanced the 
military's power when in 1933 it received further support 
for its advocacy of a stronger navy. The United States 
had reduced construction of naval vessels after the 
onslaught of the Depression, but as part of Roosevelt's 
new deal, the administration announced plans for increased 
naval spending and construction, enabling Japan's military 
leaders to promote themselves and their ideas for a strong 
navy to a point where they won popular support for their 
13stephen E. Pelz, The Race to Pearl Harbor: The 
Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset 
of World War II, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
19 7 4 ) , pp . 14 , 16 . 
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demands of parity. They resolved that failure to achieve 
satisfaction would not be compromised by another ratio 
agreement. Abrogation or parity were the only alternatives. 14 
Officials, both civilian and military, in the United 
States charted the various developments in Japan and at the 
same time plotted their own course of action. For American 
naval leaders there existed only one direction: increased 
naval construction that would bring the United States up to 
its treaty limits as soon as possible. This required con-
vincing their new Commander in Chief that their needs 
superseded and surpassed the arguments of American isolationists 
and economic conservatives. They found an ally in Roosevelt. 
The Department of State interpreted the problem 
differently. Unhappy with Japan's aggressive action on the 
Asian mainland, American diplomats faced a dilemma; how could 
Japan be controlled if the Japanese were, as they had indicated 
in Manchuria, insensitive to international pressure. This 
was complicated by the fact that military coercion did not 
exist as an option since the western powers lacked the 
strength and the desire to use it. 
America's hopes then seemed to rest in having Japan 
adhere to the already existing ratio. Should attempts to 
realize this end fail, the United States had to make it 
appear that the Japanese caused the breakdown of international 
14 Pelz, 13, 40-41, 81. 
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cooperation. By the winter of 1933, the first alternative 
ran out. W. Cameron Forbes, former American Ambassador to 
Japan and who had retired the preceding year, stopped by to 
chat with Hornbeck. They discussed the former Ambassador's 
views regarding disarmament,and Forbes suggested that the 
military element in Japan had gained a predominant position 
and that "no Japanese statesman will dare sign an agreement 
leaving the ratio as it is." 15 
The evolution of American policy clearly required 
a depth of understanding and an equal amount of adept 
maneuvering. Dooman provided just that. Forbes had suggested 
to Hornbeck that the United States and Britain use political 
pressure as a means of bringing about Japan's continued 
acceptance of the 10:6 ratio produced a sharp reply from 
Dooman. Aware of Japan's sensitivity to allied force directed 
at the Japanese, Dooman warned against the strategy since 
in the past they had evinced "no satisfactory results," but 
only raised the possibility of reviving" in full strength 
the fanatical spirit of 1931 and 1932." He suggested, as an 
alternative that the United States should take its tim~ noting 
that this alternative left two years before the conference 
convened, "by which time there may be a favorable change in 
the atmosphere."l6 
15soO.Al5A5/l4, Memorandum of Conversation, Hornbeck 
and Forbes, 12/14/1935; 500.Al5A5/15, Dooman to Hornbeck, 
12/15/1935. 
16 rbid., SOO.AlSAS/23, Hornbeck to Phillips, 1/12/1934. 
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Such a change seemed unlikely in 1933 and in early 
1934, as members of the navy's "fleet faction" secured top 
naval positions. One of these, Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa, 
who had risen to the rank of Commander in Chief of the com-
bined imperial fleet, fanned the diplomatic fires with comments 
carried in a news story that reached Hornbeck's desk. The 
admiral warned of an impending "trade war between Japan and 
America " in which the United States would have the 
support of the other "powers." Faced with this threat Japan 
had little choice but to depend on its military preparedness 
and therefore would not concede its position of "armament 
equality." Hornbeck deemed Suetsugu's remarks "significant" 
though "not conclusive." In a report to Phillips, the Division's 
Chief reported that Suetsugu was "the leader of the ultra-
nationalistic element in the Japanese navy . . and he 
commands considerable influence among that group . " 
Dooman had provided Hornbeck with the description of Suetsugu 
and cautioned him that the latter's comments "need not be 
taken as more nor less than the words of one admiral." But 
Hornbeck nonetheless interpreted the remarks as "significant," 
perhaps because the two men's opinions complemented one another. 
The admiral's comment that "a naval treaty does not bring 
peace . (or) reduce financial burdens," Hornbeck felt, 
was "right to the point." The admiral's contention that 
"we do not believe that diplomacy will settle the issues and 
we are determined to prepare for the worst possibilities of 
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an economic and political clash . ." not only described, 
in Hornbeck's mind, "the general view of the Japanese," 
but was an idea that he appraised as "thoroughly realistic." 
Hornbeck seemed a firm adherent of Suetsugu's ideas and he 
used a similar argument that America's national security 
rested on possession of a superior navy and therefore the 
United States had to "proceed as rapidly as possible with 
1 
. .,17 nava construct~on. 
The antagonistic views shared by these men, exchanged 
even before the preliminary talks began, indicated that little 
hope for a successful conference existed. Internal political 
developments within Japan worsened dailyvprompting Ambassador 
Grew to report in January of 1934 that despite the existence 
of a "liberal" and ''conciliatory view" in Japan regarding 
naval limitation, the navy would "have the final say at the 
conference in 1935." Dooman corroborated Grew's position, 
commenting that the Japanese navy did indeed have "unrestricted 
freedom . . to determine naval policy ... l 8 
Planning for the conference continued, however, and 
Dooman took various opportunities to express his opinions 
l7500.Al5A5/135, Hornbeck memorandum, "Naval Con-
ference: Preliminary Conversations," 6/25/1934. 
18 soO.Al5A5, Telegram 650, Grew to Secretary of State, 
1/22/1934; SOO.AlSAS/34, Dooman memorandum, "Japanese insistence 
upon participation in any preliminary conversations which may 
be held with regard to naval limitation," 2/6/1934. 
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and demonstrate his understanding of the immediate and the 
long range problems mvolved in Japanese-American political 
relations. Expounding on a naval attache's report from 
Tokyo, Dooman warned of impending dangers inherent in a 
suggestion for preliminary Anglo-American talks. Recalling 
past experiences (and personal knowledge), he cautioned 
discretion in all actions so as not to arouse Japanese 
fears of a western conspiracy. He reiterated his point 
that "influential Japanese" had in the past expressed to 
him their determination that "Japan would never again offer 
an opportunity to be caught off its feet." Any preliminary 
talks excluding Japan would, he contended, provide the 
Japanese with an excuse - that the western powers were once 
again plotting together against Japan - allowing them to 
withdraw from the conference. Dooman's recommendation was 
to avoid all talks excluding Japan, leaving the onus for 
failure of the conference on the Japanese. 19 
On April 20, 1934, a relatively junior officer in 
Japan's Foreign Office, Arno Eiji, produced what he described 
as an "unofficial 11 statement regarding Japan's new Asian 
policy as necessitated by foreign assistance to China. The 
document said in effect that Japan had "special respon-
sibilities in East Asia," and that the Japanese would oppose 








to China or Japan, or the stability of East Asia. Japan's 
Foreign Minister, Hirota Koki, attempted to soften the tone 
of the "Amau Statement" several days later. His efforts had 
little effect as most westerners interpreted Amo 1 s statement 
t b t d • t' f J I d • 20 o e an accura e escr1p 1on o apan s new har l1ne. 
Four days after Amo met with reporters, Dooman 
reacted by preparing a memorandum analyzing this new develop-
ment that he sent to Norman Davis who had been designated to 
20The spelling of Amo's name had been, until recently, 
Amau. This was an error in transliteration. u. s. Department 
of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. I (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 224-225, Foreign 
Relations volumes are hereinafter referred to as FRUS. Dorothy 
Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-
1935: From the Manchurian Incident throughout the Initial Stage 
of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard 
university Press, 1964). Borg has a rather detailed account of 
the incidents which preceded the "Amau Statement" and American 
reaction it it. See "The Challenge of the Amau Doctrine," 
pp. 46-99. Borg describes the statement as a Japanese attempt 
"to prevent the rehabilitation (particularly economic) of 
China" and that it "constituted a more direct challenge to 
the West." p. 55. In his essay on "The Role of the Department 
of State" Thomson contends that the significance of Amo's 
action was that the episode solidified relations among the 
members of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull, and the President. It also reflected 
American "post-Manchurian, post-Stimsonian ... disinclina-
tion to respond with vigor ... to the evolving shape of 
Japanese intentions." p. 96. Iriye, in corrunenting on "The 
Role of the United States Embassy in Tokyo," reaches the 
same conclusion as Thomson regarding the situation in the 
Department but that the doctrine more firmly convinced Grew 
of mounting Japanese expansionism. He also notes that the 
Ambassador interpreted Hirota's role in correcting the mis-
understanding caused by the statement as further proof of 
the influence of Japanese "moderates" in controlling foreign 
policy. pp. 112-113. 
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head the American Delegation to the London Conference. This, 
Dooman wrote, "can only be considered as an abandonment by 
Japan of the principles ennunciated in the Nine-Power Treaty." 
Amo•s statement and others like it, he continued, "indicate 
beyond any possibility of a doubt that it is not the intention 
of Japan to agree to the acceptance . . of the naval ratio 
now allotted to her [and] that the conference, if held 
would be abortive." Japan did have, however, reasons for 
continued adherence to the Washington treaty, "particularly 
the advantage • . of maintaining the present restriction 
on fortifications in the Pacific." Consequently, he con-
eluded that Japan would want to see the conference held, and 
would call for its opening if none of the powers acted.
21 
Obviously distressed by the entire series of eventsr 
particularly that of Amo, Dooman reversed his earlier position. 
He suggested that the United States and Great Britain announce 
their intention of withdrawing from the Washington treaty 
system and then invite France and Italy to participate in 
a separate gathering. Despite "its chances of bringing 
forth something concrete, 11 Dooman wrote, "a conference of 
the four powers would at least have a chance of arriving at 
some arrangement." Such a conference, "would, by emphasizing 
21 FRUS, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. I, p. 227. 
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the isolation of Japan, have a moral effect incalculably 
greater than any statement or practicable action denunciatory 
of Japan's disregard for treaties. 22 
Given a day to reconsider his suggestions, Dooman 
tempered his remarks. In a memorandum sent to Davis on the 
25th, Dooman reiterated his point that "the power party to 
the treaty which would be most apt to violate the treaty 
has, in effect, withdrawn from it. . . " and thereby 
reduced "the importance and value of " it. But he 
noted that: 
In giving consideration to the question of 
denunciation by any power of the Washington 
Naval Treaty, it would be necessary to give 
thought to the effect of denunciation upon 
the status of the political treaties of the 
Washington Conference. 
Dooman pondered the problem of the American public's reaction 
to its government's denunciation of the treaties, suggesting 
that it would be seen "as a jettisoning of fundamental American 
policies." In a subtle manner he also moderated his call for 
denunciation of the treaties. In the first note he had 
suggested that action, but in the second he shifted to a 
passive statement: "If it be decided to act towards denuncia-
tion of the Naval Treaty, the two political treaties [the 
Four-Power and Nine-Power] should be allowed to stand until 
22 Dooman to Davis, memorandum. "Naval Policy and the 
Far East: Exclusion of Japan from Treaties for the Limita-
tion of Naval Armament," 4/24/1934, Norman Davis Papers, Box 70, 




an opportunity is had, in conference with Great Britain and 
if possible with other interested Western powers, to 
decide. . 23 .. " on the future of those agreements. 
Dooman's dedication to achieving the best position 
possible for the United States in the diplomatic jousting 
related to the doomed naval conference never clouded his 
sensitivity to Japanese awareness of western antipathy. He 
knew that events like the triple intervention in 1895, and 
the Immigration Act in 1924 had worked to the disadvantage 
of good Japanese-Western relations. Indeed, the feeling 
that they would not be "caught off their feet" had become 
a driving force in Japanese diplomatic dealings. Dooman 
maintained that by 1934 this drive had become more than a 
"sentimental emotion" as Grew had suggested. This feeling, 
Doornan observed, had, between 1931 and 1934, taken on a 
"utilitarian purpose." The Japanese envisioned themselves 
as constant victims of western conspiracies and thus had 
set forth on an attempt to prove - particularly to the 
Chinese, that Japan would no longer be coerced into 
unacceptable agreements. Dooman pointed out that the end 
23 Doornan to Davis, "Political Treaties of the Washing-
ton Conference: The Effect Thereon of Termination of the Naval 
Treaties," 4/25/1934, Davis Papers, Box 70. Dooman was a 
member of the American Delegation for the preliminary sessions 
and the full session. He went out as an adviser from the 
Department of State. It was during the full session that he 
suffered a bleeding duodenal ulcer that confined him to bed 
for sometime and would later become a source of serious 
illness. FRUS, 1935, Vol. I, p. 64; Interview with Mrs. Dooman. 
82 
product that the Japanese hoped for was a concert of Japan 
and China's foreign policies. 24 
Japanese machinations springing from their determina-
tion to achieve their ends paralleled those of the Western 
allies, and the resulting antagonism ensured the failure of 
the conference. The United States had hoped to avoid any 
confrontation while quietly racing to bring its fleet strength 
upwards toward treaty limits. Great Britain's government 
plotted the most likely ways of securing, through more treaty 
agreements, protection for their Eastern empire, and it was 
they who watched with increasing trepidation as hopes for 
successful negotiations dwindled. Their concern over unlimited 
growth of the Japanese fleet made them prone to granting 
concessions but an intransigent United States precluded any 
hopes for "a deal." The ultimate cost of failure of the 
conference went beyond the predictions of some of the policy 
makers who had facilitated the collapse of the treaty system. 
Most felt that the likely result would be an arms race. Within 
the United States' government, Hornbeck predicted that Japan 
would eventually fall behind in naval arms production because 
of a lack of natural resources, a factor, he suggested, that 
limited growth of Japan's navy to a point of "natural limits .. 
24Telegram, 1333, Gre\v to Secretary of State, 5/31/ 
1935, FRUS, 1935, Vol. I, p. 68; 500.Al5A5/419, Dooman to 
Hamilton, 6/20/1935. 
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by 1937. In light of this, he went on, the United States 
would win any naval race and thus be capable of supporting 
its foreign policy in Asia. Dooman agreed with his boss 
that "there may be some possibility that the Japanese would 
eventually be exhausted by a naval race." But, he pointed 
out, almost in prophetic terminology, that those circumstances 
could cause the Japanese, "in desperation ... [to] bring 
the competition to an end by seeking hostilities." 25 
On January 15, 1936, the Japanese delegation walked 
out of the conference making good their declared intentions. 
The announcement left little doubt that effective January l, 
1937, Japan would, for the first time in a decade and a half, 
be free from binding contracts with the United States and 
Britain. It also marked the advent of a program that had 
as a conclusion the hostilities which Dooman had predicted. 
The recalcitrant Japanese admirals who sought to gain a 
decided military advantage were partially responsible for 
the failure of the conference. Their demands for parity and 
their inflexibility had as their source motivations other 
than naval predominance in the Pacific. Commenting on 
those reasons, Grew quoted from a Japanese newspaper thoughts 
that coincided with those set forth in Dooman's 1935 memorandum 
in which he had suggested that Japan wanted to demonstrate 
that it was a first class power. The Chugai article clearly 
linked Japan's action at London to its policy in China: 
2 5Pelz, pp. 128-129; ~O.Al5A5/631, Hornbeck memorandum, 
1/16/1936; 500.Al5A5/15, Dooman memorandum, 12/15/1933. 
In the present conference this country has 
adopted a policy which does not give China 
the slightest cause to believe that Japan is 
subservient to Great Britain and the United 
States. Japan's policy in the conference has 
been independence. Thus it would be hard for 
China to see in it any sign of weakness.26 
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The question of responsibility went, however, beyond 
those Japanese admirals and even beyond Japan's desire to 
demonstrate its independence to China. It lay also with the 
shapers of American foreign policy; men like Hull and Hornbeck. 
The latter had made his feelings about the Japanese quite 
clear on numerous occasions but never were they so distinct 
as in his memorandum of March 27, 1935. "The people and 
Government of the United States want peace," he wrote. 
people and Government of Japan are not so soliticious about 
peace." With this as his premise he went on to show that a 
major cause of misunderstanding sprang from the Japanese 
inability to honor laws and treaties. "They do not believe 
as firmly as we do in regulation by law and by contract and 
by treaty; nor are their concepts of laws and contracts and 
treaties of respect which should be given them identical 
with ours." For Hornbeck, a man given to a legalistic point 
of view, the crux of the problem lay in this failure to abide 
by treaties and consequently the United States could expect, 
26The Japanese plan and the work of the admirals is 
part of the thesis that is set forth in Pelz; ~O.AlSAS/491, 
Dooman memorandum, 6/20/1935; FRUS, 1936, Vol. IV, pp. 25-28. 
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he forecasted, "barring unpredictable political accidents 
or acts of God," war with Japan. 27 
War was an inevitable outgrowth of a "war minded" 
people according to Hornbeck's thesis, and the Japanese 
were, he believed, seized with the "militarist" fervor. 
Dooman disputed Hornbeck's argument that a Japanese military 
clique had taken control of the nation and had popular support. 
Dooman agreed that a "militarist trend" had a popular base, 
adding quickly that "there had been two occasions in recent 
Japanese history when public upheaval had brought about and 
supported a more pacific and cooperative policy • .,"and 
that this pattern presented a possible precedent for a shift 
in policy, "although it might be a long process."
28 
Hornbeck's attitude prevailed throughout the period 
of the naval conference, having its roots in the post-Manchurian 
Incident feelings toward Japan. Policy-makers in the Depart-
ment of State marshalled support for their inexorable con-
tention, based on that 1931 confrontation, that Japan and 
the United States shared a mutual enmity, a consequence of 
what one officer in the division described as a "white man's 
burden;" an attitude that the Japanese were aware of and it 
had convinced them that "the United States is in their way." 
2 7711.94/1034, Hornbeck memorandum, 3/27/1935. 
28 
FRUS, 1935, Vol. I, p. 65. 
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Japanese officials, enjoying as they were, "successful 
military operations," in Manchuria, had developed a "war 
minded" consciousness and they justified Japan's actions 
on the continent as a legitimate effort to fulfill Japan's 
"inevitable destiny." Therein lay the basis of what Hornbeck 
described as Japan's "Janus headed foreign policy." Japanese 
"liberal elements" lacked control over Japan's foreign policy, 
which was in the hands of military leaders who effected this 
two faced policy - one with a "smiling, refined face . II 
looking eastward, while an "expression of ... Attila. II 
faced west. Based on these conclusions, Hornbeck had advised 
his superiors, Phillips and Hull, that "in dealing with 
Japan we are dealing with a military and militant state," and 
that those same military leaders believed that the Far Eastern 
policy of the United States threatened their efforts to a point 
that there existed the possibility of war. The resulting 
problem facing American officials of this persuasion was 
how to cope with this military state without betraying their 
29 
biases or appearing to be belligerent. 
Since 1922, the treaty system, while not as effective 
a tool as some Americans would have preferred, served as a 
vehicle for checking Japanese aggression. The system worked 
in great measure, not because there existed an enforcement 
29 
711.94/822, two memoranda, one by Joseph E. Jacobs, 
the other by Hornbeck, were sent to Phillips and Hull on 
6/12/1933. 
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body capable of carrying out sanctions, but because the 
Japanese had been willing to adhere to western concepts 
of international behavior. But by the 1930's, they became 
aware that the treaty system had paid few dividends in their 
behalf, and they began a counter attack on the western 
standards that they had tolerated for over a decade. They 
began in 1931 with their invasion of Manchuria, elevated 
the attack with their withdrawal from the League of Nations 
in 1933, and reached a peak with their abrogation of the 
treaty system itself in 1936. 
Dooman perception of the Japanese viewpoint emerged 
in a note delivered to Hull and Phillips via Hornbeck a few 
weeks after Japan announced its intention to abrogate the agree-
ment. Rather than being offended by the apparent disregard 
for contracts of cooperation, Dooman urged that westerners 
should examine the "oriental concepts" of legal pacts. 
Pursuing this logic, he went on the explain that: 
To the Japanese a contract is essentially a declara-
tion of intent, and not, as it is to the Occidental, 
a definition of the rights and obligations in regard 
to a given set of circumstances of the respective 
parties. It is an accepted principle among Japanese 
. . that if the circumstances in which a contract 
is to be fulfilled are modified, they party adversely 
affected by the change may in good faith claim relief 
pari passu with the modified circumstances. 
Perhaps the major difference in understanding contracts came 
in the settlement of claims, as Dooman indicated: 
The party favorably affected by the change is 
expected to refrain from asserting his full 
legal rights, and if he should reject a pro-
posal to compromise and seek redress . . . the 
onus tends to fall upon the plaintiff, for 
the reason that he has refused to compromise, 
rather than on the respondent for failure to 
carry out the terms of the contract. 
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In view of this understanding of contracts, and as a result 
of changes that had taken place since 1931, the Japanese 
simply wished to exercise their right to abridge the agree-
ments and forego their obligations thereunder, in 1935.3° 
Dooman posed the immediate question that arose from 
this situation: "Is it possible for two nations with 
fundamentally different conceptions of the significance of 
a contract to develop between themselves satisfactory 
relations on the basis of contractual arrangements?" He 
answered in the negative, but added that it was a gray area 
that had previously gone unexplored. He went on to explain 
that without this understanding, the United States could not 
establish satisfactory relations with Japan if the American 
relied solely upon the basis of the exercise of rights, and 
the fulfillment of obligations arising out of contractual 
agreements. He proffered instead a call for a "convincing 
show of good will ••• 11 and "a sympathetic, cooperative and 
helpful attitude toward Japan ••• " while abstaining, 
30 711.94/1025, Dooman memorandum, "Relations Between 
the United States and Japan: Occidental and Oriental Concepts 
of the Effect of Contracts," 2/7/1935. 
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wherever practicable from initiating intervention in situations 
affecting ... " that nation. "I cannot but feel," he closed, 
"that the problem of maintaining relations with Japan on a 
satisfactory basis calls for something over and beyond care 
in the exercise of legal rights and observance of legal 
obligations. .. 31 
Undaunted by these suggestions, individuals in the 
Department continued pressing for a treaty settlement and 
insisting that Japan remain bound to its treaty commitments. 
Both Hull and Hornbeck reve 1ed in legalist theory and they 
represented the prevailing attitude in Washington. Ratifica-
tion of pledges made at the conference in 1921 had elated 
Hornbeck, who felt that his own concerns for China had been 
set down in terms of international law: 
That these provisions have given the Open Door 
policy a new and enhanced position in the realm 
of international commitments, that they place the 
problems of international relations in the Far East 
on a new basis, and that they offer China a vastly 
improved opportunity for solving her many ... 
problems of reconstruction, are propositions scarcely 
open to challenge. . They are intended to 
promote peace and to safeguard the rights and 
interests of all the peoples concerned. 
Hull believed in high principles of international behavior 
and strict adherence to negotiated contracts. "To me," 
Hull explained, "these doctrines were as vital in international 
relations as the Ten Comn1andments in personal relations. 32 
31rbid.; 711.94/1026, Dooman to Phillips, 4/2/1935. 
32 EHD, p. 107; Hornbeck, "Principles and Policies in 
Regard to China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. I, no. 2, December 
15, 1922, p. 135; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull 
(New York: MacMilliam Company, 1948), p. 356. 
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In 1937, Dooman's four years in Washington ended, and 
he left behind his "unpleasant experience." His opinions 
had not always differed greatly from those of his associates, 
but the school of thought that Hornbeck represented distressed 
him. If he entertained any desire to depart, he could not 
have been happier than when he received his new assignment 
in January 1937- as Counselor at the Embassy in Tokyo. 33 
33123D72/186, Secretary of State to Dooman, 1/5/1937. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEDICATION AND DISILLUSIONMENT 
During the first two years of his tour in Tokyo, Counselor 
Dooman handled an array of minor problems,typical of those 
experienced by American diplomats which included answering 
complaints from missionaries who felt threatened, resolving 
customs conflicts, and giving speeches at official dinners. 
There wereothers, however, of a more serious nature, including 
one that threatened Grew's career and another that brought 
the United States and Japan to the brink of war. Dooman met 
these problems head on, using his expertise, his friendship 
with Japanese officials and private citizens, and common sense. 
Between 1937 and 1938, he supervised maintenance of the embassy 
building, trained junior staff officers, and solved a Japanese-
American fishing dispute thereby saving Grew from an embarrassing 
moment. All of this occurred as he and Grew witnessed a marked 
decline in Japanese-American relations and the outbreak of 
war between Japan and China. 
Strained relations between Japan and the United States 
had made Grew increasingly aware of his need for fully com-
petent second-in-command. In June 1936, Grew responded to an 
inquiry from Hornbeck as to a candidate to replace Edwin 
Neville, Counselor of the embassy. Specifying his preference 
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for a language officer, Grew suggested three candidates: 
John K. Caldwell, Joseph W. Ballantine, and Dooman. He 
then eliminated the first two men, noting that he did not 
know Caldwell and indicating that he knew Ballantine had 
already been assigned to a position in the division. He 
dwelled on Dooman, commenting that they had twice met and 
in both instances Grew's impressions had been "entirely 
favorable." To allay any misapprehensions which Hornbeck 
may have harbored, the ambassador assured the chief that 
Dooman's reputation, his "prejudices," and "'touchiness'" 
preceded him. Questioning the undesirability of such traits, 
Grew went on to corrunent that Dooman's "broad background of 
things Japanese" and his "poise and mature judgment," made 
Dooman the ideal candidate. After some elucidation as to 
the importance of a well qualified wife, "a factor worthy 
of consideration," Grew returned to the subject at hand 
pointing out that Dooman would arrive in Tokyo fully informed 
and with a "clear conception of just what material the Depart-
ment needs and desires and the form in which it can be most 
helpfully presented." Grew described that knowledge as "a 
controlling factor," in choosing Neville's successor. Thus, 
on January 5, 1937, Doornan was ordered to Japan. 1 
1Letter, Grew to Hornbeck, 6/22/1936, Grew papers; 




For his efforts, the ambassador had gained a loyal 
and worthy adviser and a diligent worker. The two men com-
plemented each other. Grew, the model ambassador, possessed 
the proper social, economic and political background enabling 
him to function at a patrician's level. Dooman typified the 
epitome of an "expert" possessing special knowledge of the 
country in which he served and a language capability that 
made it possible for him to communicate with a wide range of 
individuals at various levels of government and society. 
Dooman enjoyed two advantages not shared by Grew: a large 
number of influential Japanese friends and the ability to 
communicate with them in their native tongue. His depth of 
training and experience in Japan so thoroughly overshadowed 
Grew's, that Ballantine, who read incoming dispatches from 
Tokyo, concluded that Grew was an excellent diplomat but 
the most important reports came from Dooman. Ballantine 
recalled that it was Dooman and not Grew whose "analyses 
and reports • ." reflected "an outstanding quality of 
penetration, knowledge, and understanding of Japanese 
2 
character." 
Japan perplexed Grew. He reached the point of 
believing that the more he learned about the country and 
its people, the less that he really knew, and, because of 
2Ballantine, "Reminiscences, .. p. 30. 
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this feeling, he abandoned his efforts along these lines. 
This problem never afflicted his subordinate. Grew's 
qualities and limitations also left him with a smaller 
circle of contacts than that of Dooman. The Aniliassador 
counted among his acquaintances, aristocrats, the wealthy, 
and high officials, or as he described them, "the worth-
while • • better class • . substantial Japanese." 
They were the "liberals," and he felt most comfortable 
among them since many spoke English or French, the language 
that he relied on for diplomatic occasions, even those 
involving the Emperor. Grew's sensitivity to his lack of 
skill in the Japanese language was such that despite his 
reservations regarding the appointment of Matsuoka Yosuke 
in 1940, he nonetheless, took comfort in the fact that the 
Foreign Minister could speak English. Dooman's qualifica-
tions made him an obvious asset in the Tokyo embassy, and 
the two men's work and contacts converged rather than 
diverged. Consequently, they worked together closely, 
becoming as Grew had promised, "thick as thieves." 3 
Dooman arrived at the embassy on May 22, 1937, some 
four months after receiving his orders to Tokyo. He departed 
from the United States, evidently having resolved the 
"certain cases" which Hull reported as the cause of his 
delay. During those additional weeks, Dooman attacked the 
3Heinrich, pp. 193-196, 209-210, 239, 324. 
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Department and voiced his dislike and consternation over 
the preference which he believed the Department was giving 
to China over Japan. In a note to the Assistant Chief of 
the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Maxwell M. Hamilton, 
and to Dooman's own successor, Ballantine, he questioned 
the effectiveness of the Department while pointing out its 
pro-Chinese tendencies. While sorting diplomatic dispatches, 
he had discovered a memorandum from Nelson T. Johnson, 
American Ambassador to China. The paper was a record of 
a conversation between Johnson and General Chang Chun, 
Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, relating the general's 
interpretation of reasons behind the Emperor's selection of 
General Ugaki Kazushige as head of a new cabinet. This 
conversation infuriated Dooman, not because Chang's evalua-
tion "missed the mark by several leagues. ."but because 
he felt that Johnson had ignored the availability of his own 
government's Japan experts and had seemingly endorsed the 
Chinese explanation. This criticism served notice that the 
recipients should be skeptical of information gained in 
this manner and should rely on the Division's geographic 
specialists for intelligence related to a specific nation. 
Having alerted Ballantine to what he considered a political 
problem within the Department, Dooman left for Japan and 
new problems.4 
4123D72/l89, Secretary of State to American Embassy, 
Tokyo, 3/16/1937; 894.00/708, Dooman to Hamilton and 
Ballantine, 3/20/1937. 
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Dooman's arrival strengthened an already capable 
staff. Besides Grew, there were others who had previously 
won accolades from the superiors for their work as diplomats 
or military men. 
served in Europe. 
Edward Crocker, Grew's protocol officer, had 
He lacked training in Japanese, but he 
made up for that shortcoming to a great extent by drawing 
on his broad background in the Foreign Service. It would 
later fall on Crocker's shoulders to deliver the United States' 
declaration of war. Cabot Coville, First Secretary, was a 
former Japanese language student with eleven years of service. 
He supervised a group of young language officers which 
included Maxwell Bishop, u. Alexis Johnson, and John K. 
Emmerson. Daily, this group accumulated and assimilated as 
much information as possible from a wide range of sources, 
then prepared their analyses. Dooman and Grew then read and 
approved or modified those reports before sending them to 
Washington. Working in this manner, the staff produced and 
delivered integrated messages that carried Grew's signature. 
In addition, the Ambassador made allowances for dissident 
opinions. He would forward dispatches bearing the initials 
of the officer who prepared the report, attaching to it a 
note with his comments. Despite the qualities of the 
individuals involved, cooperation remained the keynote, and 
Grew expected everyone, regardless of his own special 
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training, to pitch in and help in matters outside of his 
own area. 5 
, 
This was also true of the military attache. Grew 
received his military intelligence from a staff of officers 
whose training and abilities matched that of his civilians. 
The army's contingent included at one point, Frank Merrill, 
who later led the famed .. Merrill's Marauders 11 in Burma, and 
Captain Maxwell Taylor, destined to become the army's Chief 
of Staff. Among the naval personnel was a Lieutenant-
Commander, Edward T. Layton, and a marine langauge student, 
Alva Bryan Lasswell. Layton, who became an admiral during 
the war, and Lasswell,who rose to the rank of lieutenant 
colonel in army intelligence,had occasion to work together 
again after leaving Tokyo. In 1942, Lasswell deciphered and 
translated intercepted Japanese messages that made it 
possible for Layton to plan and direct the destruction of 
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's plane in the south Pacific. 6 
Srnterview with Cabot Coville conducted by Sharon 
Chamberlain, 4/19/1975; EHD, pp. 61-63; Ballantine, "Reminiscences, .. 
p. 30; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929-1969 (New 
York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973), p. 108. Ballantine 
said that Dooman lacked perspective since he had not served 
in Manchuria. There, Ballantine concluded, Dooman could have 
seen the other side of the Japanese. Ballantine stated that 
Dooman 11 had no idea of the character that this absolute 
power. ." free of 11 public opinion and social sanctions, 11 
engendered. Dooman could never 11 Visualize that and have it 
so impressed so indelibly upon his mind that he couldn't get 
away from it . . as I did. 11 Ballantine, "Reminiscences, 11 pp. 
12-13, 17. 
6Relmin Morin, East Wind Rising - A Lonf View of the 
Pacific Crisis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960 , p. 298; David 
Kahn, The Codebreakers (New York: MacMillian and Company, 1967), 
pp . 5 9 5 , 5 9 8 . 
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Although these officers, for the most part, departed 
from Tokyo at different intervals, continuity remained in the 
form of expert replacements and it remained a harmonious 
organization throughout the period prior to the second world 
war. Together the staff functioned in a "white tie suburbia," 
as one witness described it. They associated with other 
foreign representatives, missionaries, and businessmen, 
playing golf and tennis, two passions that Grew and Dooman 
shared. 7 
Dooman's auspicious arrival in May into this congenial 
atmosphere began a very short period during which he and 
Grew had few opportunities to indulge in any outside activ-
ities. A minor skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge near 
Peiping (Peking) on July 7 developed into hostilities on a 
large scale. The fighting intensified and spread into north-
eastern China. Although daily telegrams reporting escalation 
arrived in the Department, none of the reports indicated or 
speculated that a Japanese invasion of China would follow. 
The events of July sent Dooman scurrying, and he found himself 
exploiting his close friendship with Yoshizawa Seijiro, Chief 
of the Foreign Ministry's American Bureau. For his part, 
Grew decided that the embassy should maintain a low profile 
and confined his reporting to Japanese actions affecting 
7 Morin , p. 2 9 9 . 
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American nationals or interests in China. He consciOU$ly 
avoided making policy suggestions. 8 
In August, Grew moved cautiously away from this 
position and ventured making a recommendation to Washington. 
Earlier, on July 28, Britain had proposed offering Anglo-
American good offices as a means of bringing Chinese and 
Japanese officials into negotiations. A week later, as a 
follow-up, the British government asked for Grew's opinion 
as to the probably Japanese reaction to such an offer. Grew 
met with James Dodds, British Charg~, Dodd's Assistant, 
George Sansom, and Dooman to consider the matter. All agreed 
that there was "no discernible enthusiasm among the Japanese 
government or people for war with China. • " and con-
sequently, the American government "should leave no stone 
unturned to prevent war .. II Based on this consensusr 
Grew recommended acceptance of the British suggestion. The 
plan failed to materialize, perishing in the wake of increased 
fighting and the receipt of a news report announcing the 
enlistment of American aviators in the Chinese Air Force. 
8Grew to Dooman, letter, 2/9/1937, Grew papers, Vol. 
83; cf. Tokyo's telegrams 205, 7/16/1927, and 211, 7/17/1937, 
in FRUS, 1937, Vol. III, pp. 184, 209; see also, Record Group 
84, 1937, Box 61, Vol. XI, marked 711.2 China-Japan: Blockade 
of China, Record of Conversation, Dooman and Yoshizawa, 8/26/1937, 
and Box 62, Vol. XV, 1937, 710 China-Japan file, July 24 -
August 31, Dooman memorandum, "North China Situation," 8.5.1937; 
Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty 
Years, 1904 - 1945, Vol. II (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1952) 1 P• 1063, 
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Undaunted, Grew cabled a penetrating analysis of 
the Sino-Japanese situation on August 6, which included 
further suggestions for policy formulation.9 
The Ambassador made clear that the report represented 
the integrated view of his staff, adding that he had drawn on 
the "extensive experiences" of himself and "several of my 
advisers." They emphasized that Japan's friendship should 
not be lost in the attempt to save China's. To this end, 
the document carried a plea which Grew and Dooman had made 
earlier, asking Washington to consider carefully the wisdom 
of taking any action that would destroy Japanese good will 
and confidence in the United States. It stressed the dangers 
inherent in a strict legalistic interpretation of the problem 
in Asia and solutions arrived at solely on the basis of 
treaties, a point that Dooman had made in 1935. In supporting 
this point, they recalled the repercussions resulting from 
the passage of the Immigration Act and the non-recognition 
doctrine, two actions that had previously threatened 
Japanese-American relations. Given the consequences of 
those two incidents, Grew and Dooman responded that history 
supported their contention that the United States stood to 
9FRUS, 1937, Vol. III, Ambassador in the UK, Bingham, 
to Secretary of State, 6/28/1937, p. 286; Grew, Ten Years in 
Japan: A Contemporary Record Drawn From the Diaries and Private 
and Official Papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador 
to Japan, 1932 - 1942 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944), 
pp. 214-215; FRUS, 1937, Vol. III, telegram 250, Grew to 
Secretary of State, 8/6/1937, pp. 340-341. 
101 
gain more from a display of good will and impartiality. 
Their beliefs became the cornerstone of the embassy's future 
policy recommendations and the basis of their opposition to 
the use of offensive measures. 10 
Hull's response shocked them. It also forecast the 
nature of Washington's attitude. "We have no desire," Hull 
wrote, "to injure either country, we wish to be a good 
neighbor to both, but we should not permit ourselves to be 
hampered in the making of our decisions by being especially 
solicitous that what we do shall not be displeasing to one 
or other or both of the combatant countries." Having declared 
his opposition to Grew's suggested line, the Secretary of 
State bluntly told the Ambassador that Japan had angered 
the American people and if the Japanese expected his country's 
good will and assistance, they could best demonstrate those 
desires through proven respect for American policies and 
methods. Hull assured the embassy that United States' 
policies would continue to "be guided by laws and treaties." 11 
This legalistic determination that Hull relished 
and adhered to had as an avid supporter, Stanley Hornbeck. 
lOFRUS, 1937, Vol. III, telegram 321, Grew to Secre-
tary of State, 8/27/1937, pp. 485-488. 
llFRUS, 1937, Vol. III, telegram 187, Hull to Grew, 
9/2/1937, pp. 505-508; Akira Iriye, "The Role of the United 
States Embassy in Tokyo," in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-
American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei 
Okamoto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 114. 
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Hornbeck's reaction to the events of July 1937 varied little 
from his reaction to the Manchurian incident six years 
earlier. He again saw the Japanese, in their inherently 
lawless fashion, precipitating a crisis with the intention 
of separating north China from the rest of the nation. 
Accordingly, the Marco Polo Bridge incident had not happened 
accidentally, but rather it marked Japan's direct assault 
on Chinese sovereignty. Although appalled, Hornbeck saw 
few legally justifiable moves that his government could 
make. He pointed this out in a conversation with Wang 
Cheng-tung, China's Ambassador to the United States. 
Hornbeck infomed Wang that the most likely action that the 
Chinese might expect from the United States would be an 
appeal for support from the signatories of the Nine-Power 
Treaty. Hornbeck indicated to the envoy that the United 
States could not act independently and that neither the 
Nine-Power Treaty nor the Kellogg Pact detailed a specific 
course of action. He thus counseled the Chinese to fend 
for themselves as best they could. Hornbeck, however, did 
not give up seeking some legal method of intervening. He 
suggested that an emergency conference be held at the White 
House to consider a request for re-enforcing American forces 
in Shanghai. Ostensibly the troops would be for the pro-
tection of American interests, but, he observed, they would 
also serve to deter Japanese encroachment on the city. He 
recommended immediate action, citing as justification the 
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right of any nation to protect the lives and property of 
its nationals. In the meantime he cautioned Hull against 
"inducing the Chinese to make concessions."12 
The attitude which the Secretary expressed put the 
embassy staff on the defensive. Grew sent a letter of 
clarification ~n which he reviewed Hull's comments point 
by point. It had become abundantly clear to the two men 
in Tokyo that they shared the same feelings as their 
Washington superiors, a dislike of the course of action 
which the Japanese were pursuing. The major source of 
disagreement, Grew wrote, centered "not about policy or 
attitude," but around the "method" needed to effect 
successful relations in the future. Dooman's feelings along 
this line were evident in a warning against American or allied 
"moral intervention." A criticism of British "ineptitude" 
included in the letter also bore evidence of Dooman's 
sensitivity to Japanese feelings: 
l 2FRUS, 1937, Vol. III, series of Hornbeck memoranda, 
and records of conversations covering the period from July 16 
to August 12. See pages 189-190, 333, 312, 380-382, 420-424. 
Subsequent historical research indicates that the incident was 
not a premediated act on the part of the Japanese government 
or military, as Hornbeck alleged. The hostilities could have 
been ended except that the Nationalist government was determined 
to use the incident in opposing Japanese penetration of China. 
Similarly the Japanese government, determined to reduce the 
influence of the Kuomintang in north China, steadfastly opposed 
a solution that would not alter the status quo of the area. 
See James B. Crowley, "A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident," Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXII, 3, 
May 1963. 
There sometimes appears an ineptitude in their 
methods, and especially in the tone and 
language and timing of their official communica-
tions. . . These things do count.l3 
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Grew's letter reached Hull on October 5, the same 
day that President Roosevelt delivered his "Quarantine 
Speech" in Chicago. In his address, Roosevelt implied that 
Japan had continued in an undeclared war that included the 
murder of innocent civilians and it had thus become part 
of a small group dedicated to obtaining its goals through 
the use of force. That small section, that "ten per cent," 
said the President, faced the other ninety per cent who 
opposed blatant violations of international agreements. 
Because of the "contagious nature" of war, Roosevelt called 
for a quarantine of the infected nations. His speech 
coincided with publication of a League of Nations report 
that blamed Japan for the hostilities and the following 
day, the Department of State endorsed the League's findings 
that Japanese encroachment into China contravened the Nine-
Power Treaty. American reaction to the speech varied. 
Hull's own feelings represented, he believed, those of the 
American people and he cited numerous demonstrations, polls, 
and calls for impeachment. Other surveys indicated, however, 
a favorable reaction. Press coverage and correspondence 
from both the public and private sectors supported Roosevelt, 
13FRUS, 1937, Vol. III, Grew to Hull, 9/15/1937, 
pp. 525-530. 
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and one article praised him for enlightening Americans with 
"things which need saying.nl4 
The Japanese press seized on the same feelings that 
Hull had sensed. The Foreign Office directed its official 
reaction not at the speech, however, but at the State Depart-
ment•s endorsement of the League's accusations. Echoing 
Dooman•s pointed memorandum on Western and Oriental concepts 
of contracts, the Foreign Office took the position that since 
conditions had changed since the signing of the treaty, it 
could not be used as a basis for regulating relations 
between China and Japan. It was the type of reaction that 
Dooman and Grew had warned of and predicted. 15 
A marked change in Japanese attitudes followed. On 
the day preceding Roosevelt's speech, Matsuoka Kojiro, a 
member of a zaibatsu family, called on Grew. In the course 
of their conversation, Matsuoka revealed that his sources 
had informed him of a shift in Japanese military thinking. 
He indicated that the Japanese army and navy had previously 
14u. s. State Department, Department of State Press 
Releases, Vol. XVLL, 419, October 9, 1937, p. 275; FRUS, 1937, 
Vol. IV, Hull to U. s. Minister in Switzerland, p. 62; Hull, 
Memoirs, Vol. I, pp. 545-546; Travis Beal Jacobs, "Roosevelt's 
Quarantine Speech, 11 The Historian, Vol. XXLV, 4, August 1962; 
see also Dorothy Borg, "Notes on Roosevelt's 'Quarantine 
Speech, 111 Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXLL, 3, September 
1957, pp. 405-433. 
l5FRUS, 1937, Vol. III, telegram 456, Grew to 
Secretary of State, 10/7/1937, pp. 585-586. 
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envisioned the United States as Japan's most dangerous enemy. 
This had changed because of a recent shift in British 
attitudes. Before leaving the embassy, Matsuoka spoke with 
Dooman, taking the opportunity to emphasize the point that 
he had already made to Grew. Dooman inquired as to the 
specifics that generated the change reported by Matsuoka 
and learned that the British had offended Japanese leaders, 
by calling them "natives" in various commu.niques. The United 
States, on the other hand had,observed Matsuoka, presented 
written comments which were considered "reasonable and were 
formulated as though they were addressed to a 'civilized' 
nation." The events of October 5 and 6 brought an immediate 
change. A week after he had spoken with Grew and Dooman, 
praising American attitudes, Matsuoka returned for another 
visit. Taking up their conversation of the previous week, 
Dooman asked his visitor for further elaboration as to the 
thinking of those military friends whom Matsuoka had 
represented. "That is now ancient history," announced 
Matsuoka, "a result of the President's Chicago speech and 
the Department's announcement of October 6. II 11 There 
is," he continued, "intense adverse feeling toward the 
United States." 16 
l6Record group 84, Vol. XII, 710-China Japan Good 
Will Missions Abroad, record of conversation, Grew and Matsuoka, 
10/5/1937, and record of conversation, Dooman and Matsuoka, 
10/5/1937. Both memorandums were forwarded to Hull, dispatch 
2619, 10/8/ 1937. The record of the Matsuoka-Dooman conversa-
tion of October 12 was sent from Grew to Hull, dispatch 2633, 
10/12/1937. See Grew, Turbulent Era, II, pp. 1156-1157. Hirota 
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Aside from indicating Japanese reaction to Roosevelt's 
speech, this incident demonstrated the minor consideration 
given to recommendations from Tokyo. Aware that he lacked 
the "complete picture," which he assumed was visible in 
Washington, Grew nonetheless felt that he had the wherewithall 
to make wise suggestions, drawing as he did on his own 
experiences and the knowledge of his experts. The significance 
of information gained in private conversations and passed 
on to Washington served not so much as an accurate indicator 
of official Japanese attitudes, but were intended to act as 
a barometer of Japanese sentiments in general. These, Grew 
and Dooman believed, could be used in the formulation of 
policies. They realized from the events of October that 
their Washington associates cared little if any for this 
line of thought. The offensive quality of Roosevelt's 
comments led Grew to believe contrariwise that his nation 
had chosen instead a path that potentially led to war. 17 
Two months later, on December l, that possibility 
loomed into reality as Japanese aircraft, without orders 
had told Grew that "The Japanese had hitherto blamed Great 
Britain for attempting to organize a solid united front against 
Japan . . This was in November and Hirota added that "The 
Chicago speech had temporarily modified. . ." that conclusion, 
but subsequent statements by the President restored their 
confidence. Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern 
Crisis, p. 464. 
l7Heinrichs, p. 248. 
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from Tokyo, attached and sank the U. S. s. Panay, an American 
gunship patrolling the Yangtze River in China. The incident 
ended as quickly as it began, thanks to Grew's quick action. 
In less than four hours, after reading the cables reporting 
the attack, he and Japan's Foreign Minister, Hirota had 
spoken together twice, the latter expressing dismay and 
regret. They immediately undertook efforts to resolve the 
problem. Grew's alert measures, without instruction from 
Washington, produced an apologetic note from the Japanese, 
which Grew cabled to Hull and thereby avoided a potentially 
explosive situation. Two weeks after the sinking, the 
United States accepted Japan's formal reply to an American 
note of protest. Final settlement came on April 30, 1938, 
when Yoshizawa presented to a rather nervous Dooman a check 
in the sum of $2,214,007.36 for damages to the vessel and 
its crew. 18 
Dooman's first year in Japan had been an eventful 
one and Grew was happy with his new lieutenant. He registered 
that satisfaction in an efficiency report filed in November 
1937, six months after Dooman's arrival. Lauding his 
counselor's "high abilities, sound judgment, cooperative 
spirit and indefatigable industry," Grew told of Dooman's 
l8Iriye, "The Role of the United States Embassy in 
Tokyo," pp. 119-120; Grew, Ten Years, p. 32 ff; Manny T. 
Koginos, The Panay Incident: Prelude to War (Lafayette, 
Ind.: Purdue University Studies, 1967); Interview with 
Mrs. Dooman. 
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"continual assistance during 'this intense period.'" The 
Ambassador had, he observed, "to rely on him as my right 
hand assistant, constantly seeking his reactions, judgment 
and advice. . " Dooman's assets included "his analytical 
mind . . his frankness and courage in supporting his con-
victions once they had been reached by thorough and careful 
analysis . . and his ability to draft dispatches and 
other documents in accurate and lucid style." His social 
graces, which were hardly tangential to diplomatic work, 
drew praise from the Ambassador also. Grew had made Dooman 
an etiquette officer, turning over to him young staff members 
who greeted people while smoking cigarettes, arrived late 
for luncheons or "slouched" into a room, hands in pockets. 
He also noted Dooman's unique position among the Japanese, 
having lived among them as a child and as a young man. The 
latter quality enabled Dooman to "meet the Japanese on 
intimate terms. " making his contacts "of outstanding 
helpfulness to the Embassy." Even Dooman's golfing abilities 
(necessary for "establishing contacts with, and commending 
." oneself "to a considerable sector of the government 
and business world which indulges in that form of exercise. .") 
received the Ambassador's attention. In recommending his sub-
ordinate for promotion to Class I, which Dooman received 
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sixteen months later, Grew confided that he ncould have 
asked for no more effective and efficient counselor than 
Dooman." 19 
Grew's thoughts and feelings, set down in a routine 
efficiency report told only half the story. Grew had, in 
fact, discovered that he owed Dooman a larger debt, for his 
counselor had saved the Ambassador from a situation that 
was so embarrassing that Grew had considered resigning. 
As early as 1930, American fishing concerns had observed 
Japanese vessels in and near Alaskan waters, particularly 
the Bristol Bay area. In 1935, a complaint received in 
Washington resulted in a Department of State enquiry into 
the possibility of a treaty protecting American salmon 
fishing interests. Japanese officials responded negatively, 
citing limited Japanese interest in the Bristol Bay area. 
The following year, a proposed Japanese investigation into 
the possibility of nopen sea fishing enterprisesn in Alaskan 
waters, drew an immediate request for confirmation of the 
project from Hull. Grew replied in the affirmative, clari-
fying that the activities would be carried non the high seas," 
and not in American waters. By December 1936 Dooman became 
19Grew papers, Vol. 85, 1937; Vol. 94, 1934, Diary, 
4/22/1937, p. 4017. In a letter to Hamilton, Grew stated 
that the reporting and representation was nin a very large 
degree of any merit . . . due to my efficient and effective 
staff in which I am particularly fortunate especially in the 
admirable support of Dooman." Grew papers, Vol. 91, Letters, 
1938, Grew to Hamilton, 9/6/1938. 
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involved, conferring with members of the Canadian legation 
in Washington and seeking some form of agreement with the 
Japanese. The American solution was to commit the govern-
ments of those countries with a northern Pacific coastline 
(The United States, Russia, Canada, and Japan) to a treaty 
supporting conservation of the salmon resources in the 
northern Pacific. The magnitude of the problem came into 
sharp focus as President Roosevelt became personally involved, 
and in December 1937 he seriously considered issuing an 
executive proclamation closing the Bristol Bay area to all 
fishing. Finally, the Japanese consented to abandonment of 
their planned exploratory expedition, but not before they 
called attention to the fact that fishing on the high seas 
remained a privilege of all nations. Grew wrote Hull that 
this move signaled the Japanese government's intention of 
not providing licenses that would allow Japanese vessels 
to fish in Alaskan waters. 20 
The incident, far from being over, had reached its 
peak. Under normal circumstances complaints of this nature 
20FRUS, 1935, Vol. III, Telegram 639, William Phillips 
to Grew, 11/19/1934, p. 1072; telegram 118, Grew to Phillips, 
6/3/1935, p. 1075; telegram 119, Hull to Edwin Neville, 8/3/ 
1935, p. 1076; telegram 208, Neville to Hull, 11/12/1935, 
p. 1078; FRUS, 1936, Vol. IV, telegram 67, Hull to Grew, 
6/3/1936, p. 943; telegram 124, Grew to Hull, 6/14/1936, p. 943; 
memorandum of conversation, Dooman and Representatives of the 
Canadian Embassy, 12/16/1936, p. 947; FRUS, 1937, Vol. IV, 
telegram 1262, Hull to Grew 6/5/1937, p. 740; Roosevelt 
memorandum 12/21/1927, p. 768; memorandum by Counselor of 
Department of State, 11/22/1937, p. 771; telegram 669, Grew 
to Hull, 12/22/1937, p. 777. 
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might have very well passed away, given the efforts of a 
few good commercial attaches. But this period was not normal, 
and the already strained relations between the two nations 
magnified non-political problems to their fullest. So it 
was that in late March 1938 Grew read an International News 
Service story published in Tokyo which reported a Congressional 
measure "specifying that no foreigners should be allowed to 
fish in Bristol Bay" was obviously aimed at Japanese fisher-
men. Grew, in convincing Hirota to accept the settlement 
reached the previous year, had indicated that passage of 
such legislation appeared imminent if an agreement could not 
be reached. The Foreign Minister acted on Grew's suggestion, 
helping to bring about the December arrangement. The proposed 
bill thus appeared to compromise Grew's word to Hirota. It 
seemed that once again Grew's efforts had been wasted, par-
ticularly if Roosevelt signed the act, since Grew presumed 
that he had negotiated his agreement with Hirota under the 
auspices of the President. Such action would indicate a 
breach of faith on Grew's part, and that, he believed, left 
him little choice but to resign. 21 
But Dooman interceded, taking the matter into his 
capable hands. The chief credit for the solution of the 
Alaskan fishing problem, Grew later wrote, ''is abundantly 
due to Dooman who ... has given a large part of his efforts, 
21Grew papers, Diary, Vol. 93, March 1938, pp. 3735-
3736. 
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thought and constructive suggestions in working out the 
details with Yoshizawa. There have been moments of great 
discouragement when a solution looked hopeless and I 
attribute to Dooman a major share of the credit for 
ironing out the almost inseparable difficulties which 
were largely of a domestic political nature." Dooman 
also reached Grew in the Ambassador's moment of despair 
and the counselor helped with a momentous decision. Grew 
wrote in his diary: 
Very fortunately, I decided to omit from my 
preliminary telegram any question of resigna-
tion, which could be approached subsequently 
if the press reports were confirmed. Dooman 
and I discussed the question for the better 
part of that night and were in entire agree-
ment. It was not a pleasant night at all. 
Relief overcame the Ambassador when he received a depart-
mental cable informing him that the matter had been resolved 
and that the news report had been incomplete and that the 
bill referred only to a restriction of fishing in American 
"territorial waters." 22 
Grew was thankful, nonetheless, for Dooman's per-
formance, and he appealed on Dooman's behalf for consideration 
of his counselor's enigmatic position in the service, a 
situation that Grew described to Hull in detail. This 
needed clarification, he wrote to Hull, because "this . 
22Grew papers, Vol. 91, 1938, 11 Letters," Grew to 
Hull, 3/29/1938. 
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point may not be well known to the officers now dealing with 
personnel questions in the Department." Continuing, he 
explained how Dooman had entered the consular service prior 
to 1924 in the capacity of a language student, later 
becoming a secretary, and "He has never been able to over-
come the penalty of serving those somewhat anarnOlous 
positions during those early days .... " Despite Dooman's 
twenty-six years of service he remained in Class II of the 
service, a "penalty" that permitted officers junior to Dooman 
to be promoted ahead of him. This created, according to Grew, 
"a situation which might have killed all service in a less 
selfless and conscientious man." He concluded his letter 
with a note on an additional problem, that of Dooman's modesty. 
He emphasized that Dooman had "not suggested this letter . 
[and] does not know that I am writing it and would probably 
disapprove if he did . . . He is not inclined to blow his 
own horn." Grew asked that his comments be given prompt 
consideration and that his letter be filed in Dooman's record. 
He closed his note to Hull with a comment that Dooman "has 
proved himself an absolutely first class officer Chief of Staff, 
a wise and well balanced counselor and one of the hardest 
workers I have ever been associated with. II Leaving 
no stone unturned, Grew sent a copy of the letter to Hornbeck 
as well, asking him to "put in an oar" if possible. A year 
23 
later Dooman received his promotion to Class I. 
23Ibid., See also Grew papers, Grew to Hornbeck, 
3/29/1938; Vol. 94, Diary, p. 4017, 3/22/1939. 
CHAPTER 5 
"A SADDENING WORLD . ul 
In the two years that followed his promotion, Dooman 
continued in his efforts to prevent or at least delay the 
complete collapse of Japanese-An1erican relations. Deteriora-
tion of the tense situation in Europe compounded problems~ 
particularly after the signing of the Tripartite Pact that 
linked Berlin and Rome with Tokyo in September 1940. Between 
1939 and 1940 Dooman and Grew met with Japanese representatives 
in a series of talks which they hoped would lead to resolution 
of various problems and misunderstandings. Repeatedly they 
failed largely because of the resistance of Hull and his 
subordinates. By December 8, 1941, the two men in Japan 
learned that they had not succeeded and they could take 
little comfort from knowing that they had tried. 
In the years between 1938 and 1941 American policy-
makers linked events in Asia with those occurring in Europe 
where Germany's Adolph Hitler menaced neighboring states. 
1 From the Haiku by Issa: 
A Saddening World: 
Flowers whose sweet 
Blooms must fall . 
As we too, alas .. 
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By t1arch 1938, he had consolidated his power sufficiently 
to absorb neighboring Austria without encountering an opposing 
shot. Within a year Czechoslovakia fell. Significantly, 
the Nazi successes in Europe coincided with Japanese actions 
in China, including the "Rape of Nanking," and the fall of 
Hankow and Canton. American officials, most notably Hull, 
saw a connection between the events, despite being separated 
by thousands of miles. Roosevelt had also linked Japanese 
action to the intensifying struggle in Europe. This image, 
however slow to develop in the minds of the American people, 
clearly existed in the minds of American policy makers. In 
this manner, events in Asia became inextricably bound up with 
2 those of Europe. 
German policy makers, evaluating the global situation, 
perceived the benefits of a German-Japanese alliance that 
would require the Russians to watch closely their back door 
and place an additional burden on the British in protecting 
its Asian colonies. Success for this plan hinged on events 
in Japan. The possibility of an alliance seemed to gain in 
momentum on January 4, 1939, when the Konoye cabinet fell 
because, according to Grew, it had .. completed its mission in 
China and Konoye's failure to stem the tide toward a more 
authoritarian form of government •..• " The appointment 
of Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro, whom the Ambassador described as 
2rriye, Across the Pacific, pp. 201-203. 
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"one of the leading proponents. . " of Japanese totali-
tarianism, followed the next day. On February 8, Grew 
again cabled Hull, this time informing him of German-Japanese 
negotiations "intended to produce a definitive alliance, 
military and political." Grew had already spoken with 
Arita Hachiro, who became Japan's Foreign Minister in 
October of 1938. The Ambassador had suggested to Arita 
that the Japanese government should consider the effects 
that the proposed alliance might have on Japanese-American 
relations. Hull agreed with Grew's point regarding the 
undesirability of an alliance and he wired the Ambassador, 
asking that Grew seek some form of rapproachment but 
emphasizing the importance of having the Japanese take the 
initiative "so as not to commit us formally." The Ambassador 
moved, seizing every opportunity to proffer his opposition to 
the pact, speaking with government officials, journalists, 
acquaintances, and other foreign diplomats.
3 
Grew's lobbying, combined with other external con-
siderations, succeeded. The Ambassador was aided in his 
efforts by a Japanese concern for maintaining good relations 
with the United States and their apprehension regarding 
Russia's possible reactions to a German-Japanese pact. The 
3FRUS, 1939, Vol. IV, telegrams 4, 5, and 6, Grew to 
Hull, all dated l/5/1939, pp. 443-444; Hull, Memoirs, Vol. I, 
p. 627; Heinrichs, American Ambassador, p. 278; Johana 
Heskill, Hitler & Japan: The Hollow Alliance (New York: 
Atherton Press, 1966), pp. 5-6. 
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relationship with the United States had received, in the 
meantime, an additional boost when the American government 
announced its intentions of delivering to Japan the ashes 
of a former Japanese llinbassador aboard the warship Astoria. 
Saito Hiroshi had recently retired as Japan's Ambassador 
andwas not an official at the time of his death. Thus, the 
Japanese interpreted the move as a good will gesture. Taking 
these events into account, Grew wired Washington that the 
chances of the proposed alliance coming to fruition were nil.4 
The predicted failure of the alliance comforted Grew, 
but it had less significance for those at horne in the Depart-
ment. Hornbeck's attitude was one of "so what." Agreeing 
that a "substantially hostile act" by the United States 
"might" drive Japan into the Berlin-Rome pact, he went on 
to comment that "I do not: (1) believe that the taking of any 
rnoderate steps toward bringing pressure upon Japan such as 
have been and are under consideration in this country would 
have such an effect, and I do not (2) believe that, in any 
event the world situation would be substantially worse if the 
Japanese were to take such a step." For once Hornbeck allowed 
the Japanese a rational mind, pointing out that Japan would 
not antagonize the United States by signing the treaty just 
to gain popularity with the Fascist states. All reason aside, 
4Heinrichs, p. 287. 
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he asked what difference would it make since over the years 
such a pact would not "substantially alter the effective course 
5 of world events." 
This generally negative attitude on the part of 
Hull's most influential Far Eastern adviser had an effect 
on the declining relations between the two nations. On 
May 18, Grew and Dooman met with Arita who presented them 
with a message from Prime Minister Hiranuma, indicating that 
the Prime Minister wanted it delivered personally and in 
confidence to the American government. Grew departed on 
leave to the States that same evening, having delivered the 
embassy to the "effective hands of Dooman." The Ambassador 
had with him both Arita's comment that better relations 
between the two countries would be forthcoming and Hiranauma's 
message urging detente. The Prime Minister had indicated 
that Japan and the United States had a moral responsibility 
to curb the fighting in Europe and to work for world peace. 6 
Soon after Grew's departure, Dooman became enmeshed 
in the first of two attempts that directly involved himself 
and Japanese leaders in efforts to find extra-diplomatic 
means of settling Japanese-American differences. On May 23, 
5FRUS, 1939, Vol. III, Hornbeck memorandum, 5/11/1939, 
pp. 34-37. 
6FRUS, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, telegram 234, Grew 
to Secretary of State, 5/19/1939, p. 1; telegram 235, Grew to 
Secretary of State, 5/18/1939, pp. l-5. 
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Hiranuma's personal adviser, identified only as "a man named 
,. 
Fujii" in Dooman's oral history, called on the Charge asking 
if he would be willing to meet "privately and secretly" with 
the Prime Minister. Dooman agreed. They set a time, and 
in a clandestine series of events Fujii picked him up and 
they drove to the Shinjuku area of Tokyo where they alighted 
and walked the remaining three blocks to Hiranuma's home. 
There the two men ate a traditional Japanese meal and dis-
cussed the world situation. According to Dooman, Hiranuma 
"gave a very interesting discourse on the way things were 
threatening to develop. He said that there was a great deal 
to be said on behalf of Germany and Italy from the long range 
point of view. ." although he wasn't defending the Nazis." 
The Prime Minister stressed that the rapidly spreading war 
in Europe promised to draw Japan and the United States into 
its vortex. This could be avoided, he continued, if the two 
nations worked jointly to avoid becoming involved and moved 
to achieve peace in Europe. Dooman expressed his doubts 
concerning the possibility of such a collaboration citing 
the fact that "Japan was considered to be guilty of the 
same acts of which Germany and Italy stood, condemned. II 
in the adverse American press coverage. Without responding 
directly, Hiranuma suggested that he would take the necessary 
steps to bring Germany and Italy to a joint conference if 
Roosevelt would take similar action with the British and 
121 
French. In conclusion, he urged, and Dooman agreed, that 
their meeting and discussion should be kept secret. 7 
Hiranuma's concern for secrecy was not without reason. 
His control of government policies depended on his ability 
to satisfy and manipulate various elements within his 
cabinet which could bring down his government, particularly 
the army. In a high level meeting on April 25, Army Minister 
Itagaki Seishiro, who favored a European alliance, threatened 
to resign and inspire acts of violence if the other cabinet 
members failed to support their position. The army's war 
in China had slowed and its leaders, envisioning an Axis 
victory in Europe, believed that the European alliance would 
aid them in their efforts on the Asian mainland. Arita and 
Navy Minister Yonai Mitsurnasa opposed the pact and Arita 
threatened to resign if Itagaki prevailed. Hiranuma was 
caught between the two factions and although he had initially 
7EHD, pp. 73-76; FRUS, 1939, Vol. III, telegram 242, 
Dooman to Secretary of State, 5/23/1939, p. 171. Dooman did 
not initially explain the concern for secrecy, nor to whom 
Hiranuma was referring. Obviously Hiranuma did not want his 
Japanese opponents to learn of his overture, but he apparently 
had authorized Dooman to report the proposal to the Secretary 
of State, as coming directly from the Prime Minister. Dooman 
did clarify this bit of confusion in a subsequent cable on 
August 3 in which he stated that Arita "has no knowledge of 
this project .... " Dooman pointed out that in his dispatch 
3936 he had "stressed 'the importance of keeping a profound 
secret the forthcoming talk' with the Prime Minister, whose 
'political position was reasonably secure, but that the 
alignment of factions within the Government over European policy 
was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very 
cautiously.'" See footnote 74, FRUS, 1939, Vol. III, p. 202. 
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sided with the army, he later changed and aligned himself 
with the more moderate elements hoping to keep Japan neutral.8 
Dooman reported his discussion with Hiranuma to the 
Department that same night, including in his cable the Prime 
Minister's suggestion for a joint meeting. In a follow-up 
telegram, Dooman stressed that Hiranuma's attitude did not 
come "from any moral regeneration but from realization that 
Japan's security can be safeguarded in this manner." But 
this was an opportunity, he maintained, that the United 
States should exploit. He cited a conversation that he and 
Grew had engaged in on May 16 with "a well informed person" 
who had given them a similar impression of Japanese willingness 
to cooperate with the United States. The individual, Baron 
Harada Kumao,had explained that he represented a group of 
Japanese sufficiently influential to ensure defeat of the 
proposed alliance with the Axis powers. This led Dooman to 
suggest that the Department should give careful thought to 
the Prime Minister's plan noting that Hiranuma's views "may 
prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored. 9 
8Richard A. Yasko, "Hiranuma Kiichiro and Conservative 
Politics in Pre-War Japan," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1973, p. 30; Frank W. Ikle, "Policies Toward Germany," 
in James W. Merely, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868-1941: A 
Research Guide" (New York: Columbia University Press) 1974, pp. 
319-320. 
9FRUS, 1939, Vol. III, telegram 245, Dooman to Secretary 
of State, 5/26/1939, pp. 40-42; EHD, pp. 76-77; Grew identifies 
the "unnamed individual''in his Turbulent Era, II, p. 1292; 
FRUS, 1939, Vol. III, dispatch 3936, Dooman to Undersecretary 
of State, 6/7/1939, p. 43. 
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To a man, the Department's Far Eastern hands reacted 
negatively to the Arita/Hiranuma overtures. Ballantine, 
Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, interpreted 
Arita's comments as a move to convince the United States 
that Japan was not "a totalitarian state and to conciliate 
this country insofar as this can be accomplished without 
compromising Japan's thesis with regard to the 'new order' 
in East Asia." Ballantine's superior, Maxwell Hamilton 
agreed that once Japan had modified its program on the 
mainland then meaningful talks could take place. Hornbeck 
added that even at that point any results would be "of 
temporary effectiveness." In a subsequent memorandum 
Ballantine compared Arita's comments and Hiranuma's proposal. 
He concluded that Japan wanted a way out of the situation in 
China which would also serve Japanese ambitions on the 
continent. The Prime Minister's suggested meeting could, 
he went on, produce a change in Japan's program in China or 
even lead to a withdrawal of troops, but if the United States 
appeared to take the initiative it would give Japan a better 
bargaining position. Any compromises, and he noted that 
concessions would have to be made, would likely leave every-
one concerned unhappy. Besides, Ballantine added, the current 
course of action in China was a source of embarrassment to 
the Japanese army and if it was allowed to run to its extent 
the army might have to withdraw regardless and with a 
greater loss of prestige.10 
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The attitude and reaction of those in Washington 
justified Dooman's skepticism. Several weeks elapsed, and 
Fujii came by to inquire if there had been a reply to the 
proposal. His visit prompted Dooman to request instructions 
from the Department as to what action he should take. That 
cable too went unanswered. Again Fujii visited, and again 
Dooman sent a telegram requesting instructions. It was not 
until two weeks later that he had a response which informed 
a stunned Dooman that a reply had been sent via regular 
diplomatic pouch.ll 
That dispatch arrived on July 8, six weeks after 
Dooman sent his initial cable. In it Hull referred to the note 
of May 18 which Hiranuma had sent with Grew,pointing out that 
it lacked any reference to the May 23 meeting and the Prime 
Minister's proposed meeting. Hull's note was little more 
than a moralistic tract, repeating parts of his and the 
President's speeches. Hull, therefore, failed to provide 
1 0894.00/856, Ballantine memorandum, initialed by 
Hamilton and Hornbeck, and sent to the Undersecretary of 
State, Sumner Welles, 5/24/1939; FRUS, 1939, Vol. III, 
Ballantine memorandum, initialed by Hamilton, 6/7/1939, pp. 182-184. 
llEHD, pp. 76-77. This information is based solely 
on Dooman's recollection of the events. The telegrams are 
not printed in the Foreign Relations series which necessitates 
future research into archival materials. 
the answer that those in Tokyo were anxiously awaiting: 
would the President work for a summit?12 
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Undaunted, Dooman continued in his quixotic mission. 
On July 28, he cabled Hull acknowledging receipt of his 
dispatch. He noted that he had no quarrel with the Depart-
ment's note, as a reply to Hiranuma's note of May 18, but 
said he urgently needed "further guidance as to what I should 
say to the Prime Minister with regard to the holding of an 
international conference to be called by the President to 
disauss problems causing world unrest including Far Eastern 
problems." He emphasized the point that the message handed 
to Grew contained no concrete proposal and "was intended as 
an opening move which the Prime Minister had made." Dooman 
suggested that if the Department had no intention of following 
through on the proposal, then it should allow Dooman to 
invite the Prime Minister "to read between the lines" of 
Hull's note. The other alternative, if the Department was 
still considering the possibility of a summit, was for the 
Charge to deliver the reply and indicate that another would 
be forthcoming. He indicated that whichever tack was chosen, 
expediency was the key to effectiveness.l3 
l2FRUS, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, letter 1767, 
Hull to Dooman, 7/8/1939, pp. 508. 
l3FRUS, 1939, Vol. III, telegram 376, Dooman to 
Secretary of State, 7/31/1939, p. 200. 
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The brusque tone of his request drew a retort from 
Sumner Welles, who had become Acting Secretary of State at 
that point. The Department failed, he wrote, to understand 
the basis of the Charges confusion: 
In view of the Department our proposed message 
answers both the Prime Minister's message 
handed to Mr. Grew and the Prime Minister's 
subsequent proposal communicated through you 
which we construe as an elaboration of the 
message. 
Welles stated that neither of the tactics that Dooman had 
suggested "need be adopted," since the reply "needed no 
explanatory cornment. 11 In closing,Welles told Dooman that 
the Department had prepared a slightly modified version and 
/ 
that when the Charge delivered it, he should make 11 no 
interpretative comments other than to say, if expressly 
asked, that the reply is meant to cover both the Prime 
Minister's written message and his statements .. " of 
May 23. 14 
Confusion reigned. As best as he could determine 
there seemed to be a lack of communication and Dooman took 
it upon himself to clear matters up. He cabled the Depart-
ment: 
I must correct a misunderstanding which I have 
inadvertently permitted the Department to form 
by failing to stress that it has been represented 
to me, and I believe correctly, that knowledge of 
the Prime Minister's proposal with regard to an 
14Ibid., telegram 235, Acting Secretary Welles to 
Dooman, 8/1/1939, p. 201. 
international conference is confined only to his 
entourage. That the Foreign Minister has no 
knowledge of this project is strongly indicated 
by the fact that both he and the Vice Minister, 
hearing that I had been received by the Prime 
Minister, asked me on separate occasions what 
the Prime Minister had to say. I believe that 
this fact will serve to explain my feeling that the 
Prime Minister's personal and confidential move 
merits a reply separate from the official reply 
to his official message. 
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An official reply, Dooman seemed to be saying, would have to 
be delivered through Arita since the Foreign Minister had 
delivered the original message to Grew. The manner in which 
the Department intended to handle the matter would "be 
interpreted," he ended "(a) by the Japanese government as 
an indication that the attitude now taken by the American 
government requires the termination of the conflict in China 
as a condition precedent to the betterment by Japan of her 
relations with the United States; and (b) by the Prime 
Minister as a closing of the door to insure peace in the 
Far East."
15 
Dooman believed that Hiranuma's offer warranted 
expeditious handling, a consideration that the Department 
ignored. On August 8 he delivered the message via Fujii, 
informing him that Hiranuma should be told that it was also 
a reply to his confidential remarks. Considering Washington's 
sluggish performance, the events that followed came as no 
surprise to Dooman. In a fortnight Germany and Russia concluded 
15Ibid., telegram 384, Dooman to Secretary of State, 
8/3/1939, pp. 202-203. 
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a nonaggression pact, a move that had the appearance of an 
effort to isolate Japan completely. Hiranuma's attempts 
at stabilizing international diplomacy had failed, forcing 
him and his cabinet to resign. 16 
The delays that Dooman experienced and which had led 
to Hiranuma's resignation had not been accidently perpetrated. 
There existed in Washington, among the highest echelons of 
government a strong anti-Japanese feeling, a fact Grew and 
Dooman realized. Hull believed Hiranuma "to be a Japanese 
counterpart of the European Facists and Nazis," and thus he 
"regarded Hiranuma's approach with skepticism." He suspected 
an "ulterior motive . . chicanery engineered to embarrass 
the United States." Hull distrusted the Japanese and Sumner 
Welles hated them. Welles had spent two years in Tokyo, 
1915-1917, as Secretary of the embassy, where he developed 
a "lifelong hatred" of the Japanese and sharpened, he believed, 
his perception. With this highly developed sense, he claimed 
to see beyond the "veneer of Westernization" that the Japanese 
used to camouflage their "primeval military machine." Welles 
commented that during the late 1920's Japanese politics had 
lost the moderating influence of the elder statesmen and 
consequently the people "reverted to the 'vicious and 
uncivilized forms of antiquity.'" He characterized the 
Japanese as a race "moved by blind hate . . . able to exist 
16Ibid., telegram 393, Dooman to Secretary of State, 
8/8/1939, p. 205. 
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and prosper at an incredibly low standard of living." An 
additional threat which he had noted was their unusual 
ability to reproduce faster than other racial groups. 
People with these characteristics, he concluded, were not 
beyond turning a high level conference into a "ruse" for 
17 "sinister purposes." 
Ballantine, who was Hamilton's Assistant, also sided 
with the anti-Japanese faction. He was themne Japanese 
expert among the group, and a fellow worker has described 
him as a "'frightfully timid ... broken spirited clerk.'" 
He believed that Hiranuma's succession to the Prime Minister-
ship in January of 1939 strengthened "the army's control of 
the government," and subsequently he went along with Welles' 
sinister theory of Japanese international relations. Ballantine 
accused Hiranuma of playing a double hand by trying to win 
an alliance with Germany and at the same time soliciting 
Roosevelt's good will. 18 
17Hull, Memoirs, Vol. I; Welles, The Time for Decision 
(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944), pp. 275-277, 
305. Welles used this explanation including the term "ruse" 
in describing the proposed Konoye-Roosevelt meeting in 1941, 
see pp. 292-295. For an additional comment on Welles' anti-
Japanese feelings see Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The 
Triumph of Internationalism in America Durin World War II 
New York: Antheneum Books, 1971), p. 42. 
1 8874.00/831, Ballantine memorandum, 1/4/1939; James 
C. Thomson, "The Role of the Department of State," in Borg 
and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor, p. 83. Thomson cites a 1969 interview 
with Alger Hiss. John K. Emmerson stated that this description 
was essentially correct. Interview with Emmerson, May 15, 1976; 
Ballantine, "Mukden to Pearl Harbor," Foreign Affairs, July 1949, 
p. 655; Ballantine, "Reminiscences," pp. 12-13. 
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Grew and Dooman contended that the United States had 
missed an opportunity because of the attitudes of those in 
the Department. It was in fact the first "last good chance" 
there were two more. After Grew's return in 1940, Dooman 
undertook a second effort securing a rapproachment via 
extra-diplomatic activities. In 1938 Hashimoto Tetsuma, 
head of the Shuinso (Purple Cloud Society) , visited Dooman 
on an irregular basis. The Shuinso had previously drawn the 
attention of the embassy because of its "ultra patriotic" 
nature and its anti-western editorials published in the 
organization's newspaper. Although no stranger to the 
embassy in 1940, Hashimoto took the unusual step of asking 
for an appointment with Grew. The Ambassador reluctantly 
agreed seeing the opportunity to tell Hashimoto that he 
resented some of the things that the Shuinso had published 
in reference to the United States. Their meeting, which 
Dooman attended, lasted for an hour and a half and had been 
"disappointing" for Hashimoto. After Hashimoto departed, 
Dooman spoke with Grew. He pointed out that their visitor 
had ceased his attacks on the United States and had begun 
pressing for "a way out of the Japanese-American impasse." 
At Grew's request, Dooman then telephoned Hashimoto and 
explained that a great deal of misunderstanding had been 
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created, adding that he would like a second meeting between 
19 himself and Hashimoto, who agreed. 
Both Grew and Dooman harbored some doubts as to what 
influence, if any, Hashimoto might have within the Japanese 
government. Moving cautiously, Dooman began a series of 
talks with the Japanese peace seeker. Hashimoto quickly 
overcame Dooman's doubts when he reported the contents of 
a note which Dooman had previously delivered to the Foreign 
Ivlinister. Because of his contacts, which included, "Hiranuma 
. Marquis Makino (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal) , and 
various prominent generals ...• " Hashimoto became an 
important source of information for the embassy. 20 
In the summer of 1940, shortly before Dooman was to 
leave on a six month furlough in the United States, Hashimoto 
came by with news that he too planned to visit America. He 
informed Dooman of his desire to meet with as many prominent 
individuals as possible and to explain Japan's hopes for a 
peaceful settlement of the disrupted relations between the 
two nations. Several events had motivated Hashimoto. On 
May 10, 1940, his organization had published in their own and 
19Record Group 83, 11 Correspondence, 11 1939, Vol. XXX, 
BOO S to z, note for file prepared by Cabot Coville, 12/30/ 
1939; Tetsuma Hashimoto, The Untold Story of Japanese-American 
Negotiations (Tokyo: Shuinso Press, 1946), pp. 18-30; Grew 
papers, Vol. 100, Diary, 3/29/1940, p. 4336. 
20EHD, p. 91; Hashimoto, pp. 22-23 1 27. 
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in ten other leading Japanese newspapers an article that 
strongly advocated cultivating peace with America. Dooman 
called Hashimoto upon reading the article, informing him 
that the embassy had wired the gist of his statements to 
the Department. Dooman added that if the Japanese Foreign 
Office agreed with the contents of the article then relations 
could "be adjusted at once." Before his departure in August, 
Dooman again contacted Hashimoto to assure him that Dooman 
would be waiting in Washington to introduce him to members 
of the Department.21 
The two men planned to meet in January, but in the 
interlude there were a series of ominous episodes. In 
Septernber, Japan had signed a pact with Germany and Italy-
a move that virtually turned American opinion against the 
Japanese. In Washington, Dooman visited the Department only 
to discover that he was not popular with certain individuals. 
Hashimoto in the meantime visited with Prime Minister Konoye 
Fumimaro, and members of his Cabinet and also spoke with 
representatives of both the army and the navy. From various 
government officials he received both funds and good wishes. 
From Grew, he received a letter of recommendation describing 
Hashimoto as a man whom the Ambassador held in high esteem 
and who was dedicated to bringing about an improvement in 
Japanese-American relations. Hashimoto then left for the States.22 
21Hashimoto, pp. 28-31. 
22 rbid., pp. 59, 63, 66-67; Grew papers, Vol. 98, 
Letters, Grew to Hornbeck, 12/27/1940. 
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On January 17, Dooman and Hashimoto met in Washington. 
Dooman introduced the visitor to members of the Division 
but he did not take part in any of the subsequent discussions 
because, he reported to Hashimoto, he had encountered 
opposition from those who felt his views were too moderate 
regarding Japan. Therefore Dooman felt his presence might 
jeopardize the talks. Hashimoto perservered, and in the 
following weeks he met with Hornbeck, Ballantine, and 
Hamilton. In his initial conference Hashimoto told the 
Americans that his purpose in visiting the States "was to 
gain an insight into the attitude of the American government 
and people . . . which might be useful to his country in 
shaping a better course of policy." He then raised a con-
troversial point that Hornbeck seized upon. Hashimoto agreed 
that Japan had the responsibility for taking the initiative 
in any efforts to change policy, but he added that it "would 
be very helpful if the Japanese could be given some assurance . 
. " that a favorable change in Japanese policies would be 
met with American cooperation. Despite a strong pro-German 
group in Tokyo, there was much support for improving relations 
with the United States. He cited as evidence the fact that 
his government had allowed him to visit the United States 
and that he had the support of influential individuals. 
Hornbeck then took the offensive, drawing attention to the 
apparent conflict between the views which Hashimoto represented 
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and the actions of the Japanese government. Hornbeck asked 
if Japan was truly free of strong German influences. 
Apparently realizing that Hashimoto had already settled that 
point, Hornbeck quickly added that the onus for rectifying 
the tangled affairs in Asia lay with Japan and not the United 
States. The United States had remained committedto one 
position, he concluded, but Japan had constantly shifted. 
Hashimoto asked for a recess claiming that he could, if 
given time, produce some possible solutions to the problems 
. d . . 23 ralse ln the sesslon. 
Four days later Hashimoto returned with a summary of 
the problems which he believed prevented the adjustment of 
relations and a list of possible solutions. The problems 
included American fears of being economically squeezed out 
of China and the Far East and concern over the Japanese-
German alliance. To resolve these, Hashimoto suggested that 
the two countries prepare a "Pacific Pact" that would 
guarantee the status quo in Asia and an American offer of 
good offices in the Sino-Japanese conflict. He also pre-
sented what was basically a reiteration of Hiranuma's proposal 
for a meeting called by the United States for the purpose 
of achieving peace in Europe and East Asia. Hamilton and 
Ballantine listened to the presentation without comment. 24 
23 h' Has lmoto, pp. 
Ballantine memorandum of 
and Hornbeck, 1/18/1941, 
56, 67-68; FRUS, 1941, Vol. IV, 
Conversation with Hashimoto, Hamilton, 
pp 0 4-6 0 
24 rbid., Ballantine memorandum of conversation, 2/22/ 
1941, pp. 10-12. 
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After Hashimoto's departure, Ballantine described 
him as 11 somewh.at visionary and impractical in his outlook. 11 
He questioned his 11 Very earnestness, 11 observing that the 
programs were unlikely to succeed. Even if Japan accepted 
the plan, Ballantine continued, he would remain opposed to 
it because 11 it would tend to bring about a situation in 
which it could be made to appear that the present policies 
of Japanese leaders have been successful in bringing the 
United States around to assent to Japanese policies rather 
than the reverse. 11 In a move that bordered on intentional 
deceit, Ballantine suggested that Hashimoto should meet with 
a higher officer in the Department. This move had been 
engineered earlier to indicate to Hashimoto that his trip 
had been fruitful and that some hope of an agreement existed. 
Ballantine had Hashimoto meet with Adolph Berle, Assistant 
Secretary of State, who confined himself to a 11 few general 
observations" to satisfy Hashimoto's desire to meet with an 
influential person. As a final gesture, Ballantine also met 
with Hashimoto before he left Washington and presented him 
with a statement that reiterated the Hull line of international 
behavior. 25 
Ballantine's strategy worked. Hashimoto left con-
vinced of the "sincerity on the part of the American side 
25 rbid., Vol. IV, Ballantine memorandum, 2/5/1941, 
pp. 27-28. 
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for the adjustment of ..• relations." The move also 
fooled Dooman, who believed that the venture had been pro-
ductive and that it had led to Japan's dispatch of Iwakuro 
Hideo and Ikawa Tadao who represented the Japanese in the 
"John Doe" negotiations that followed. Ballantine too was 
pleased with his work. In a memorandum to Hull he stated 
that Hashimoto had departed "satisfied with the results of 
his visit ... and convinced that Japan's hope for the 
future lay in a policy of cooperating with the United States." 
Everyone involved was satisfied with the manner in which 
the matter was handled but, once again Japanese officials 
seeking direct answers to pressing problems had come away 
with little more than they had had previously. 26 
Dooman, in the meantime, had returned to Japan. 
There he found Grew distraught and discouraged. During 
his Counselor's absence, the Ambassador had learned to dis-
like the jingoistic Matsuoka Yosuke, Konoye's Foreign 
Minister and a man Dooman characterized as "very clever. 
and possessing "a virtual hatred of the United States and 
Americans in general." Matsuoka had spent his youth in the 
United States and had related to Dooman the origins of his 
prejudice. As a student at the University of Washington, 
Matsuoka had experienced the racist treatment which west 
coast Americans accorded Japanese. He himself had been a 
26Hashimoto, p. 7; EHD, p. 91; FRUS, 1941, Vol. IV, 
Ballantine memorandum, 2/25/1941, pp. 49-50. 
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victim of a racial incident. Two white students set upon 
him stealing his hat. The first of the two threw the hat 
to the ground and when Matsuoka stooped to pick it up the 
second "gave him a kick in the backside. " knocking 
him down. "Matsuoka said," Dooman recalled, "that he had 
never forgotten that." Those years in the Pacific northwest 
left an unfavorable impression on Matsuoka though he kept 
it concealed "under an extremely effusive and . 
friendly .... " appearance until 1940. Beginning in that 
year Matsuoka verbally attacked the allies in what Dooman 
believed was an attempt to provoke a new spirit of toughness 
. J d' 1 27 1n apanese 1p omacy. 
The Foreign Minister seemed to be enjoying some 
success in that direction in February of 1941 when Dooman 
arrived back in Tokyo. Japan appeared on the verge of 
securing bases in French Indo-China, and Grew had strong 
reasons to believe that Japan's next move would be an 
expensive plunge southward towards Singapore. The blusterings 
of Matsuoka and other warning signals caused Grew to prepare 
a telegram to Hull suggesting a show of naval power in 
Asian waters. He had delayed sending the cable pending 
Dooman's return. His Counselor argued persuasively that 
the proposed action would most likely fail as a deterrent, 
adding that a major show of force ran the risk of a hostile 




The reports of the Military Attache, Lieutenant 
Colonel Harry L. Cresswell, had failed to support the 
Ambassador's contention, as well. After some discussion 
among the staff, Grew decided against sending the cable. 28 
Dooman had not taken his position out of a feeling 
of weakness, nor was he opposed to a show of force when the 
situation called for it. A week after the incident of the 
telegram Dooman took it upon himself to demonstrate his 
unhappiness with Japanese officialdom in an explosive 
manner. During a meeting with Ohashi Chuichi, Vice-Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Dooman reached his flash point. After 
listening to a diatribe defending Japanese policy, Dooman 
unleashed a tirade of his own. Using his Japanese to its 
fullest, he made Ohashi aware of America's growing dis-
satisfaction with the general world situation and Japan's 
alliance with Germany and Italy. That pact, the growing 
enmity with America's ally Great Britain, and Japan's 
failure to resolve the Chinese conflict threatened to bring 
the United States into those hostilities. Having concluded, 
Dooman left. Ohashi was stunned and was at a loss for words. 
Although his outburst had been spontaneous, the hard hitting 
words became official when Grew assured Matsuoka with some 
pleasure that Dooman had spoken with the Ambassador's 
approval and that Washington had not disavowed any of the 
Counselor's cornments. 29 
28Heinrichs, pp. 326-327. 
29Ibid.; FRUS Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, Grew to the 
Secretary of State, 2/26/1941, pp. 137-143. 
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During the summer of 1941 tensions in the Pacific 
increased sufficiently that Konoye took a further 
step towards reaching an accord with the United States. 
On September 6 Konoye sent his private secretary Ushiba 
Tomohiko to the embassy asking for a secret meeting with 
Grew and Dooman. At the appointed time an unmarked car 
arrived at the embassy to pick them up and carry them to 
a house in the Tokyo suburbs. In a private setting, the 
four men, Grew, Dooman, Konoye, and Ushiba dined and talked 
"openly and frankly .... " Konoye assured Grew that he 
accepted the four principles that 
Hull had steadfastly insisted on as the basisfor establishing 
any subsequent agreements or action. Konoye commented that 
the urgency of the situation necessitated his approach out-
side of ordinary diplomatic channels. He told the Americans 
that he was prepared to reconsider an earlier proposal and 
meet with President Roosevelt at which time he would 
present the President with a "proposition that . . . Roosevelt 
could not afford to reject." If acceptable to Roosevelt, 
Konoye would radio the news back to To.kyo, and a cessation 
of the fighting in China would follow. 30 
30Grew papers, "Personal Notes," 9/26/1941, p. 5643; 
EHD, pp. 94-95. Hull's four principles were: (1) Respect for 
the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all 
nations; (2) Support of the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries; (3) Support of the 
principle of equality of commercial opportunity; (4) Non-
disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the 
status quo may be altered by peaceful means. See FRUS, Japan, 
1931-1941, Vol.II, p. 332. 
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Throughout the encounter, Ushiba had acted as an 
interpreter. As the two Americans prepared to leave Konoye 
detained Dooman speaking to him in Japanese. "Now," Konoye 
began, "I'm going to tell you something that I don't want 
you to repeat to Mr. Grew or in any way disclose. This is 
purely for your own infromation so that you can advise the 
Ambassador with more intelligence as to what my thinking is." 
The Prime Minister's concern for confidentiality was apparent 
from his next comment. "The fact is that as soon as I reach 
an agreement with the President I will report immediately 
to the Emperor and it will be the Emperor who will command 
the army to suspend hostilities." This and other statements 
made during the evening convinced Dooman that Konoye had 
acted independently without knowledge of his cabinet members 
or any other government official. It became imperative to 
the Counselor, therefore, to maintain the cloak of secrecy 
31 
if the gamble for peace was to succeed. 
Without mentioning Konoye's last remarks, Do oman 
prepared a report of the meeting which Grew forwarded to 
Hull. Konoye's actions had impressed both men, and the 
31EHD, p. 95. In 1953 Dooman met Ushiba again and 
asked if he had any idea as to the nature of the terms that 
Konoye had in mind. Ushiba replied that he did not, but he 
assured his American friend that the terms had not been those 
tentatively agreed upon by Japanese military leaders. Based 
on this information and his own knowledge of events, Dooman 
speculated that Konoye had in mind a double cross of the 
military and that he had in fact a different set of proposals 
than those that the Emperor had approved for presentation to 
Roosevelt. EHD, pp. 120-121. 
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Prime Minister's sincerity led them to believe that the 
proposed meeting offered the best opportunity thus far for 
a peaceful settlement of the China war. They pointed out 
in the report that Konoye had shattered all precedents and 
traditions by offering to meet with a head of state outside 
of Japanese territory. They argued that Konoye's willingness 
to negotiate was a "gauge of the determination of the Japanese 
government's attempts to reach a settlement." They stressed 
their belief that this could be "very likely the final effort 
on the part of the Japanese government to win in its struggle 
to avoid war with the United States." 32 
The proposal enjoyed a brief moment of hope before 
passing into limbo. President Roosevelt declared that he 
"would relish a meeting .... "with the Prime Minister, 
but on the advice of Hull and his "associates" the President 
declined. Roosevelt made the final decision, but his negative 
answer had strong support in the Division of Far Eastern 
Affairs. Hornbeck,who was now Hull's Political Adviser and 
who had "viewed it from thecutset with suspicion and dis-
favor," advised. Hull that the proposed meeting be delayed 
until the two governments signed a formal agreement reconciling 
their differences. 33 
32FRUS, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II, Grew memorandum; 
Grew, Turbulent Era, Vol. II, pp. 1285-1286, 1302, 1332-1333. 
33Hull, pp. 1023-1025; James c. Thomson, "The Role of 
The Department of State," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor, 
p. 83. 
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The roots of this distrust lay in past events, par-
ticularly the "John Doe" negotiations. The idea of the surrunit 
had originated during those talks which had begun early in 
1941 and continued through the spring and summer. Included 
on the American side were two Maryknoll priests, James E. Walsh 
and James M. Drought, and on the Japanese side were a banker 
and businessman, Iwaka Tadao, and Colonel Iwakuro Hideo. On 
April 16 the four men drew up a "draft understanding" which 
they hoped would become a basis for high level talks. They 
delivered the document to Hull and Japanese Ambassador Nomura 
Kichisaburo for consideration during their negotiations which 
were being conducted simultaneously. Konoye also received 
a copy, and he believed that it had originated in the Department 
at the instigation of the President. Foreign Minister Matsuoka 
objected to the contents of the note and had Nomura deliver a 
response that differed significantly from the agreements 
included in the April 16 paper, and he deleted any reference 
to a conference. On August 8, however, Nomura inquired 
as to the possibility of a meeting between the Premier and 
·the President, and Konoye made similar overtures through 
the Ambassador on August 18 and 28. It seemed to Hull and 
his advisers that Konoye's offers were a reiteration of 
earlier proposals that the Japanese had responded to negatively 
in May, and they viewed with suspicion and with a jaundiced 
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eye the Premier's overtures of August and September as they 
came shortly after the American government's freeze of 
34 Japanese assets in July. 
34 Robert J. C. Butow, "Backdoor Diplomacy in the Pacific: 
The Proposal for a Konoye-Roosevelt Meeting, 1941," Journal of 
American History, LIX~ 1, June 1972, pp. 49-72. Butow concludes 
that had Grew and Dooman been aware of the origins of the pro-
posal they may have been skeptical; Chihiro Hosoya, "Japan's 
Foreign Ministry and its Embassy in Washington," in Borg and 
Okamoto, Pearl Harbor, pp. 149-157; FRUS, Japan, 1931-1941, 
pp. 344-347. Dooman states in his oral History interview with 
Hull complicated matters by violating the request for secrecy, 
thereby ensuring the collapse of any further attempts at 
negotiations. One of the significant points of the September 6 
meeting was Konoye's agreement to the four principles, but that 
this had to remain confidential. But Dooman, continues, Hull 
asked Nomura why the Ambassador had not made any mention of the 
four principles while Konoye had indicated his acceptance of them. 
Repercussions from Hull's actions, according to Dooman, reached 
back to Japan. Toyoda Teijiro, the new Foreign Minister 
called on the embassy asking to speak with Grew or Dooman. 
Solemnly Toyoda, who Dooman believed had remained uninformed 
of Konoye's move until this point, asked "is it true that 
Prince Konoye unconditionally or conditionally accepted Mr. 
Hull's four principles? 11 Dooman goes on to say that he and 
Grew believed that Hull had deliberately violated the request 
for secrecy to undermine Konoye's move. The results of Hull's 
indiscretion doomed, Dooman believed, the talks and destroyed 
the good faith that Grew and Dooman had built among Japanese 
leaders. With the embassy out of the picture all further 
negotiations became meaningless. EHD, p. 97; Dooman's 
allegations are not supported by the documents examined. 
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The embassy had in fact contributed little in the way 
of policy making since 1939. The negative attitude of 
Roosevelt's and Hull's advisers in Washington had negated 
Grew and Dooman's efforts in each of the three instances 
of special overtures seeking an end to the existing enmity. 
T.hose negative reactions simply could not have come from a 
belief that Grew and Dooman interpreted events incorrectly, 
for in oneinstance at least,Dooman's evaluation of Hiranuma•s 
effort in 1939 had not differed significantly from the 
Department's. The differences that occurred throughout the 
period centered around what action should be appropriate. In 
each of the cases it seems that Dooman was willing to accept, 
or at least feign acceptance of, the proposals and thereby 
ease tensions which in turn may have opened the way to 
further negotiations. Dooman and Grew blamed Washington for 
the failure of the attempts at peace in 1939, 1940, and 1941. 
The negative responses discouraged any further Japanese moves 
in this direction. By 1940 the world was divided into two 
camps, and the allies had rejected the Japanese, forcing 
them into the axis alliance. The staunch demands of Hull 
and the constant rejections made by Washington had left the 
Japanese two alternatives in 1941. They could give in to 
the demands of a western power or go to war. 
War came. Grew and Dooman had expected it, predicted 
it and warned against it but to no avail. Officials in 
Washington maintained that they appreciated the infromation 
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that they received from Tokyo but that it had limited value 
because of Grew and Dooman's limited perspective. Hornbeck, 
Hull, and the others shared, Dooman alleged, "The invincible 
conviction that Japan was bluffing. II They dismissed 
Dooman's explanation of the situation that Japan had fought 
for four years and was earnestly seeking a way out with 
"prestige and dignity unimpaired." This had been the embassy's 
goal as well during the period but it failed because of 
attitudes like those held by Hornbeck, who believed that 
Japan could be brought to its knees by economic sanctions 
and without the use of force. Dooman cited as a good example 
a November 27 memorandum that Hornbeck had prepared. In it 
Hull's adviser set forth his fim belief that "the Japanese 
government does not desire or intend to have forthwith a 
conflict with the Unites States . .. ," adding conclusively 
that the United States was not "on the immediate verge of 
war in the Pacific." Within two weeks the Japanese struck 
at Pearl Harbor.35 
From December 8, 1941 until June 25, 1942, the 
Japanese held American diplomatic personnel prisoners within 
the embassy compound. Grew described the period of internment 
as"incarceration," as his keepers worked at making the stay 
35
Heinrichs, pp. 355-356; FRUS, Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. 
II, Grew to Secretary of State, 11/3/1941, p. 704J EHD, pp. 109, 123-
124. For an analysis of the decreasing role that the embassy 
played see Iriye, "The Role of the United States Embassy in 
Tokyo," in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor, pp. 121-123, 125-126. 
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unpleasant. Dooman, who had lived among the Japanese for 
years and who had developed a strong affinity for them, saw 
the other face, the one that Ballantine had described. The 
police whom he described as being puffed up with a "swollen 
sense of importance," initially refused him entry into the 
embassy grounds. Inside Japanese servants continued working 
for the Americans, giving up their own freedom. Finally, 
after seven months of diplomatic maneuvering and bickering, 
Dooman and the others departed from Yokohama as part of an 
exchange of official personnel. His work in behalf of good 
Japanese-American relations seemed at an ebb, but in fact 
h 
. 36 t ey were to cont~nue. 
36Heinrichs, p. 358; EHD, pp. 103-104, 108-109, 125-
131; Grew papers, "Diary" 1941, pp. 7-8. 
CHAPTER 6 
PANDORA'S BOX 
Doornan did not come horne a hero. He had not 
anticipated retirement when he returned from Japan in 
1942, but during the next three years he carne under 
increasing attacks from sources both within and outside 
of the government. After a brief stay in the Soviet Union, 
he returned to the Department and once again worked for 
Grew who in 1944 became Under Secretary of State. In 
1944-45 Doornan focused his energies on post-war planning 
for Japan, and the victory in Europe shifted his attention 
to the problem of American demands for Japan's unconditional 
surrender. Under Grew's auspices Dooman worked to pro-
duce a document spelling out illnerican plans regarding the 
Emperor and the imperial institution in hopes that it would 
alleviate Japanese fears and hasten an end to the war. 
Consequently, the two men became the object of bitter 
criticism and were accused of being appeasers. Dooman's 
apprehensions intensified as he learned of rumors of Japan's 
desire to capitulate, but even as he prepared a document 
which eventually became the instrument of surrender for 
Japan, American scientists were perfecting the first atomic 
bomb. The decision to use that weapon was unwise, Doornan 
t+l 
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concluded, and it was made by men who had little concern 
for the Japanese but who had more interest in winning a 
victory in the rapidly developing cold war. 
Upon his return to the United States in 1942, 
Dooman underwent a debriefing process before beginning a 
two-month furlough. He resumed his duties in an entirely 
/ 
new environment, serving as the Charge at the embassy in 
Moscow. He later moved to Kuybyshev, the Soviet Union's 
wartime capital. Even in neutral Russia he found himself 
constantly reminded of the strife existing between the 
United States and Japan. American diplomats attended state 
functions where they inevitably encountered Japanese repre-
sentatives. Protocol demanded that the two parties should 
refrain from any unfriendly gestures. For Dooman, however, 
the problem was of a different nature. Many of those 
individuals were his friends, people whom he had known 
and associated with on a personal basis. Such was the 
case when, on a crisp spring evening, Dooman met Ota Saburo, 
a Foreign Ministry official, at the opera house. This pro-
duced little more than formal glances of recognition, but 
soon afterwards at a luncheon the two met again. This time 
Dooman took the initiative, slipping a small piece of paper 
into Ota's hand. On it, written in Japanese, was a message 
that almost moved the Japanese diplomat to tears: "'Mina-san 
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ni yoroshiku. Genki de ne. 
well.)'"l 
(Regards to everybody. Keep 
Dooman himself was not well, as persistent problems 
with his duodenal ulcer cut short his tour. In April 1943 
he became seriously ill and returned home. That summer, 
he worked for a short period under the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agreement, in November he joined other 
Department personnel assigned to post-war planning for 
Japan. He continued working in that capacity until his 
retirement at the end of August 1945. 2 
1EHD, pp. 131-132; Asahi Shinbum, The Pacific Rivals: 
A View of Japanese-American Relations, by the staff of the 
Asahi Shinbum (New York: Weatherhill/Asahi, 1972), p. 104. 
2EHD, pp. 131-132. Department officials had realized 
early the importance of presurrender planning. That recogni-
tion had produced an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign 
Policy, an embryonic presurrender planning group in February 
1942, less than two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
This committee spawned various subcommittees with responsi-'-
bilities for specified geographic areas. In the summer of 
1943 the Department began forming interdivisional area 
committees, and a few weeks later an area committee for the 
Far East emerged. Members of these various bureaucratic organs 
drew up papers recommending specific directions that policy 
should take. In an attempt to control and coordinate the 
work of all the groups Stettinius made his proposal for a 
single coordinating committee. The evolution of the post-war 
planning groups is described in Hugh Borton's "American Pre-
surrender Planning for Postwar Japan," Occasional Papers of 
the East Asian Institute (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1967), pp. 5-14, 18. Borton's pamphlet provides a description 
of the creation of the Department of State's planning groups 
and the work that they did and includes Borton's own role as 
a planner. The work leaves room for further study, par-
ticularly in the area of analysis regarding the effectiveness 
of the groups, and the intersection of the Department's offices 




Secretary of State Hull's resignation in November 
1944 was followed by a reorganization of the Department of 
State. Roosevelt had chosen Edward Stettinius as Hull's 
successor, and the new Secretary selected Grew as his Under 
Secretary. Ballantine took over the recently renamed Office 
of Far Eastern Affairs, and Dooman was appointed his assistant. 
Stettinius had already proposed that a committee be appointed 
to coordinate the post-war planning efforts of the State, 
War, and Navy Departments and followed through with his idea 
once appointed. This committee had, besides intradepart-
mental functions, the responsibility of formulating recommenda-
tions for the Secretary of State regarding military and 
political issues. This joint State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC) first met in December and three weeks 
later appointed a subcommittee on the Far East with Dooman 
as the Chairman. 3 
Dooman's return to the Department and his promotion 
had not gone unnoticed. In September 1943, Truman Martin, 
a colonel in the War Department's military intelligence 
section, contacted Dooman, soliciting his opinion on the 
possible effects of American protests against Japanese 
maltreatment of prisoners and a possible warning that the 
United States would hold the Emperor responsible for such 
mistreatment. Dooman replied that such threats would have 
3Borton, "Presurrender Planning," p. 18. 
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little effect on Japanese military leaders except to 
antagonize them and thereby further endanger the lives of 
those held captive. This initial contact began a sequence 
of correspondence that lasted over a year during which time 
Martin came to rely on Dooman's counsel. 4 
Others too had taken notice of Dooman's position. 
In December, Julian Friedman, a Treasury Department employee, 
notified Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Dexter 
White, of recent appointments within the Department of 
State. Friedman noted Dooman's return calling Dooman's 
position as Assistant Director of the Office of Far Eastern 
Affairs a "key post." He also pointed to Grew's and 
Ballantine's appointments, and lumping the three men together, 
described them as individuals who believed "that agreement 
between the United States and pre-war Japan was possible 
. that war with Japan was unnecessary and caused mainly 
by our 'sentimentalist' attitude toward China." The three 
men wanted at war's end, Friedman continued, "a strong Japan 
and a weak China." The memorandum reflected an already 
existing antipathy between Secretary of the Treasury, Henry 
Morgenthau, White's superior, and those sympathetic to Japan. 
Dooman depicted Morgenthau as being "under the thumb . . of 
White," and he added that both shared an opposition for 
4Truman Martin to Dooman, 9/3/1943; Dooman to Martin, 
9/11/1943; Other correspondence between the two men include 
letters on 1/31/1944, and 3/24/1944. Dooman papers. 
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"anything like a rational treatment of Germany and Japan." 
Thus it was that Friedman noted the ascent of a trio that 
precluded a satisfactory settlement of post-war problems 
in Asia. 
These are the men who will be in charge of State 
Department policy on the Far East when the fate 
of China and Japan are being decided . . . It 
does not seem likely that sufficient voice will 
be given to the importance of building up China
5 as the stabilizing country in the Pacific area. 
Unaware of Friedman's letter, Dooman began work in 
January of 1945 overseeing the work of SWNCC's subcommittee 
on the Far East which drafted, reviewed, and submitted pro-
posals to the parent co~nittee for approval. Those 
recommendations, once pa-ssed by SWNCC became official United 
States policy subject, in Japan's case, to implementation by 
the Supreme Allied Commander of Pacific forces (SCAP) • The 
Yalta Conference in February was to result in a major change 
in policy formulation. In March a new organization, the 
Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG) came into 
existence, relieving SWNCC of its responsibilities for 
Germany and shifting more attention to Dooman's subcommittee, 
as SWNCC began devoting its planning efforts almost 
exclusively to matters pertaining to Asia. 6 
Su. S. Senate, Subcommittee to Investigate the Adminis-
tration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security 
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, The Morganthau Diary 
(China) Vol. III (Washington, D. C.; Government Pr~nt~ng Office, 
1965), memorandum, Friedman to viJhite, 12/27/1944, p. 1394. 
6Borton, "Presurrender Planning," pp. 19-20. 
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Dooman and his committee alleviated the burden of 
work carried out by earlier planning groups, and they 
quickly found that the problem of Japan's imperial institution 
required a large amount of time and effort. They were keenly 
aware of the importance of the Emperor, and they approached 
their task with caution. The Japanese revered their monarch 
with, the committee reported, "almost a fanatical devotion 
., because of the unique position the Emperor occupies." 
The Emperor is considered "to be the source from which all 
authority emanates and is regarded as sacred and inviolable." 
This information was elementary as most people knew that 
traditionally the Japanese believed the Emperor and his 
ancestors represented a divine, unbroken lineage of rulers 
in Japan since 660 B.C. and provided a link between his 
people and their spiritual ancestors. Thus his position 
transcended the normal role of a ruler as the head of state. 
The special position of the Emperor obviously made difficult 
any attempts to deal with this problem. 7 
Dooman, Borton, and others had tackled this problem 
in Hay 1944, prior to the establishment of the SWNNC sub-
committee. As members of the Department's Interdivisional 
Planning Committee on the Far East, they had drafted a policy 
paper focusing on "The Institution of the Emperor," contending 
7PWC ll6D/CAC 91E, policy paper entitled "Japan: 
Political Problems: Institution of the Emperor," 5/9/1944, 
Box 78, Notter files. 
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that any "attempt from the outside to abolish the institution 
of the Emperor would, so long as the present attitude of the 
Japanese continues, probably be ineffective." As an alterna-
tive, they suggested that the allied Military Governor, who 
would hold a superior position during a post-war occupation, 
should allow the Emperor "to direct certain functions . 
which relate to the delegation of administrative duties to 
subordinate officials." The planners hypothesized that 
"This procedure should facilitate the rise of Japanese 
officials . under the military government." This policy 
of indirect occupation subsequently became part of the official 
post-war plans for Japan. 8 
A second nettlesome problem had been created in 
December 1943 when Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang 
Kai-shek met at cairo and issued a statement setting forth 
the general aims of the allies, including a call for the 
unconditional surrender of the Axis powers. By April of 
1945 the outcome of the Pacific war was evident, and the 
question no longer was "would Japan surrender, .. but rather 
"when would Japan surrender?" American air power, striking 
from bases in Saipan, attacked targets within the Japanese 
islands at will while American naval vessels crippled Japan's 
fleet and blockaded the sealanes. In desperation, Japanese 
pilots resort'ed to suicide (kamikaze) attacks, but it was 
8Ibid. Borton, 11 Presurrender Planning," pp. 15-18. 
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already clear that even these "divine wind" fliers could 
not turn the tide of defeat. Still the fierce fighting 
of Japanese soldiers on Saipan and Iwo Jima indicated that 
an invasion of Japan's main islands, in an effort to secure 
an unconditional surrender, could mean an inordinate number 
of allied casualties. 
Faced with that unpleasant prospect and armed with 
the knowledge of Japan's weakened condition, SWNCC's Far 
Eastern Committee preparedca::statement early in 1948 defining 
"unconditional surrender." Basing their paper on an earlier 
document, the subcommittee arrived at a "workable definition" 
of the term and recon~ended that Japan be given the right 
to settle its own economic, political, and social problems. 
Their proposal went to the parent committee, and to the 
surprise of some of the drafters SWNCC approved it. Thus, 
by May, the problem created through the use of the term 
"unconditional surrender" seemed to diminish, and a possible 
settlement in the Pacific appeared to be in the making. 9 
Further evidence that.an end to hostilities was immi-
nent had cane on April 15 when Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, a 
"moderate," replaced General Koiso Kuniaki as Japan's Prime 
Minister. Dooman believed that this move indicated a 
Japanese willingness to enter into talks in the direction 
of capitualtion. In a 1944 "estimate of the requirements 
for bringing forth an unconditional surrender of Japan. • I 




Dooman spelled out the sequence of events that he felt would 
lead to that action. He predicted a "series of violent 
offensive operations . . . diminishing in intensity . 
and final exhaustion," followed by "a reorganization of the 
Japanese Government in preparation for surrender." Little 
more than a year had elapsed since Dooman's prediction when 
S k . k . . . t 10 uzu 1 too over as Pr1me M1n1s er. 
Subsequently reports regarding Japanese enquiries into 
the possibilities of concluding the war reached Washington 
through the Office of Strategic Services. Intercepted Japanese 
messages also revealed that Japanese government officials had 
sent former Prime Minister Hirota Koki to Russia for the 
purposes of improving Soviet-Japanese relations and convince 
the Soviets to act as an arbiter between the Japanese and 
the allies. That effort failed because of a secret agreement 
that Russia had made at Yalta commiting itself to enter the 
Pacific war once Germany had been defeated. Similar attempts 
by Japanese army officers to solicit aid from the Chinese 
communists also failed. 11 
10nooman to Martin, 1/31/1944, Dooman papers. 
ll740.00119PW/5-l245, OSS Director William Donovan 
to Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, 5/12/1945; 740. 
00ll9PW/6-2245, G. Edward Buxton, Acting Director, OSS to 
Dunn, 6/22/1945; Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to 
Surrender (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954), pp. 
90-92; Saburo Hayashi and Alvin D. CooM Kogun: The Japanese 
Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Associa-
tion, 1959), pp. 176-177. 
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Despite the Japanese attempts to initiate peace 
talk~, the United States maintained a "hard line" on surrender. 
On May 8, President Harry S. Truman, who .had succeeded Roosevelt 
upon the latter's death in April, had issued a state-
ment directed at Japan. He reemphasized unconditional 
surrender, spelling out what this meant for Japan. Truman 
promised "utter destruction" of Japanese military units and 
their supporting activities if hostilities continued. Should 
the armed forces accept their defeat, the President pointed out, 
it would mean "the end of the war . • for the Japanese 
people." "It means," he continued, "termination of the 
influence of ... military leaders ... the return of 
soldiers and sailors to their families . . " and a hope for 
an end to "the present agony and suffering of the Japanese." 
Truman concluded by saying that "Unconditional surrender does 
not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese .. 
The President's speech made no reference to the Emperor. 
Dooman and Grew did not object to the President's 
declaration, although Dooman thought it was prepared with 
inadequate knowledge. In a 1965 letter to Len Giovannitti, 
Dooman recalled that he had read a draft which John K. Fair-
bank, a Harvard professor working for the War Department, had 
written and told Fairbank that his "statement lacked substance" 
and that the lastline was particularly objectionable, if not 
12u. S. Department of State, Department of s·tate 
Bulletin, XII, 307 (May 13, 1945), p. 886. 
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ludicrous. After all, Dooman observed, "the Japanese people 
are aware that in this day and age a defeated people [are] 
not enslaved." It was, he recalled, simply inadequate for 
the purposes that the Department had in mind,and it came as 
no surprise to Dooman that there was no respons.e from 
Japanese leaders. He then stressed his conviction that the 
only meaningful statement would be some insurance as to the 
well-being of the Emperor and the continuance of the monarchy. 
That mild protest was the only objection raised before the 
President issued the statement. 13 
Dooman was not alone in this view. There existed 
among the Far Eastern planners a consensus that some sort 
o£ statement was necessary regarding Japan's future. The 
problem remained one of the nature of the announcement. 
Dooman's subcommittee had considered this enigma prior to 
Germany's surrender, but victory in Europe stimulated them 
to work for an announcement guaranteeing the continuation of 
the imperial institution in order to "allay the fears of the 
13Dooman papers, Dooman to Len Giovannitti, 3/11/1965. 
Dooman papers. Giovannitti was researching material for a 
National Broadcasting Corporation's television program, "The 
Surrender of Japan," which was aired on September 19, 1965, 
with Dooman taking part in an interview. A copy of the 
transcript is included in the Dooman collection. Giovannitti 
subsequently published a book based on the research that he 
did for the program. Len Giovannitti and Fred Freer, The 
Decision to Drop the Bomb (New York: Coward McCann, In~ 
1965). Dooman later questioned the wisdom of issuing the 
statement because it has, "as expected, served only to increase 
Japanese doubts and confusion." This is included in the paper 
which Dooman prepared and submitted to replace the oral history 
interview for Columbia, p. 4. Dooman had not been satisfied 
with the original transcript and submitted this shorter paper, 
which is hereafter designated as EHDCOHP. 
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Japanese" and encourage surrender. On May 26, following 
an extensive series of air raids on Tokyo, Grew asked 
Dooman to prepare a statement "calling on the Japanese to 
surrender and setting forth in general terms, but as succinctly 
as possible, what the allies would or would not do. II 
Drawing on a composite of previously agreed upon principles 
and policies Dooman completed the paper and submitted it to 
Grew on the 28th.l4 
The would-be-proclamation had, in Dooman's mind, a 
dual purpose. It should spell out in no uncertain terms the 
determination of the allies to defeat Japan, but at the same 
time it should offer inducements to capitulation. He had 
lifted the preamble of his work "almost bodily" from an 
14EHD, p. 161; EHDCOHP, p. 12. There has existed some 
questions regarding the May 28 document and whether or not 
it was the same one that Grew handed to Byrnes as the 
Secretary was leaving for Potsdam. The question was raised 
in the FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. I, regarding a document marked 
740.00119EW/5-3145, page 897. Heinrichs subsequently saw 
that document and concluded correctly that it was not the 
version given to Byrnes but that the authorship was uncertain 
as there were no initials or indication of who may have pre-
pared it. However there is another copy of the same document 
in the Pacific War decimal file series, marked 740.00ll9PW/ 
6-1345 which bears Dooman's initials (AD-EHDooman:bmz). 
Further proof thatfuis is the document presented at the May 
28 Meeting is evident from another document, 740.00119P~Vj8-245, 8/2/ 
1945 prepared by Sir George Samson of the British embassy. 
In it Samson reviews "the document regarding the future 
treatment of Japan, which was shown to him on May 29." The 
notes attached clearly indicate that Samson read the paper 
described above. Heinrichs is correct in his observation 
that the two documents, the one of May 28 and the one given 
to Byrnes,are different. 
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earlier piece that former actor Douglas Fairbanks, Jr. had 
prepared for the Navy Department. Dooman had originally 
considered Fairbanks' effort as a bit too strong -- "It was 
one of those blood and thunder things . surrender or 
we'll blow you to hell sort of thing." But as he worked at 
preparing a document that would carry a message of hope to 
the Japanese, Fairbanks' "blood and thunder" warning was 
included, apparently to satisfy Americans who preferred 
"no quarter." In the body of the message, Dooman presented 
the "terms" of the allies in general phraseology that only 
indirectly dealt with the Emperor. "Unconditional surrender," 
applied in his version only to the armed forces, not to the 
Japanese people or government. Instead of guaranteeing that 
the United States would preserve the throne, he used a 
quotation from a speech by Chiang Kai-shek on New Years Day, 
1944 in which the Generalissimo stated that the character of 
the future Japanese political system "should . . better be 
left to the awakened and repented Japanese people to decide 
for themselves." In this manner Dooman felt that he had 
subtly raised and settled the issue of the Emperor. 15 
Dooman delivered his draft to Grew, who in turn dis-
cussed it with Assistant Secretaries Dean Acheson and Archibald 
MacLeish and the heads of the geographical divisions at a Depart-
ment Policy Committee meeting. 
lSA copy of the original May 28 statement is attached 
to a memorandum prepared by Dooman on June 16, 1945 and given 






Acheson and MacLeish objected to the inclusion of any comment 
that inhibited the United States from disestablishing the 
monarchy. There were no further objections, and Grew dis-
cussed the document with Truman later that day. In his 
interview with the President, Grew emphasized "that the greatest 
obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their 
belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent 
removal of the Emperor and the institution of the throne." 
The President agreed, stating that "his own thoughts had been 
following the same line," but asked that Grew first discuss it 
with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy. 16 
On May 29 all parties concerned met at the Pentagon. 
Those present included Dooman, Grew, Stimson, Secretary of 
the Navy James Forrestal, Director of the Office of War 
Information (OWI) Elmer Davis, General George C. Marshall, 
and the President's Legal Adviser Samuel Rosenman. Dooman 
and Grew addressed the group, restating their feelings 
regarding the disposition of the Emperor and the reason 
for the draft document. When they solicited comments 
from the group, Davis objected to the statement citing 
the same arguments that 
l6EHDCOH~ pp. 14-16; Grew Turbulent Era, Vol. II, pp. 
1428-1434 (a copy of this excerpt in the Dooman papers is 
marked (erroneously) as being part of Grew's diary). 
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Acheson and Macleish had presented earlier. Stimson, Forrestal, 
and Marshall "were in accord with the principles," Grew reported, 
"but for certain military reasons, not divulged, it was con-
sidered inadvisable for the President to make a statement." 
Stimson, Forrestal, and Marshall were aware of the development 
of the atomic bomb and regardless of Grew's impression that the 
President had agreed with him, Truman later claimed otherwise. 
"I had listened to many arguments on the question of unconditional 
surrender, both pro and con," Truman wrote in his memoirs, and 
"The complete collapse of the German armies and their uncon-
ditional surrender had settled the argument by itself." In May, 
American scientists had nearly completed work on a device 
which Stimson described to Truman as "the most terrible 
weapon ever known in human history. .,"the atomic bomb. 
Possession of this knowledge bolstered Truman's position, 
for he could realistically expect Japan to capitulate without 
ques-tion when confronted with this weapon to the American 
arsena1. 17 
Grew and Dooman persevered. On June 15, Grew once 
again brought Dooman's May 28 draft to Truman's attention, 
this time sending him a reply attaching it to a 
memorandum suggesting two minor changes. Then on 
17740.00119PW/5-2945, Grew memorandum of conversation with 
Stimson, Forrestal, Marshall, Davis, Rosenman, and Dooman, 5/29/ 
1945; EHDCOHP, p. 16. Dooman indicates that Assistant Secretary 
of War John McCloy and several generals and admirals were also in 
attendance. Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, Vol. I of Memoirs 
by Harry S. Truman (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), 
p. 208; Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 
Harper's Magazine, February 1947, p. 99. 
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the 26th, Grew, Stimson, and Forrestal met the President. 
Grew now had a strong ally in Stimson, who had begun 
thinking, as several people had, that the Japanese should 
be given a warning prior to any extraordinary attack. 
Knowledge of the atom bomb and the projected high cost of 
lives that would be lost in an invasion had evidently 
aroused Stimson's compassion. Together with Grew and 
Forrestal he suggested that representatives from the State, 
War, and Navy Departments should prepare a statement of 
warning to Japan. With all in agreement, Grew nominated 
Dooman and Ballantine as the Department's representatives. 
On July 2, Stimson gave an additional push when he prepared 
a long memorandum setting forth his ideas regarding the 
purpose, nature, and content of the warning. The elements 
which he wanted to include in the "warning," as he described 
it, closely followed the points set forth in Dooman's earlier 
draft except that Simson explicitly provided for the possi-
bility of the Japanese maintaining a "constitutional monarchy 
18 
under the present dynasty." 
Stimson sent his memorandum to Truman on July 2. Simul-
taneously the joint drafting committee sent its version to 
the State Department. The Committee's proposal, a thirteen 
paragraph document, incorporated many of Dooman's ideas but 
18stimson, "The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb," 
pp. 101-104, EHDCOHP. p. 22; 740.00119 P.W./6-1645, Grew 
to President, 6/16/1945. 
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did not make any specific reference to the person of the 
Emperor or the institution of the throne. When Dooman read 
the copy received at the Department on July 3, he called 
Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy's office and suggested 
that paragraph 12 be amended to allow, as in Stimson's 
memorandum, for the establishment of "a constitutional 
monarchy under the present dynasty." Grew had delivered 
the final draft to James Byrnes, who had succeeded Stettinius 
on July 3, and the new Secretary would carry it with him to 
the Allied Summit at Potsdam. 19 With their mission completed, 
Grew, Stimson, and Dooman relaxed with a sense of accomplishment. 
The three men had agreed on the need to maintain 
the imperial institution, and each had similar and different 
19FRUS, The Conference at Berlin (Potsdam), Vol. I, 
Document 591, 6/26/1945, pp. 887-888; St1.mson, "The Decision 
to Use the Atomic Bomb," pp. 101-104. Heinrichs has concluded 
that the final document was a third or fourth generation 
version of Dooman's May 28 Statement. It had undergone 
reworking in the Joint Committee. Heinrichs, note 57, p. 379. 
Further support for Dooman's claims to being the originator 
of the Potsdam Declaration is given in an August 27 Newsweek 
article that describes Dooman as "The Architect of Potsdam 
Terms." "The What to do Men," Newsweek, August 27, 1945, p. 39. 
There is no substantial evidence to prove that Dooman did in 
fact made the telephone call to the War Department. There is 
a note attached to the final version of the document with the 
modified paragraph 12 in the State Department papers. At the 
top there is a penned comment "Changes communicated to Col. 
Gerhardt over the telephone July 3, 5 pm." The handwriting on 
the sheet bears strong resemblance to Dooman's, but there is 
no record of who received the call in Gerhardt's office. 
(Colonel Harrison A. Gerhardt, General Staff Corps, Executive 
to the Assistant Secretary of War.) See document 740.00ll9PW/ 
7-245. Who deleted the phrase in the document that was sent to 
the Department on July 3, and why the phrase was left out, 
remains a matter of supposition. 
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reasons. Stimson believed, as did Grew, that retention of 
the Emperor would guarantee Japanese acceptance of the pro-
posed warning and would save both Japanese and Allied lives. 
Grew had vacillated over the problem. In 1943 he had stated 
that without the throne as a cornerstone "for a healthy and 
peaceful internal ... regeneration, Japan faced a chaotic 
future." In April 1945 he had questioned Hirohito's con-
tinuance as Emperor and even retention of the throne itself, 
observing on several occasions that the official attitude 
towards the ruler should "be left fluid until we can definitely 
ascertain whether the emperor . . . or the institution of 
throne is going to be an asset or liability."
20 
Dooman questioned the wisdom of a direct attack on the 
throne for some of the same practical reasons cited by Grew 
in April, but he did not share Grew's later doubts regarding 
the necessity of keeping the institution. Dooman believed, 
as he said later, that Japan's "whole social structure would 
fall apart," if "there were no emperor." The throne had, 
he elaborated, "kept the Japanese together as a unit for 
1500 years" and its demise meant the destruction of the 
2 °FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. I, Document 592, enclosure 2, 
note Stimson to Truman, 7/2/1945, pp. 893-894; Ibid., note 
9, p. 899; Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," 
p. 102; Grew to Hornbeck, 9/30/1943, Grew papers; Letter, 
Grew to Dooman, 4/12/1948; Dooman papers; Grew to Ronald 
Gould, 4/14/1945, and Grew to Lieutenant William W. Wertz, Jr., 
5/9/1945, both in the Grew papers; Heinrichs, p. 377. 
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Japanese social order. He envisioned such a disunified period 
as an ideal moment for the social revolution called for by 
well organized communist forces. Retention would work to 
the advantage of the Allies, Dooman insisted, because the 
communists realized the incongruity of their system and 
monarchical governments. Both he and Grew saw communism 
as a potential threat and both wanted to combat it as best 
they could. In view of these considerations Dooman questioned 
the right of a victorious nation to reorder the social 
structure of the vanquished, and he focused on the need to 
protect the cultural integrity of the defeated nation.
21 
21 EHD, pp. 142-143; Dooman to Giovannitti, 3/11/1965; 
PWC 116/CAC 93e, 5/9/1949- paper, "Japan: Political Problems: 
Institution of the Emperor," Box 78 of the Harley Notter files, 
National ARchives; IPR Hearings, p. 705. In 1962 Dooman care-
fully explained the term unconditional surrender in the paper 
he submitted to the Columbia Oral History Project. He pointed 
out that there was a difference between the term when applied 
to an enemy state rather than its armed forces. The former, 
he argued, was "known in international law as de bellatio, had 
defined by actual practice and precedents over~he centuries 
as conferring on the victor absolute and unlimited rights of 
disposal over the vanquished nation (consistently with the 
dictates of humanity), including the right to end the latter's 
independence." He cited as examples the partition of Poland 
in 1772 and the conversion of the Boer republics into a British 
colony. On this basis, he evaluated the situation in 1945. 
"When the victor on his own initiative undertakes to assume 
limitations on his treatment of the about-to-be defeated nation 
as an inducement to surrender, and when that inducement is 
accepted by the latter, he cannot, with any color of reason 
or logic, now lay claim to the absolute right which unconditional 
surrender would have conferred." Stimson recognized the limita-
tions which existed as Dooman later pointed out Stimson had 
state d in his Harper.' s article of February 194 7: 
"While the Allies made no promises other than those already 
given .... " In a footnote Dooman pointed out that MacLeish 
had technically violated his own determined efforts to avoid 
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Several individuals remained unsatisfied by the out-
come of the meetings and continued pressing their arguments. 
On July 5 Assistant Secretary MacLeish forwarded his comments 
on Dooman's draft to Acheson. He blasted Dooman for his 
"lack of clarity and candor .... " and his attempt "to 
substitute for 'unconditional surrender' surrender on 'terms' 
acceptable to the Japanese." MacLeish also criticized use 
of Chiang Kai-shek's quotation rather than one issued by 
the United States. He suggested that in the draft Dooman 
had approached the problem "obliquely" as it referred not 
to the Emperor but to "the political system" and "form of 
government." Even this implied easing of Allied demands 
upset the Assistant Secretary, who strongly objected to 
the idea of allowing the Japanese to "retain the charac-
teristic and essential institution of their government," 
and to respect "the person of the incumbent of that 
institution." 22 
offering terms in a ra1io broadcast of July 22,, 19 45. After 
statirig that only the unconditional surrender of Japan was 
acceptable, the Assistant Secretary went on to say that 
"although the Allies might indicate the measures they would 
apply to post-surrender Japan, such clarification could 
not be taken as offering 'terms' to Japan, and therefore a 
proposal for a negotiatied surrender would be nothing more 
than clarification of the 'treatment' which Japan might 
expect." Dooman added that "this piece of casuistry was 
probably put out in anticipation of the Potsdam Declaration." 
EHDCOHP, pp. 5-6. 
22
740.00119PW/7-545, MacLeish Memorandum to Acheson, 
7/5/1945. 
l6i 
Dooman soon learned that others did not share his 
feelings, and that .vestiges of past enmities still remained 
in the halls of the Department. MacLeish followed his July 
5 memorandum to Acheson with a note to Byrnes, criticizing 
the jointly prepared statement. He reiterated his point that 
substituting terms, "even irreducible terms, is not uncon-
ditional surrender," and if this was the government's intention 
then he argued, "the American people have the right to know 
it." He commented that a compromise along the lines proposed 
proved inconsistent with the policy administered toward 
Germany. Then MacLeish ventured, as others before him had, 
his non-expert evaluation of the Japanese mind and the 
resulting effects that the compromise statement would have 
on the Japanese people. Although he agreed that retaining 
the Emperor might speed the capitualtion process and save 
lives, he warned that "Japanese jingoes" had manipulated 
the throne in the past and they could as easily do so in 
the future. Retention had to be balanced aginst "the lives 
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already spent in vain . . and lives [that] will be lost 
again in the future . if the throne is employed . 
as it has been in the past." In conclusion MacLeish 
recommended against issuing any public statement until some 
final departmental policy had been developed. He added that 
the reasons for change "should be precise and clear, so that 
no one in the United States will misunderstand." 23 
Grew and Dooman had placed themselves in a tenuous 
position by suggesting what some interpreted as softening 
of American policy, and they soon found that others sided 
with IvlacLeish. As word of the "Grew-Dooman" proposal became 
known, the two men came under fire from what Dooman labeled 
"the liberal press." Two publications in particular, the 
magazine The Nation and the newspaper P.M. gave wide coverage 
to "appeasers" in the State Department. Nation carried 
articles with pseudonym by-lines like "Argus," and "Pacificus." 
Contributors and editors alike espoused a sympathetic line 
towards the communist movemen~ and they consistently attacked 
the Department for its "reactionary" elements. In February 
1945, "Pacificus 11 had written a bitter criticism of Dooman 
and his role in the Department. The author decried Dooman's 
"staunch support" of Japanese "ruling groups" as the most 
likely source of future leaders for Japan while he ignored 
23 FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. I, document 593, memorandum from 
MacLeish to Byrnes, 7/6/1945, p. 895. 
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other elements including "Conununists . . ' [and] other 
labor and peasant leaders. 11 The article alleged that Dooman's 
association with 11 Upper class Japanese 11 rendered him ineffective 
as a director of post-war policy. 24 
In June the attacks became more personal in nature 
as I. F. Stone and Owen Lattimore, advocates of a "hard 
peace 11 line, joined the opposition to any softening 
of American demands. Stone accused Dooman and Grew of using 
11 the old red bogey" as a vehicle for saving Japan from "full 
defeat." A subsequent editorial linked Dooman to Assistant 
Secretary of State James Dunn, who was described as a man 
of "pro-Franco and anti-Russian prejudices." All three 
Department officials represented, according to the editorial, 
a sizeable number of policy makers who had been "contaminated 
by . . snobbery and . • false social standards," making 
them stumbling blocks to "a vigorous, consistent, democratic 
foreign policy." In the following issue, Stone continued 
this line of attack on the two men whom he described as 
having been "thrilled by the Imperial court and aristocratic 
society" and thus duped by the clever Japanese in 1941. 
Consequently Stone surmised that "they cannot be trusted for 
25 realistic or rigorous advice for the future of Japan." 
24EHD, p. 136; Pacificus, "Dangerous Experts," The 
Nation, February 3, 1945, pp. 127-128. 
25 I. F. Stone, "Arrest of the Six," The Nation, Vol. 
160, 24,June 16, 1945, pp. 666-667; Stone, "Clean out the State 
Department," The Nation, Vol. 161, 1, July 7, 1945, pp. 4-5; 
Stone, "Pearl Harbor Diplomats," The Nation, Vol. 161, 2, 
July 14, 1945, pp. 25-27. 
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Like The Nation, P.M. had a left of center political 
bias. Its writers assaulted "conservatives" and "Big 
Business" while supporting leftist ideals. In Max Lerner's 
four part article, "No Soft Peace A Hard Revolt," this 
point of view came across clearly as the writer attacked the 
Japanese throne and business concerns. He charged that 
Japan's problems, past and present, sprang from the "Emperor 
Institution" which had the support of "Big Business 'liberals 
. ' who are the darlings of the State Department's Grews 
and Doomans." Following Japan's surrender P.M. would picture 
Grew and Dooman in caricature, carrying Hirohito on their 
shoulders, with a caption reading "Our Hiro!" (See overleaf.) 
The only path open to allied planners, P.M. insisted, lay in 
the destruction of the throne. 26 
Russian predominance in Eastern Europe and American 
fears of the spread of Communism affected war time diplomacy. 
The Japanese imperial institution became the focus of the 
debate between right and left wing ideologues in and out of 
government. Arnerical military leaders, notably Admiral 
William F. Halsey, represented right wing elements, 
which had called for the elimination of the throne 
26Max Lerner, "Mastering Japan's Masters," a four 
part article in P.M., July 22-August 14, 1945. 
172 




and the Shinto faith which supported it. Ironically, the American 
Communist Political Association announced, similarly, that 
one of its basic tenents was that "the'Mikado' must be 
dethroned." The Nation and P.M., left in orientation, 
had also endorsed this theme because, they 
asserted, without the Emperor Japan could undergo a "social 
revolt," allowing "the people" to take power. Fear of this 
social revolution stimulated, the journals observed, American 
. t . . . h h 27 1n erest 1n reta1n1ng t e monarc y. 
27 . " Barton J. Bernste1n, Roosevelt, Truman, and the 
Atomic Bomb, 1941 - 1945: A Reinterpretation," Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, 1, Spring 1975, p. 68. Bernstein's 
art1cle 1s a critical examination of the Alperovitz theory. 
(Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy -- Hiroshima and Potsdam: 
The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontat1on with 
Soviet Power (New York: Vintage Books of Random House, Inc., 
1965). Alperovitz argued that the decision to bomb Japan with 
atomic weapons was made by American leaders who wanted to impress 
and frighten Soviet leaders in order to gain an advantage in 
the cold war. Martin J. Sherwin ((A World Destroyed: The Atomic 
Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975)) 
elaborates upon Alperovitz's views but shows that there was in 
fact a consistent desire to have the United States and Great 
Britain (the "Grand Alliance") control post surrender world 
affairs. Sherwin also emphasizes the fact that Truman and 
Stimson and the others were primarily interested in a swift end 
to the war with as few allied casualties as possible. All con-
clude, however, that the bomb and American interpretations of Russiar 
attitudes influenced American foreign policy in 1945; 740.00ll9PW, 
memorandum, William T. Turner to Grew, 7/19/1945. Turner quotes 
Halsey's statements in an issue of Colliers magazine and 
evaluates Japanese reaction to it. Forrest Davis, "Did Marshall 
Prolong the Pacific War?" Freedman magazine reprint, November 
19, 1951, p. 4.; Lerner, "What to do about the Emperor?" P.M., 
August 13, 1945, p. 2; Lerner, "What Do We Fear in the Fa_r __ 
East?" P.M., August 16, 1945, p. 2; Stone, "Arrest of the Six," 
p. 6. --
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Officials sympathetic to those attitudes joined the 
argument and thereby complicated any movement in the direction 
of retention. One of the most outspoken of the leftist 
bureaucrats was serving in the Office of War Information. 
Owen Lattimore, former editor of Pacific Affairs, the journal 
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and a China expert, 
who had written several books on Asia, bitterly contested what 
he called "the record of our experts on Japan," and Japan's 
negative attitude towards a "benevolent" United States. The 
"Solution in Asia," as Lattimore explained, meant harsh 
treatment of the Japanese, the removal of the Emperor, and 
the reorganization of Japanese society. To implement his 
plan, he called for the internment of the Emperor and all 
males eligible for succession ("preferably in China"), and for 
the transfer of royal estates along with those of zaibatsu 
families to agrarian reform programs. In this way, Lattimore 
decided, new vested interests would emerge and prevent 
restoration of the monarchy. 28 
Among Dooman's associates in the Department were 
individuals whose work had helped to undermine the thesis 
that the communists posed a threat. John K. Emmerson, a 
Foreign Service Officer who had served in Tokyo before the 
war and later went to Yenan, China, as an observer of Japanese 
28 tt. s l . . . l t. thl Owen La ~more, o utlon ln Asla, an At an lC Mon y 
Press Book (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945), pp. 8, 
17, 27, 47, 187-189. 
---------
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Communist activities, wrote that the United States had 
nothing to fear from the communists in Japan. In fact, 
he argued, Americans could look forward to the help that 
the communists would provide in post-war Japan. Dooman 
found equally distressing the fact that few of his fellow 
workers shared his concern over a possible communist 
uprising and what he saw as the destruction of Japan's 
traditional political, economic, and social structure. 
Adding to his consternation was the problem of a news leak 
within the Department. Throughout the summer, policy state-
ments made in confidence found their way onto the pages 
29 of The Nation and P.M. 
The events of July seemed to favor, however, Grew 
and Dooman. The Allies had scheduled a conference for the 
29 894.00/2-1645, John K. Emmerson memorandum, 11 Com-
munism and the Future of Japan," 2/16/1945, Dooman testified 
against Emmerson at the IPR Hearings in 1951, and Emmerson 
has expressed puzzlement over his former "friend's 11 actions. 
Dooman testified that Emmerson had commended a Japanese 
communist, Nozaka Sanzo, to the Department and he, Emmerson, 
later visited with that same individual in a Japanese prison. 
Upon release, Emmerson picked him up and drove him to Occupa-
tion Headquarters in Tokyo in an official staff car. The latter 
actions were, according to Emmerson, part of his official duties 
in the SCAP government. Emmerson was then unaware of the 
bitter attacks on Dooman back home and later wondered why 
Dooman, with whom Emmerson "saw eye to eye" in 1945, had turned 
on him. IPR Hearings, pp. 749-750, and Interview with Emmerson, 
May 25, 1976. Dooman expressed his concern over the nonchalant 
attitude towards a social revolution in a letter to Benjamin 
Mandell, Director of Research, U. S. Senate Subcommittee to 
Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and 
other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
1/12/1959, Doornan papers. Doornan attributed the 11 leak" in the 
Department of State to Julian Friedman who was working for John 
Carter Vincent at the time. IPR Hearings, p. 714. 
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last two weeks of July at Potsdam, a small town near Berlin, 
Germany. Grew and Dooman had reason to be optimistic as to 
the outcome of the summit since American representatives to 
the conference, including Truman, had read intercepted 
Japanese cables and knew of Japan's attempts at surrender. 
Furthermore they had taken with them the draft statement that 
the joint committee under Dooman's tutelage had prepared. 
Dooman's hopes ran high. If the Allies published his declara-
tion while at the meeting, he believed that Japan would 
capitulate allowing a peaceful conclusion to the war.3° 
On July 26 Dooman's hopes collapsed. On that date 
the heads of the Allied powers issued the Potsdam Declara-
tion. The statement, essentially the same one sent along 
with Byrnes, had a major change: the reference to the Emperor 
had been deleted. In a memorandum prepared for Truman, 
Admiral William Leahy had suggested that while the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff felt that the proclamation was "generally 
satisfactory," they wished to propose a change. "To some 
of the extreme devotees of the Emperor," Leahy speculated, 
"the phrase 'this may include a constitutional monarchy under 
the present dynasty• may be misconstrued as a commitment by 
the United Nations to depose or execute . " Hirohito 
and place some other member of the family on the throne. He 
expressed further concern over the reaction of "the radical 
30nooman to Giovannitti, 4/11/1965 
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elements in Japan to which this phrase may be construed to 
as a commitment to continue the institution of the Emperor 
and Emperor worship." Consequently Leahy suggested a phrase 
acceptable to the Joint Chiefs which made no mention of the 
Institution. Truman, a man quick to accept the advice of 
his military advisers, concurred and the original phraseology 
31 was changed. 
Following the broadcast of the declaration, the 
Allies bided their time. Little had changed. The powers 
had done nothing more than to re-emphasize their call for 
an unconditional surrender, and Japanese reaction to the 
Potsdam Declaration was a foregone conclusion to Dooman, 
Grew and others knowledgeable of Japan. 
Initially the declaration did not discourage Japanese 
leaders. Members of the Japanese Foreign Office discerned 
"conditions" in the ultimatum, and they decided, despite 
31FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. II, document 1239, Leahy to 
Truman, 7/18/1945, pp. 1268-1269. Note: the phraseology is 
Leahy's not the author's. Bernstein points out that Byrnes 
had deleted the phrase on ~dvice from Hul~ who argued 
inclusion might stiffen Japanese resistance and thereby create 
political problems for Truman at home. He also notes the 
action of the Joint Chiefs and concludes that based on these 
two moves and not for ulterior motives, the President agreed 
to deletion. The argument that Truman did not want to depart 
from Roosevelt's policy of unconditional surrender is per-
suasive except that, as Dooman has pointed out (see footnote 
21) , inclusion of the phrase would not have been a great 
deviation. It should also be noted that while Bernstein is 
aware of Grew's role he seems to have neglected that of Dooman. 
Thus he has ignored one of the most important questions 
involved in the entire episode- Why didn't those who made 
policy listen to an expert? 
··--------· --·-.---.,.-:--_c:....o_-_, 
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the objections of the military, not to reject the Allies 
demands. In a play for time, the government announced that 
its policy was one of mokusatsu, or "remaining silent." Here 
the Japanese language worked to the disadvantage of these 
government officials who had hoped to gain some room for 
negotiation. The ambiguity of the term produced some confusion 
becausethewaU ~eked an exact equivalent in English. Thus the 
Tokyo newspaper Mainichi stated that the government considered 
the declaration a "laughable matter." Japan's War Minister, 
Anami Korechika, who opposed negotiation, described the 
government's policy as one of "rejection by ignoring." On 
July 28 Radio Tokyo broadcast in English the message that 
Japan chose to "ignore" the Allies' ultimatum. Japan's fate 
was sealed. 32 
Dooman later insisted that American decision makers 
had decided Japan's fate prior to the Tokyo radio broadcast. 
On June 1, a committee composed of scientists and government 
advisers sent to Truman their recommendation "that the bomb 
be used against the enemy as soon as it could be done." 
Others opposed its use or at least its direct use on any 
inhabited sector of Japan. Under Secretary of the Navy 
Ralph Bard led a group whimbroached the idea of offering 
a demonstration of the weapon to the Japanese before using 
32Kazuo Kawai, "Mokusatsu, Japan's Response to the 
Potsdam Declaration," Pacific Historical Review, XIX, 4 
(November 1950), 412-413; Truman, p. 421. 
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it on target. In doing so, Bard explained the United 
States would live up to its reputation "as a great humani-
tarian nation" and display "the fair play attitude" of the 
American people. A group of sixty-three scientists, led by 
Leo Szilard,who had originally supported the development of 
atomic energy for military purposes, sent a petition to 
Truman asking him not to approve the use of the bomb against 
occupied areas of Japan. Their efforts went for nought 
because Truman had already made a decision. On the 26th, 
after consulting again with his advisers and Churchill, he 
ordered that the first bomb be dropped after August 3 if 
Japan had not surrendered before that date. 33 The bombs were 
dropped on August 6 and 9. 
Between 1960 and 1963 Dooman's attitude regarding 
the reason for the use of the bombings had solidified and 
his conclusion was similar to the one published by Alperovitz 
three years later. Truman and his advisers, Dooman alleged, 
"had made up their minds to use the bomb." He noted Truman's 
comment; "Let there be no mistake about it, I regarded the 
bomb as a military weapon and never had any doubt that it 
should be used." Dooman disputed Stimson's altruistic 
argument, which he set forth in his 1947 Harpers article, 
33Truman, pp. 419-420; Lewis L. Strauss, "A Thousand 
Years of Regret," in Strauss, Men and Decisions (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1962), p. 192; Sherwln, p. 202. 
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that the bomb would shock the Japanese into surrendering and 
thereby save "many times the number of lives, both allied 
and Japanese that it (an invasion) would cost." Stimson 
knew, Dooman argued, of Japan's weakened condition and of 
their interest in surrendering. Stimson dismissed the 
early attempts as being "not worthy of 'serious considera-
tion,'" but Dooman counters that the Secretary of War later 
knew that the Japanese had not ignored the terms of the 
Potsdam Declaration because he had read an intercept of an 
August 3 message which indicated Japan's desire to negotiate 
a surrender based on the declaration. He also doubts the 
validity of the argument that Stimson set forth justifying 
the decisionrot to issue a warning in the end of May. The 
Secretary indicated in his article that he and others believed 
that the intense fighting on Okinawa would have been adversely 
affected by the issuance of a statement that could have been 
interpreted as making concessions. According to Dooman that 
theory fails because the battle for Okinawa had been won by 
the end of May and that only small pockets of resistance 
still existed at that time. 34 
"Why then had the bomb been used?" Dooman asked. He 
speculated that Roosevelt and Truman had "badgered" Stalin 
into entering the war but that Churchill, after hearing of the 
34oooman, 11 The A-Bomb and American Foreign Policy," a 
speech before Saint Michael's Church Men's Club (Litchfield, 
Conn.) 1/12/1960, Dooman papersi Truman, p. 419; Stimson, 
"The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb," pp. 101-102, 106; 
Truman, p. 419; EHDCOHP, 24-26. 
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successful testing of the bomb, concluded that the Allies 
no longer needed Russia. The Prime Minister believed, 
Dooman continued, that "the end of the war was no longer 
dependent on the pouring in of their armies •• We had 
no need to ask favors of them." Dooman inferred that Truman 
had agreed and consequently the bomb was not used to save 
lives but rather to force Japan's capitulation before 
Russia's entry into the war. In this manner, Dooman sadly 
concluded, those leaders had hastened to open "a Pandora's 
box of indescribable horrors. ." which became a "fearful 
price that mankind has been called on to pay for a reckless 
and sinister gamble which did not come off! '' 35 
Japan surrendered eight days fater the bombing of 
Hiroshima, but the bomb had not been the deciding factor 
according to Dooman. In its official account of the August 6 
bombing of that city, Japan's Foreign Ministry described the 
nature of the weapon as a "conventional bomb of extraordinary 
power." The only confirmation that the United States had 
used a nuclear weapon appeared in the minutes of an August 9 
meeting of the Supreme Council. After concluding that the 
bomb "was a nuclear device .... ,"General Umezu Yoshijiro 
reassured the Council that the military could provide an 
35oooman "The A Bomb and American Foreign Policy." 
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effective defense against further air raids. Despite Umezu's 
confidence in the military, the Emperor ordered Japan's 
surrender.36 
Surrender meant an American occupation of Japan and 
implementation of SWNNC's policies to be carried out by the 
Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific (SCAP), Douglas 
MacArthur, and his staff. Grew and Dooman worked to have 
some voice in the SCAP by having Dooman assigned to the 
general's staff. They had begun their efforts following a 
mid-July meeting with Brigadier General William Crist, during 
which Grew had learned of MacArthur's desire for some "top notch 
men" to serve as his political, economic and financial advisers. 
Grew had respectfully declined Byrne's suggestion that he serve a~ 
political adviser to MacArthur.andsubmitted Dooman's name. 
Grew had later sent a list of Department personnel which 
he thought were qualifie~ including at the top of the list 
Ballantine's and Dooman's names. Dooman also pursued the 
3 6EHDCOHP, pp. 27-28; Dooman provides a translation 
of the Foreign Ministry's report in a footnote (p. 17) of his 
second version sent to Columbia's Oral History Project. He 
provides the following citation: "Shusen Shiroku (Documents 
Relating to the End of the War), Foreign Office, Tokyo, 1961, 
pp. 535, 536." See Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 
pp. 151-153. There was a debate among the Japanese mil1tary 
leaders and scientists as to this question. It was not until 
August 10, a day after the second bombing, that they agreed 
as to the bomb's nuclear origins. Still many believed that 
countermeasures could be taken which would afford some pro-





matter calling attention to the fact that the Department 
should "take the initiative .. in appointing" a candidate. 
The War Department had set a precedent, he continued, when 
it appointed Robert Murphy as Eisenhower's adviser, adding 
that "if the initiative [was] left entirely to General 
MacArthur, the Department may have very little to say 
about ... it." 37 
Grew and Dooman's moves were uncovered and eventually 
came undone. Acting Secretary of War McCloy had written to 
Byrnes listing those characteristics which an adviser should 
possess, including that the individual "should ..• be known 
to the public as a person in whose judgment great trust can 
be placed." Dooman's reputation at that point left him short 
of this image. P.M. quickly picked up the various stories 
originating in the two Departments and printed them, 
suggesting that appointing Dooman would be tantamount to an 
American defeat. Dooman and Grew had acted, and would continue 
37 740.00119PW/7-1645, Grew memorandum of conversation, 
7/16/1945; 740.00 119PW/8-745. Ballantine to Grew, 8/7/1945; 
740.00119PW/8-745, Grew to Byrnes, 8/7/1945; 740.00119PW/ 
8-1345, Dooman to Grew and Dunn, 8/13/1945. NOTE: As late 
as August 22 Grew made efforts to have Dooman assigned to 
MacArthur's staff. Grew wrote MacArthur that Dooman was "a 
man who knows and understands the Japanese probably better than 
any living American," adding that he had passed the name on 
to the general should he need nature advice on Japan. Grew 
to MacArthur, 8/22/1945, Grew papers. Grew passed up the offer 
to go himself saying that he did not want to go back to Japan 
"in the guise of a conqueror .... " and that he doubted that 
anyone serving MacArthur "would be able to sway any important 
issue .... " as the general was "a prima donna." Grew to 
Harry s. Grew, 8/21/1945, Grew papers. 
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to act, according to P.M., not out of any deep concern for 
the Emperor, but out of a "fear that Asia will swing to 
the left as. •.. " Europe had. 38 
The anxiety exhibited in P.M.'s editorials proved 
unwarranted. Byrnes named George Atcheson, Jr., as Acting 
Political Adviser, praising him as a "Foreign Service 
Officer who ... devoted himself to Far Eastern work." 
He did not point out, however, that Atcheson had gained 
his experiences as a China hand and not as a Japan expert. 
Regardless of that fact Stimson readily accepted the 
nomination, as did MacArthur. One more battle had been 
lost. 39 
Dooman continued in his efforts to prevent the 
reduction of Japan to a state of "fisherman and farmers," 
and the destruction of the imperial institution. Japanese 
acceptance of the Potsdam ultimatum constituted, he argued, 
a contractual agreement and not complete capitulation. His 
opponents, particularly John Carter Vincent and the Navy's 
representative on the SWNCC subcommittee on the Far East, 
Captain R. L. Dennison, staunchly opposed this point of view. 
38 740.00119 (Control) Japan/8-1345, McCloy to Byrnes, 
8/13/1945; I. F. Stone, "What About the Emperor?" P.M., p. 2; 
Max Lerner, "What Do We Fear in the Far East?" P.M., August 16, 
1945, p. 2. ----
39740.00119 (Control) Japan/9-145, Byrnes to Stimson, 
9/1/1945; 740.00119 (Control) Japan/9-645, Stimson to Byrnes, 
9/6/1945. 
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Not only had Japan surrendered unconditionally, the two 
retorted, but the Emperor had not received immunity in any 
form and should therefore be tried as a war criminal. 40 
Dooman found his position untenable, and he decided 
to resign. The events of August upset hi~ and the liberal 
elements of the American press continued to criticize him. 
Those around him seemed determined to ignore the advice he 
offered as had happened in the past. He had dedicated his 
career to serving the United States and to that extent he 
had hoped to establish [in some way] good relations between 
the United States and Japan. Instead he had spent the years 
between 1937 and 1945 in a campaign against individuals 
antagonistic towards Japan or who had denigrated the role 
of the Japan expert. Dean Acheson was one such individual, 
and when Dooman learned that Acheson had been appointed 
Under Secretary of State, he made his resignation effective, 
41 
not January 1, 1946 as scheduled, but on September 1, 1945. 
40 IPR Hearings, exhibit 241, pp. 736-743~ Minutes of 
the 37th meeting of the SWNNC subcommittee on the Far East, 
8/29/1945, p. 3; 38th meeting minutes, 9/1/1945, pp. 1-2; 
Ninutes of the 43rd meeting 9/25,11945, pp. 3, 6; Hinutes of 
the 48th meeting, 10/23/1945, p. 2; 851G.OO/l0. Vincent 
memorandum to Acheson, 10/2/1945. 
41EHD. 139; Interview with Mrs. Dooman, February 
25, 1973. 
CHAPTER 7 
THE JUSTICE OF ANGRY MEN 
Dooman's experiences, particularly during the last 
years of his service, had made him bitter. In 1946 he 
denounced American occupation policies and "the present 
regime. ." in Washington. "I was kicked out," he com-
mented. He later expressed his conviction that there existed a 
clique which was "primarily concerned with insuring the per-
manent continuation of the war time collaboration between the 
United States and the Soviet Union." Dooman believed that he 
had prevented the "injustice," that he called, "the justice 
of angry men," but he had received constant opposition. 1 
In 1951, during the peak of the McCarthy era, Dooman 
found a forum where he could vent his spleen. He volunteered 
as a witness before a Senate subcommittee which was investiga-
ting the Institute of Pacific Relations as part of a larger 
probe into possible violations of the Internal Security Act. 
There, under oath, he accused Vincent of attempting to undo 
the work of himself and Grew by attempting to appoint Lattimore 
as an adviser in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, noting Latti-
more's insistence on the disestablishment of the monarchy, which 
1 "Dooman Says Present Policies Mean 50 Year Jap Occupa-
tion," The News and Courier, Charleston, South carolina, February 
13, 1946, p. l. Doornan, undated, untitled paper, section entitled 
"Is American Attitude Towards Japan Changing? 11 p. 2, in the 
Dooman papers; Doornan, "Open Letter to my Japanese Friends," 
November 24, 1949, Dooman papers. 
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Dooman described as one of the "cardinal points" of world 
communism. Dooman also criticized Vincent for wanting to 
try the Emperor as a war criminal and condemned him for his 
support of the Chinese communists and his association with 
Julian Friedman, whom Dooman had charged with leaking con-
fidential Department information. Dooman made the point that 
Emmerson had associated with the Japanese communist, Nozaka, 
and that as MacArthur's adviser Emmerson had prepared a SCAP 
report on land reform which Dooman believed to be inspired 
by Nozaka's comrades. 2 Dooman did not believe, however, that 
Emmerson and the others were communists. "They were 
opportunists. .,"acting in their own behalf without 
regard for the best interests of the United States or Japan, 
an attitude which galled·Dooman, who envisioned himself as a 
realist and as one who had therefore never acted out of a 
devotion to any political ideology despite his conservatism. 
He doubted, for instance, the wisdom of American support 
for Nationalist China, calling Chiang Kai-shek's regime one 
"which had no future." 3 
Dooman did believe that between 1931 and 1941 American 
foreign policy makers had favored China while turning an 
2IPR Hearings, pp. 704-705, 7-8-709; Dooman to 
Mandell, l/12/1955. 
3IPR Hearings, p. 753; Dooman to J. w. Fulbright, 
Chairman, F U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
3/14/1959; Interview with Mrs. Dooman. 
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insensitive ear to Japan. Reflecting on his service Dooman 
wrote that "the foreign policy of a democratic state is not 
the product of only a few .•.. ,"but he had found that a 
handful of people in positions of influence could, despite 
their qualifications, turn the corner on a particular issue, 
and in that manner continued action of this sort produced a 
long term effect on overall policy. This had been clear in 
the late thirties and early forties when Hornbeck undermined 
the work of Grew and Dooman. Hornbeck could not have been 
successful, Dooman concluded, if he had not represented a 
popular point of view, but he never doubted that Hornbeck 
had held a persuasive hand in determining pre-war policies 
and that he had spread his "pathological hatred for Japan" 
to those susceptible individuals around him, notably Hull. 
Dooman described the former Secretary as an individual 
"lacking that flexibility and . . knowledge which dis-
tinguished other Secretaries of State:' Thus Hornbeck had 
little difficulty in passing his anti-Japanese sentiment 
upwards. 4 
By 1945 the situation had changed significantly. 
The opposition to Dooman's advice no longer flowed from a 
4nooman, "American Foreign Policy and its Implementa-
tion in the Far East," paper included in Dooman's letter to 
Fulbright, 3/14/1959~ EHD, pp. 50-51, 107. 
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group who applied American values to international disputes; 
but rather from a wide range of individuals of varying 
political persuasions. The most obvious group was those 
China and Japan hands, such as Vincent and Emmerson. There 
was also a concern among many government officials, including 
Stimson and Acheson that Russia would emerge victorious in 
the cold war. Thus control of the new threat took pre-
cedence over any concern for Japan and again it became a 
question of method that separated Dooman from his opponents. 
Dooman apparently believed that a strong democratic Japan 
built on the traditional basis of its own system would provide 
the bulwark ofdemocracy in East Asia. Stimson and the others 
opted for, according to Dooman, a thorough defeat of Japan 
through the use of nuclear weapons as a way to convince 
the Soviets of American predominance in Asia and elsewhere. 
Although embittered by his experiences, Dooman never 
relinquished his desire to improve Japanese-American relations. 
In 1948 he formed, together with lawyer James Lee Kaufman, 
and Harry F. Kern, foreign news editor for Newsweek magazine, 
the American Council on Japan. The Council set as its goals 
encouragement of harmony between the two nations, and it 
attempted through several methods, including a quasi-lobbying 
group, to produce changes in Occupation policies. In 1950 
it sponsored an American tour by Ozaki Yukio, a member of 
Japan's first Parliment (1896), a Japanese liberal who had 
led the fight for universal manhood suffrage. In 1952 it 
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arranged for an exhibition of Japanese art which toured 
several major American cities. At this point the Council 
was convinced that it had "opened the eyes of the public" 
and its founders quietly disbanded their organization. 5 
Dooman remained active however. He visited Japan 
several times and saw old friends. He became involved in 
community and church activities in his new home of Litchfield, 
Connecticut where he also joined the editorial staff of a 
local historical organization that printed a journal of 
history written by laymen. In it he published an article 
based on materials which he had obtained and translated in 
1928-1929. In 1962 he participated in Columbia University's 
Oral History Project and throughout his retirement he had 
constantly received enquiries from individuals researching 
h . ' d 6 the lstory of the war perlo . 
5EHD, pp. 149-154. 
6Dooman had begun his research while stationed in 
Tokyo, having obtained the Japanese originals of papers that 
had belonged to Count Hotta Masayoshi, who had served on the 
Tokugawa Shogun's Council of Elders during the negotiations 
with Towsend Harris, American Minister to Japan, in 1856-1858. 
His original plan was to translate the documents for publica-
tion by the Department. Dooman to Tyler Dennett, Chief of 
Publications, Department of State, 1/4/1928, and 2/16/1928, 
Treat papers, Hoover Institute, Stanford California. Later he 
prepared a manuscript but the man to whom it was delivered for 
review died and it was lost. Dooman did publish an article 
based on the materials in the January of My Country of which 
he was an editor, "W. C. Reed and T. T. Dougherty," My Country, 
Vol. 3, no. 1, January 1969, pp. 16-19. Published by My Country 
Society, Inc., of Litchfield, Connecticut. Among those who 
corresponded with or interviewed (other than previously mentioned) 
Dooman were author John Toland (The Rising Sun: The Decline and 
Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945), 1972, and Professor Kenneth 
Colegrove of Northwestern University (The American Senate and 
World Peace, 1936). 
~---·_:___ -----------------------------~------
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On June 21, 1960, Dooman met with Japan's Consul 
General 1n New York, Tanaka Mitsuo. In a brief ceremony 
Tanaka presented Dooman with the Order of the Rising Sun, 
Second Class, in recognition of D:ooman' s "Long and 
meritorious service in the advancement of Japanese-American 
relations and in the building of a new Japan ... Tanaka 
commented that 11 It was indeed fortunate for us that the SCAP 
policies were formulated with the advice and considered 
judgment of men of your stature. All of us Japanese will 
long remember your sympathetic understanding of our problems 
and aspirations through the years of crises and good times. 7 
Two years later Hornbeck exchanged views with Dooman 
regarding their years in the Department. In the course of 
a discussion with a friend regarding Department personnel, 
Hornbeck mentioned his belief that there was atthe moment 
a great deal of .. in-fighting ... His unidentified associate 
remarked, 11 Has that not always been?" Hornbeck expressed 
doubts that any such strife had existed between 1928 and 
1942, adding, however, that in 1942 and continuing through 
1945 .. there had been on the part of some of the officers 
. views and efforts directed toward undermining and 
getting rid of the official policies and the seasoned per-
sonnel and in place thereof substituting policies and 
7 . k Open1ng remar s, Consul General Tanaka Mitsuo, 1n 
ceremonies held on June 2, 1960, Dooman papers. 
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practices favored by and to be presided over by themselves." 
Hornbeck wrote to Dooman asking if he would substantiate 
the defense that Hornbeck had made. Dooman replied supporting 
his former associate's position but with qualifications. He 
pointed out that if by "in-fighting" Hornbeck meant that of 
the "conspiracy . . back stabbing . ." sort, there had 
been a minimum. "Of course there was," Dooman recalled, 
"discord and conflict of views and opinions. .," adding 
that he and Hornbeck had "disagreed violently. . over 
actions and attitudes with respect to Japan," but had not 
undone any professional regards that existed. Dooman noted 
two "back stabbing" incidents that affected first Hornbeck, 
and then Dooman and Ballantine. Although he could not 
remember the "'discord and conflict,'" Hornbeck concurred 
with Dooman's observation regarding the personal attacks. 8 
What does Eugene H. Dooman's life and career tell 
us about experts and the role of the Foreign Service Officer 
in Japanese-American relations during the period of his 
service? Dooman might be characterized as unsuccessful 
because he did not receive an ambassadorial appointment. 
In addition, his staunch pro-Japanese attitude negated, 
8
Hornbeck to Dooman, 3/9/1964 with memorandum attached; 
Dooman to Hornbeck, 3/13/1964 and Hornbeck to Dooman, 3/24/ 
1964; Box 150; Hornbeck papers. 
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according to some, his ability to function effectively as 
an official of the United States' government. But such 
an observation would be too limited and personal in scope. 
Despite hisfuilure to attain the highest diplomatic post, 
Dooman had risen in rank to Foreign Service Officer Class I, 
having overcome the "penalty" of serving in the Consular 
corps prior to the Rogers Act in 1924. He had been fortunate 
to serve under an outstanding diplomat in the person of Grew, 
but that also had been his undoing. There seems little doubt 
that of the two men Grew was the more polished diplomat, but 
Dooman was, as some believed, "a far abler man" than his 
chief. Had Grew not needed Dooman's expertise, perhaps the 
latter would have received the ambassadorial appointment 
that eluded him in the pre-war and war period. 9 
As a diplomat and as a Japan expert Dooman realized 
his mvn limitations. Some fifty years after his appointment 
as a student interpreter, Dooman paraphrased Townsmd Harris 
who stated that the primary duty of a diplomat was to place 
the interests of the nation to which he was sent second only 
to the .interests of his own country. This diplomatic "first 
conunandment," as Dooman referred to it, created part of the 
expert's problems because the Foreign Service Officer in the 
field generally adhered to it, while those who were responsible 
9r~ F. Stone, "Pearl Harbor Diplomats," p. 26. 
Stone described Dooman as "a far abler man" than Grew. 
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for defining foreign policy gave more consideration to 
"promoting and safeguarding the rights and interests of 
the United States." Consequently Dooman deduced, those 
at horne did not attach "to political force and movements 
in another country -- whether they be compatible or incom-
patible with American policy -- the same significance and 
weight that do their representatives on the spot." Thus 
there existed a natural tendency towards "some conflict of 
opinion between . . . the representative in the field . 
and his superiors at horne. 1110 
Dooman was generous in allowing "those at home 11 
some consideration. Between 1924 and 1945 expert advice 
from both himself and others had gone unheeded. When Dooman 
and Grew sought talks aimed at settling the disturbed 
relations between Japan and the United States ~n 1939, 1940, 
and 1941, nothing happened. When the problem of deciding 
whether or not to define the terms of unconditional surrender, 
which Doornan believed could have avoided the nuclear 
holocausts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, again nothing happened. 
It seemed that Acheson's remark was not only accurate in 
reference to himself, but that it could also be applied to 
a multitude of high echelon government officials throughout 
the period. American officials were ambivalent about expert 
advice regarding East Asian peoples and cultures. 
10oooman, undated, handwritten paper which he had pre-
pared as an appendix to the paper submitted to the Columbia 
Oral History Project. 
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In 1962,some seventeen years after his retirement, 
and a half a century after he first went to Japan as a 
member of the Foreign Service, Dooman's efforts paid dividends 
at a personal level. At an imperial tea party, Emperor 
Hirohito took the unusual step of taking Dooman aside from 
the reception line and offered the American his heartfelt 
thanks for Dooman's work on behalf of the Emperor and the 
Japanese people. Dooman was happy, despite the shortcomings 
of his efforts. He took solace in the personal thanks that 
he received and in his own knowledge that he had been at 
least partially successful in his quest for better Japanese-
American relations. He died-seven years later. 11 
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